DVD alloys help make computers that think like us
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21128205.200-dvd-alloys-help-make-computers-that-think-like-us.html A brain-like computer is one that can learn and adapt without external programming. Such an ability would allow machines to become far better at tasks like face and speech recognition. They could also process and store data in the same location - just as nerve cells do. Conventional computing loses efficiency by keeping these functions separate. In the UK, David Wright and colleagues at the University of Exeter have created a GST neuron (Advanced Materials, DOI: 10.1002/adma.201101060), while at Stanford University in California, Philip Wong's group have created a nanoscale electronic synapse. The junction even mimics the way synapses can change their connection strength (Nano Letters, DOI: 10.1021/nl201040y). Well, they do say if the GST allay will generate qualia as well. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 14 Jul 2011, at 14:39, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't want to talk about inner experience. I want to talk about my fundamental reordering of the cosmos, which if it were correct, would be staggeringly important and I have not seen anywhere else: Mind and body are not merely separate, but perpendicular topologies of the same ontological continuum of sense. Could you define perpendicular topologies? You say you don't study math, so why use mathematical terms (which seems non sensical for a mathematicians, unless you do a notion of set of topologies with some scalar products, but then you should give it. The interior of electromagnetism is sensorimotive, the interior of determinism is free will, and the interior of general relativity is perception. What do you mean by interior of electromagnetism. Quantum Mechanics is a misinterpretation of atomic quorum sensing. This seems like non sense. Time, space, and gravity are void. Their effects are explained by perceptual relativity and sensorimotor electromagnetism. ? The speed of light c is not a speed it's a condition of nonlocality or absolute velocity, representing a third state of physical relation as the opposite of both stillness and motion. ? It's not about meticulous logical deduction, it's about grasping the largest, broadest description of the cosmos possible which doesn't leave anything out. I just want to see if this map flies, and if not, why not? Anyway, you seem to presuppose some physicalness, and so by the UDA reasoning, you need a physics and a cognitive science with (very special) infinities. This seems to make the mind body problem (MB), and its formulation, artificially more complex, without motivation. Without an attempt to make things clearer I can hardly add anything. Perhaps understanding the MB problem in the comp context might help you to formulate it in some non-comp context. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's blasphemy.
On 15 Jul 2011, at 00:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will needs the global structure of all computations. If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown physics. I don't consider it an unknown physics, just a physics that doesn't disqualify 1p phenomena. So either you naturalize the quale, which can't work (it is a base on a category error), or you introduce an identity thesis, which is ad hoc, and logically incompatible with the comp. assumption. I don't get why yellow is any less stable than a number. Yellow, or any qualia. This is a consequence of the UDA. Are you willing to imagine that comp *might* be true for studying its consequence? Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think. And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything physical. I get what you're saying, but you could put a drug in your brain that affects your thinking, and your thinking can be affected by chemistry in your brain that you cannot control with your thoughts. In my sensorimotive electromagnetism schema, everything physical has an experiential aspect and vice versa. That's a form of pantheism, which does not explain what is matter, nor mind. Bruno: It is more an information pattern which can emulate all computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in the physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at least Turing universal. CW: It sounds like what you're suggesting is that numbers exist independently of physical matter, whereas I would say that numbers insist through the experiences within physical matter. I find natural to suppose that 17 is prime independently of universes and human beings. I need it if only to grasp actual theories of matter which presuppose them logically. I don't need to know what numbers are. I need only some agreement on some axioms, like for all natural numbers x we have that s(x) is different from 0, etc. Then I can explain the appearances of matter and mind from the relations inherited by only addition and multiplication. It is amazing (for non logician) but if comp is true, we don't need more than elementary arithmetic. We don't need to postulate a physical universe, nor consciousness. The point is that the universe is not made of anything. Neither physical primitive stuff, nor mathematical stuff. You have to study the argument to make sense of this. So you have to accept the comp hypothesis at least for the sake of the argument. Hmm. If the universe isn't made of anything than your point isn't made of anything either. I don't get it. The game of bridge is not made of quarks and electron. No mathematical object is made of something. My point is a reasoning, you have to cjeck his validity. It is non sense to assume a logical point has to be made of something. You are confusing software and hardware (and with comp, the difference is relative, and eventually hardware does not exist: it is in the head of the universal machines: that is enough to derive physics (which becomes a first person plural measure on possible computational histories). Also, we are not made of math. math is not a stuffy thing. It is just a collection of true fact about immaterial beings. Have you read any numerology? Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that math is about immaterial relation between non material beings. Could you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 by using a physics which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers. Relatively to universal number, number do many things. we know now that their doing escape any complete theories. We know now why numbers have unbounded behavior complexity. It seems to me that you can already intuit this when looking at the Mandelbrot set, where a very simple mathematical operation defines a montruously complex object. The complexity is in the eye of the perceiver. Your human visual sense is what unites the Mandelbrot set into a fractal pattern. There is no independent 'pattern' there unless what you are made of can relate to it as a coherent whole rather than a million unrelated pixels as your video card sees it, or maybe as a nondescript moving blur as a gopher might see it. OK, but I don't take human as primitive. I explain human by (special) universal machine (a purely mathematical notion whose existence is a consequence of addition and multiplication). That explain matter, too. Indeed, that makes physics completely derivable (not derived!) from arithmetic. So we can test the comp. hyp. by comparing the comp physics, and empiric data. I cannot be satisfied with this, because it put what I want to explain (mind and matter) in the starting
