SV: Neuroquantology
If it had not been first of april that is... _ Från: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Michael Rosefield Skickat: den 1 april 2008 21:30 Till: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ämne: Re: Neuroquantology http://www.boingboing.net/2008/04/01/poltergeists-and-qua.html I think that answers that question On 28/03/2008, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I just had a cold call from an editor of a fairly new journal called NeuroQuantology (http://www.neuroquantology.com/), which has its focus area on the intersection of cognitive science and quantum physics. The nature of this topic, of cause, gives rise to no end of kookiness, but this doesn't mean there isn't a serious subject here waiting to be explored (indeed this is a major theme of my book Theory of Nothing). I was wondering if anyone has had experience of this journal, and whether its publishing standards are as rigorous as they claim. They claim to be indexed by ISI (they're not in the 2006 JCR, but since they only claimed to have just received ISI indexing, that is not suprising). Some of the paper titles look intriguing, but you have to register in order to download abstracts, so I haven't done that yet. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
Gear Günther, Le 31-mars-08, à 19:01, Günther Greindl a écrit : Dear Bruno, The things I am unclear about are: 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state - what are these? We assume comp ok? So for example, my current relative mind state can be associated with a computational state. By Church thesis, this state is accessed an infinity of times by the Universal Dovetailer through an infinity of infinite computations. OK? A complete computational history is just such an infinite computation. Sometimes I use the word history to refer to the internal view of some machine whose current state has been accessed by the UD. In that case some similarity equivalence class is in play. To get the math of those similarity classes I proceed in interviewing such machines. Ah OK, I understand. The equivalence class found in the interview - do you have results already? Yes. The comp intelligible matter hypostases give the modal logic corresponding to quantum logic, except that I loose the necessitation rule. The significance of this remains to be seen of course. 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way - no contradiction; or differently?)- Just no contradiction. Now a computation is not per se a theory, so the notion of contradiction is not directly applicable. That is why I identify a computation with a proof of a Sigma_1 sentence of (elementary, Robinsonian) arithmetic. Of course this leads to the white rabbit issue, a lot of statement are relatively consistent and false at the same time, like the self-inconsistency statement (by Godel's second theorem the proposition I am inconsistent is consistent (when asserted by a Robinsonian machine or a Lobian machine). I recall that a Robinsonian machine is a machine having Turing Universal abilities, but without the introspective power to acknowledge that. On the contrary Lobian machine are universal and know that they are universal. Ok, this is also clearer now. What my problem is that these restrictions seem somewhat arbitrary to me (only sigma_1 sentences etc) OK. This is part of what I intended to explain to David, Barry, Mirek and some others. In a nutshell, the restriction to the sigma_1 sentences *is* the translation of the comp hyp in the language of a Lobian machine. Why? Because you can characterize a Turing Universal Prover Machine by the fact that she can prove all true Sigma_1 sentences. So Turing Universality can be defined by the modal formula p - []p, for p sigma_1. A lobian machine is not only universal, but knows that she is universal, i.e. she can prove all the formula p - []p for p Sigma_1. Adding the axiom p - []p to the logic G, gives the self-reference logic of the computationalist lobian machine. The Universal Dovetailer is equivalent to the set of true sigma_1 sentences together with their many proofs. This is explained at the end of most of my papers, but needs some amount of knowledge of recursion theory. It seems very much like picking out some well-behaved classes of mathematical objects so that one get's nice resultes, compatible with observable universe. Not at all. Everything comes from the mathematical description of what is a Universal dovetailer (and motivated by UDA which is itself based on the first person indeterminacy, and its invariance for some transformation). But why should the Plenitude restrict itself to such theories? Necessity follows from the informal UDA, and then the precise math is given by the formal (arithmetical) UDA. Remember that we postulate comp at the start. (After, the results go trough with very strong weakening of the comp hyp). Or is your view just that the others do not give rise to observers? The others give rise to observer, but use principle which I think should be justified. Thanks for the references out of line. I will read those papers once I have the time. At first sight it looks like the cosmologists begin to be aware of a (third person) white rabbit problem. It will still take time before they realize the first person white rabbit problem. The reason is that they have no formation on the mind-body problem I think. The 3rd person white rabbit would be the many universes; Hmmm... I would say that 3rd person white rabbit appear when there are too much universes with aberrant histories. Too much universes with too much talking white rabbits having clocks in their hands and saying too late, too late ...? but I think they are also aware of first person white rabbit, as they discuss the Boltzmann brain quite literally as a brain in some papers - which just oozes away after some time or immediately after cogito ergo sum. I don't understand. (In general the first person is forgotten or assimilated to third person constructs like brain through some identity thesis, this cannot
Re: Neuroquantology
There was that... but the submission date was a while back. It's funny either way On 02/04/2008, Lennart Nilsson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If it had not been first of april that is… -- *Från:* [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] *För *Michael Rosefield *Skickat:* den 1 april 2008 21:30 *Till:* [EMAIL PROTECTED] *Ämne:* Re: Neuroquantology http://www.boingboing.net/2008/04/01/poltergeists-and-qua.html I think that answers that question On 28/03/2008, *Russell Standish* [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I just had a cold call from an editor of a fairly new journal called NeuroQuantology (http://www.neuroquantology.com/), which has its focus area on the intersection of cognitive science and quantum physics. The nature of this topic, of cause, gives rise to no end of kookiness, but this doesn't mean there isn't a serious subject here waiting to be explored (indeed this is a major theme of my book Theory of Nothing). I was wondering if anyone has had experience of this journal, and whether its publishing standards are as rigorous as they claim. They claim to be indexed by ISI (they're not in the 2006 JCR, but since they only claimed to have just received ISI indexing, that is not suprising). Some of the paper titles look intriguing, but you have to register in order to download abstracts, so I haven't done that yet. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --- - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~--- -- They couldn't hit an elephant at this dist- Last words of Gen. John Sedgwick, spoken as he looked out over the parapet at enemy lines during the Battle of Spotsylvania in 1864. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
