Brent Meeker writes:

> > I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a 
> > conscious 
> > computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of 
> > computationalism 
> > have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any 
> > conscious 
> > computation as evidence that there is something special and 
> > non-computational 
> > about the brain. Maybe they're right.
> > 
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> Why not reject the idea that any computation implements every possible 
> computation 
> (which seems absurd to me)?  Then allow that only computations with some 
> special 
> structure are conscious.

It's possible, but once you start in that direction you can say that only 
implemented on this machine rather than that machine can be conscious. You need 
hardware in order to specify structure, unless you can think of a God-given 
language against which candidate computations can be measured.

Stathis Papaioannou
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