On Wed, Dec 15, 2010 at 4:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> But then a digital machine cannot see the difference between its brain
> emulated by a physical device, of by the true existence of the proof of the
> Sigma_1 relation which exists independently of us in arithmetic. Some will
> argue that a physical universe is needed, but either they add a magic, non
> comp-emulable, relation between mind and matter, or if that relation is
> emulable, they just pick up a special universal number (the physical
> universe) or introduce an ad hoc physical supervenience thesis.
I think multiple realizability applies to mathematical objects as well.
 Arithmetic may be simple enough to support minds and explain what we see,
but should we discount the possibility that more complex mathematical
objects exist, or that they are valid substrates for consciousness?  I think
a computer existing in a mathematical universe performing computations is
ultimately still representing mathematical relations.  If this is true, does
it makes the UDA less testable or formally definable?

> I agree. But the consequence seems to be a big leap for many. "Seems"
> because the results are more ignored than criticized.
> The problem (for many) is that mechanism is used by materialists, but in
> fine mechanism is not compatible with materialism. Mechanism makes matter an
> emerging pattern from the elementary arithmetical truth seen from inside.
> That makes mechanism a testable hypothesis, and that can already explain
> many qualitative features of the observable worlds, like indeterminacy,
> non-locality, non-clonability of matter, and some more quantitative quantum
> tautologies.

I thought non-locality is solved with Everett's interpretation, or do you
mean the appearance of non-locality?  Also, I am curious how mechanism
accounts for the non-clonability of matter.

> A key idea not well understood is the difference between proof/belief and
> computation/emulation. I will send a post on this.

I look forward to this post.

> No. The running of a program does NOT create a mind. It just makes it
possible for a mind to manifest itself relatively to you.
> The mind is already related to the platonic relations between the numbers
which exist in an infinity of exemplars in Platonia.

If a single program does not create a mind, how does an infinite number of
programs in the UDA create one?  Perhaps I am unclear what you mean by mind.



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