David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If grandmother asks for recalling the main difference between Plato and
Aristotle's theories of matter, I would just say that in Plato, the
visible (observable, measurable) realm is taken as appearances or
shadows related to a deeper unknown
Nick: the practical - philosopher.
I refer to my 'misunderstood' expression to Bruno:
NAME Calling
(which was a pun, meaning we call names and assign
meaning to it - in our OWN mindset, then fight for
THIS meaning against another person's meaning called
by the same NAME) - Bruno misunderstood
Hi,
Roadmap:
There are two things I can hardly separate: UDA, that is the Universal
Dovetailer Argument, which is an argument showing that if you take
seriously enough the hypothesis that we are digitalizable machine then
it follows that *necessarily* the physical laws, among more things
Dear Norman,
Thanks. I think this could help. I would not attribute atomism to Plato (except through Pythagorism and the platonic notion of substance), and my Plato is mainly the one from the Theaetetus and Parmenides.
Recall me this when I will succeed to explain the arithmetical hypostases (the
I will probably probably resend the last post, it seems some words are
lacking. Sorry. I will take the opportunity to make this one clearer
before the one on the hypostases.
Good week-end,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
Why shouldn't they denote that ? And what has that to do with
substances ?
The inside/outside distinction can be asserted is a single-substance
universe. The inside/outside distinction is enough to found the 1st/3rd
person divide, what
do you need a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Dear Norman,
Thanks. I think this could help. I would not attribute atomism to
Plato (except through Pythagorism and the platonic notion of
substance), and my Plato is mainly the one from the Theaetetus and
Parmenides.
Recall me this when I will succeed to explain the
1Z wrote:
That is, there is no plurality of substances with essential
characteristics.
Just one bare subtrate.
Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
dispense with matter and just have
I think this is wrongheaded. You doubt that you really assume things are
how they appear to me - the Earth appears flat, wood appears solid, and
electrons don't appear at all. What one does is build, or learn, a model
that fits the world and comports with how they appear. I see no reason
Colin,
Thanks for expressing my ideas so eloquently.
However... (of course!)
I may interspace some remarks (as usual) on details. (I am more lenient on
the oldies (do rely on them less) because our epistemic enrichment could
work only on the 'timely' level of comprehension (buildability-up on the
1Z wrote:
1) the don't seem to have, and they *are* what they seem
2) they are incommunicable in mathematical, and hence
sructrural terms.
1) Well, this obviously depends on the subject of the seeming. To me,
'red', 'middle C', or 'bitter' all *do* seem to possess a sort of
directly sensed
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
1) the don't seem to have, and they *are* what they seem
2) they are incommunicable in mathematical, and hence
sructrural terms.
1) Well, this obviously depends on the subject of the seeming. To me,
'red', 'middle C', or 'bitter' all *do* seem to possess
1Z wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
...
Well, if 'experience' is the fact of *being* differentiable existence,
and 'the physical' is the observable relations thereof, then both
ultimately 'supervene' on there being something rather than nothing.
No. There being something rather than nothing is
David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Yes, and I despair (almost) of remedying this, even if I knew how. My
own attempts at linguistic 'clarity' seemed destined only to muddy the
waters further, especially as I'm really trying to translate from
personal modes that are often more visual/ kinaesthetic
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