Dear Bruno, Yes. The comp intelligible matter hypostases give the modal logic corresponding to quantum logic, except that I loose the necessitation rule. The significance of this remains to be seen of course. Ok I get it. I will reread your papers :-) (too much new stuff in one reading) In a nutshell, the restriction to the sigma_1 sentences *is* the translation of the comp hyp in the language of a Lobian machine. Why? Because you can characterize a Turing Universal Prover Machine by the fact that she can prove all true Sigma_1 sentences. So Turing Universality can be defined by the modal formula p - []p, for p sigma_1. A lobian machine is not only universal, but knows that she is universal, i.e. she can prove all the formula p - []p for p Sigma_1. Adding the axiom p - []p to the logic G, gives the self-reference logic of the computationalist lobian machine. The Universal Dovetailer is equivalent to the set of true sigma_1 sentences together with their many proofs. This is explained at the end of most of my papers, but needs some amount of knowledge of recursion theory. Ah OK; I am going to do some recursion theory this semester. (the Rogers book :-) Could you recommend something on modal logic? Hmmm... I would say that 3rd person white rabbit appear when there are too much universes with aberrant histories. Too much universes with too much talking white rabbits having clocks in their hands and saying too late, too late ...? Yes that is what I meant. but I think they are also aware of first person white rabbit, as they discuss the Boltzmann brain quite literally as a brain in some papers - which just oozes away after some time or immediately after cogito ergo sum. I don't understand. (In general the first person is forgotten or assimilated to third person constructs like brain through some identity thesis, this cannot work by the Movie Graph argument or by Maudlin's Olympia: we have discuss this). Now I don't understand; I am aware of Maudlin's Olympia, though not of your movie graph argument. How do you mean the first person is forgotten? Best, Günther -- Günther Greindl Department of Philosophy of Science University of Vienna [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/ Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/ Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Bostrom Paper
Dear List, I searched through the archive, this paper does not seem to have been discussed. Quantity of Experience: Brain-Duplication and Degrees of Consciousness If two brains are in identical states, are there two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? Two, I argue. But what happens in intermediary cases? This paper looks in detail at this question and suggests that there can be a fractional (non-integer) number of qualitatively identical experiences. This has implications for what it is to implement a computation and for Chalmer's Fading Qualia thought experiment. [Minds and Machines, 2006, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 185-200] http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/experience.pdf It raises some issues the UDA is concerned with. What do you think of it? Best Regards, Günther -- Günther Greindl Department of Philosophy of Science University of Vienna [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/ Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/ Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Observer Moment or Observer Space?
On Tue, Apr 01, 2008 at 09:34:29PM -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote: Hi Russell: You wrote: What does it mean to have a material aspect? I see my model as requiring a time like aspect induced by the evolution triggering endurance meaningful question. Selecting out space like aspects would inject net information into the Everything - the out selection - so given a time dimension space dimensions seem unavoidable. I'm not sure this follows. A single bit process can exist in zero dimensional space. However, perhaps single bit processes are too uninteresting. I have constructed models in which matter is itself just a distortion of [a discrete point] space time. If applicable, these types of matter models would make matter a direct consequence of the space and time aspects. I suspect that something like this will explain matter eventually, so good luck with your theorizing. I'm personally intrigued by the Helon model, but don't really have the smarts to do anything with it. I take this as indicating that you hold that something [information processing?] is going on during an observer moment. This is as in your book as I understand it so far. I do not see this in my model. In my model an observer moment is a fixed state terminated by a transition to the next state. The selection of a next state is in part determined by the incompleteness of the current state which is solely a product of its history and the random sub set of the incompleteness that gets resolved by the state to state transition. Consciousness is inherent in the process of the transition wherein both states momentarily overlap [for lack of a better term], as some incompleteness is resolved [information added] and fresh incompleteness is generated by that resolution. Why don't you see this transition as a form of information processing? The transistions may be rather accidental in your model, but this is from a bird view perspective. From the frog perspective, the transitions must appear to be information processing. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Observer Moment or Observer Space?
Hi Russell: [My current mail client does not work the way I like and I can not spend the time to insert s in the right places so this indicator of who said what will be missing from my posts for awhile, I will use an xxx separator for my responses.] Selecting out space like aspects would inject net information into the Everything - the out selection - so given a time dimension space dimensions seem unavoidable. I'm not sure this follows. A single bit process can exist in zero dimensional space. However, perhaps single bit processes are too uninteresting. xx I have found the no selection tool rather useful, so I will stick with it in this case for the time being. xxx I have constructed models in which matter is itself just a distortion of [a discrete point] space time. If applicable, these types of matter models would make matter a direct consequence of the space and time aspects. I suspect that something like this will explain matter eventually, so good luck with your theorizing. I'm personally intrigued by the Helon model, but don't really have the smarts to do anything with it. xxx I will look at this and dust off my old stuff, which I have not looked at for several years. x Why don't you see this transition as a form of information processing? The transistions may be rather accidental in your model, but this is from a bird view perspective. From the frog perspective, the transitions must appear to be information processing. I will accept that for now. Importantly it seem to move the two points of view closer together Hal Ruhl --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
