Re: advice needed for Star Trek talk

2010-12-19 Thread ronaldheld
Jason
 I would think normally the implant should work as well. Being
Bajorean, could the missing essence be the influence of the Prophets?
 Data and the EMH should be able to pass the Turing test.
 Maybe I am missing something. A matter human in a matter universe
should function the same as an antimatter human in an antimatter
universe, AFAIK
 Ronald

On Dec 18, 12:57 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 Ronald,

 I remember that episode.  I thought it was quite a departure from the
 atheistic slant that was usual to star trek.
 ( For those not familiar with the 
 scene:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihdI8U9eS4c#t=2m30s)

 They seemed to suggest in the episode that the operation failed not because
 of a defect in the artificial brain but because there was something more to
 the mind that the machine didn't capture, some soul or some essence that
 couldn't be copied.  This is contrary to the frequent use of transporters
 throughout the series, unless you accept something like biological
 naturalism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism), the idea
 that only biochemistry has the right stuff or can do the right things to
 create consciousness.  I don't think the writers of that episode were well
 versed in philosophy of mind, so I wouldn't put too much stock in the ideas
 they promote.  For that episode to make sense you either have to accept
 dualism or biological naturalism (which is almost like a form of dualism).

 Do you think that Commander Data, whose entire brain is positronic, lacks
 consciousness?  I like the argument Picard gave for Data's 
 sentience:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWNPeNEvMN4

 You mentioned that you had no problem with the idea of a person made from
 anti-matter particles.  What if scientists invented tiny machines that were
 not atoms but operated all the same, would you accept that you could build a
 person using these?  Taking the idea slightly further, lets say these little
 faux-atoms were expensive, so scientists decided to model the machines in a
 computer rather than make them.  Simulating a small number of them together
 they could predict how  nano-machines behaved.  If the scientists modeled a
 much larger collection of these atoms, organized in the same way as in a
 person, do you think any of the complexity is lost?

 Jason



 On Sat, Dec 18, 2010 at 8:05 AM, ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com wrote:
  Bruno and Jason
    The complexity issue concerns me, perhaps because of the Deep space
  9 episode:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
  Life_Support_(Star_Trek:_Deep_Space_Nine)
                                                              Ronald

  On Dec 16, 11:39 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
   On Wed, Dec 15, 2010 at 7:57 AM, ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com
  wrote:
Jason:
  I do not think a neutron take more trhan a finite amount of voltage
to be able to fire. I do wonder if merely replacing the bio parts by
processing hardware, do you lose the part of the complexity of the
mind? Np problem with an antimatter man and mind.

   If the mechanical replacements have the same repertoire and behavior as
  the
   biological parts I don't see how the complexity would be lessened.  Many
   people feel lessened to be thought of as a machine, but they probably
  don't
   fully appreciate just how complex of a machine the brain is.  It has 100
   billion neurons (about 1 for each stars in this galaxy) and close to 1
   quintillion connections or 1,000,000,000,000,000 (about 1 connection for
   every cent of US debt).  People aren't familiar with man-made machines
   anywhere near this level of complexity and so it is understandable that
  one
   could doubt a machine acting like a human. However, I think this is
  mainly a
   prejudice instilled by the types of (comparatively simple) machines we
  deal
   with on a daily basis.

   Jason

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Re: advice needed for Star Trek talk

2010-12-19 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, Dec 15, 2010 at 4:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



 But then a digital machine cannot see the difference between its brain
 emulated by a physical device, of by the true existence of the proof of the
 Sigma_1 relation which exists independently of us in arithmetic. Some will
 argue that a physical universe is needed, but either they add a magic, non
 comp-emulable, relation between mind and matter, or if that relation is
 emulable, they just pick up a special universal number (the physical
 universe) or introduce an ad hoc physical supervenience thesis.


I think multiple realizability applies to mathematical objects as well.
 Arithmetic may be simple enough to support minds and explain what we see,
but should we discount the possibility that more complex mathematical
objects exist, or that they are valid substrates for consciousness?  I think
a computer existing in a mathematical universe performing computations is
ultimately still representing mathematical relations.  If this is true, does
it makes the UDA less testable or formally definable?




 I agree. But the consequence seems to be a big leap for many. Seems
 because the results are more ignored than criticized.
 The problem (for many) is that mechanism is used by materialists, but in
 fine mechanism is not compatible with materialism. Mechanism makes matter an
 emerging pattern from the elementary arithmetical truth seen from inside.
 That makes mechanism a testable hypothesis, and that can already explain
 many qualitative features of the observable worlds, like indeterminacy,
 non-locality, non-clonability of matter, and some more quantitative quantum
 tautologies.


I thought non-locality is solved with Everett's interpretation, or do you
mean the appearance of non-locality?  Also, I am curious how mechanism
accounts for the non-clonability of matter.



 A key idea not well understood is the difference between proof/belief and
 computation/emulation. I will send a post on this.


I look forward to this post.

 No. The running of a program does NOT create a mind. It just makes it
possible for a mind to manifest itself relatively to you.
 The mind is already related to the platonic relations between the numbers
which exist in an infinity of exemplars in Platonia.

If a single program does not create a mind, how does an infinite number of
programs in the UDA create one?  Perhaps I am unclear what you mean by mind.

Thanks,

Jason

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Re: advice needed for Star Trek talk

2010-12-19 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Dec 19, 2010 at 09:15:20PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
  No. The running of a program does NOT create a mind. It just makes it
 possible for a mind to manifest itself relatively to you.
  The mind is already related to the platonic relations between the numbers
 which exist in an infinity of exemplars in Platonia.
 
 If a single program does not create a mind, how does an infinite number of
 programs in the UDA create one?  Perhaps I am unclear what you mean by mind.
 
 Thanks,
 
 Jason

I think what he means is because all possible programs already exist
in a running state, all possible minds must also exist. Running a
program therefore cannot instantiate a mind, as all possible minds
already exist. All it can do is allow you (the program instantiator)
to interact with that mind.

Cheers
-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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