Re: SV: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Lennart Nilsson wrote: ... But my point is that this may come down to what we would mean by a computer being conscious. Bruno has an answer in terms of what the computer can prove. Jaynes (and probably John McCarthy) would say a computer is conscious if it creates a narrative of its

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that it is the case if computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used the self-evident absurdity of the idea as an argument demonstrating that

RE : computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Bruno Marchal
Brent Meeker wrote (through many posts): I won't insist, because you might be right, but I don't think that is proven. It may be that interaction with the environment is essential to continued consciousness. Assuming comp, I think that this is a red herring. To make this clear I

Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)

2006-09-11 Thread Tom Caylor
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: - Original Message - From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 3:23 PM Subject: Re: ROADMAP (SHORT) You wrote: What is the non-mathematical part of UDA? The part that uses

Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)

2006-09-11 Thread jamikes
Tom, thanks, you said it as I will try to spell it out interjected in your reply. John - Original Message - From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 12:21 PM Subject: Re: ROADMAP (SHORT) [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)

2006-09-11 Thread Tom Caylor
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Tom, thanks, you said it as I will try to spell it out interjected in your reply. John - Original Message - From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 12:21 PM Subject: Re:

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious-computation; since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're thinking, since there a practical infinity of maps (even a countable infinity if you allow one-many) there is

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of computationalism have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any conscious computation as

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Colin Hales
-Original Message- Stathis Papaioannou Brent Meeker writes: Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious- computation; since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're thinking, since there a practical infinity of maps (even a

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious-computation; since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're thinking, since there a practical infinity of maps (even a countable infinity if you

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of computationalism have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any conscious

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent meeker writes: I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly withdraw it's hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the robot with feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it would be conscious.

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Colin Hales
Stathis Papaioannou snip Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically possible to explain what consciousness *is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a blind man: he might be the world's greatest scientific expert on it but still have

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly withdraw it's hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the robot with feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Colin Hales wrote: Stathis Papaioannou snip Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically possible to explain what consciousness *is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a blind man: he might be the world's greatest scientific expert on it