Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal >>> > The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it cou

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote: > >> Hi, >> >>> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. >>> Here >>> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me >>> conceive that indeed there is only one person playin

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote: > > Hi, > >> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. >> Here >> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me >> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to >> itself. >> Li

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal >> > >>> >>> >>> >>>The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you >>> even in >>>

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me. I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal memories. By loosing memory "I" would be wounde

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi, > Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here > I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me > conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. > Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that uni

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi, 2009/2/26 Bruno Marchal > > On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal > >> >> >> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in >> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got >> new memories, including f

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> >> >> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> >> >> >> >> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in >> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he g

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

On 21 Feb 2009, at 07:35, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Stephen Paul King wrote: >> Hi Stathis, >> >>A question : Is is incorrect of me to infer that the psychological >> criterion of personal identity discussed in Shoemaker's book and, >> by your >> statement below, used by a predominance of me

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

On 22 Feb 2009, at 23:34, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/2/23 John Mikes : >> Stathis, >> >> I usually appreciate the wisdom in your posts. Now I have a retort: >> >>> "...What I find incoherent is the idea >> that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but >> neverthel

Re: random thoughts

On 23 Feb 2009, at 16:40, ronaldheld wrote: > > Perhaps this paper would be of interest: > Deterministic multivalued logic scheme for information processing and > routing in the brain(arxiv.org/abs/0902.2033)? > Speaking of logic, even though I am not starting from zero,and given > that it is not

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal > > > The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in > the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got > new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/26 Brent Meeker : > If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream > of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2.  Supposedly > it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that > case why couldn't B3 also include some memory of