Re: bruno list
Could you define perpendicular topologies? You say you don't study math, so why use mathematical terms (which seems non sensical for a mathematicians, unless you do a notion of set of topologies with some scalar products, but then you should give it. Yeah, I'm not sure if I mean it literally or figuratively. Maybe better to say a pseudo-dualistic, involuted topological continuum? Stephen was filling me in on some of the terminology. I'm looking at a continuum of processes which range from discrete, [dense, public, exterior, generic, a-signifying, literal...at the extreme would be local existential stasis, fixed values, occidentialism (Only Material Matter Matters)] to the compact [diffuse, private, interior, proprietary, signifying, figurative...at the extreme would be non local essential exstasis, orientalism (Anything Can Mean Everything)]. They are perpendicular because it's not as if there is a one to one correspondence between each neuron and a single feeling, feelings are chords of entangled sensorimotive events which extend well beyond the nervous system. Since the duality is polarized in every possible way, I want to make it clear that to us, they appear perfectly opposite in their nature, so I say perpendicular. Topology because it's a continuum with an XY axis (Y being quantitative magnitude of literal scale on the occidental side; size/scale, density, distance, and qualitative magnitude on the oriental side; greatness/significance, intensity, self-referentiality...these aren't an exhaustive list, I'm just throwing out adjectives.). I'm not averse to studying the concepts of mathematics, I'm just limited in how I can make sense of them and how much I want to use them. I'm after more of an F=ma nugget of simplicity than a fully explicated field equation. I want the most elementary possible conception of what the cosmos seems to be. What do you mean by interior of electromagnetism. The subjective correlate of all phenomena which we consider electromagnetic. It could be more of an ontological interiority - throughput.. I'm saying that energy is a flow of experiences contained by the void of energy - and energy, all energy is change or difference in what is sensed or intended. Negentropy. If there is no change in what something experiences, there is no time. So it makes sense that what we observe in the brain as being alterable with electromagnetism translates as changes in sensorimotor experience. Quantum Mechanics is a misinterpretation of atomic quorum sensing. This seems like non sense. Didn't mean to be inflammatory there. What I mean to say is that the popular layman's understanding of QM as how the microcosm works - the Standard Model of literal particles in a vacuum with strange behaviors, is inside out. What we are actually detecting is particulate moods of sensorimotive events shared by our measuring equipment (including ourselves) and the thing that we think is being measured. Time, space, and gravity are void. Their effects are explained by perceptual relativity and sensorimotor electromagnetism. ? Time is just the dialectic of change and the cumulative density of it's own change residue carried forward. Space is just the singularity's way of dividing itself existentially. If you have a universe of one object, there is no space. Space is only the relation of objects to each other. No relation, no space. Perceptual relativity is meta-coherence, how multiple levels and scales of sensorimotor electromagnetic patterns are recapitulated (again cumulative entanglement...retention of pattern through iconicized representation). The speed of light c is not a speed it's a condition of nonlocality or absolute velocity, representing a third state of physical relation as the opposite of both stillness and motion. ? Stillness is a state which appears unchanging from the outside, and from the inside the universe is changing infinitely fast. Motion is the state of change relative to other phenomena, the faster you move the more time slows down for you relative to other index phenomena. c is the state of absolute change - being change+non change itself so that it appears non-local from the outside, ubiquitous and absent, and from the inside the cosmos is still. Any better? Craig On Jul 15, 4:39 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Jul 2011, at 14:39, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't want to talk about inner experience. I want to talk about my fundamental reordering of the cosmos, which if it were correct, would be staggeringly important and I have not seen anywhere else: Mind and body are not merely separate, but perpendicular topologies of the same ontological continuum of sense. Could you define perpendicular topologies? You say you don't study math, so why use mathematical terms (which seems non sensical for a mathematicians, unless you do a notion of set of topologies with some scalar products, but then you should give it. The interior of
Re: Bruno's blasphemy.
On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that math is about immaterial relation between non material beings. Could you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 by using a physics which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers. || Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Bruno,
Roughly speaking, my main struggle with your wonderful arguments is
making the leap from the domain of mathematical logic to the one and
only domain we can be sure of as conscious, namely biological human
consciousness, and this without rejecting comp. Unfortunately I am
hindered by my lack of fluency in mathematical logic. See below for
comments.
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Terren
Apology for commenting your post with some delay.
No worries about the delay. I play email chess and have had games over
a year old, so I am used to being patient :-]
snip
To be sure, the
mathematical/logical framework you elucidate that captures aspects of
1st/3rd person distinctions is remarkable, and as far as I know, the
first legitimate attempt to do so. But if we're talking TOE, then an
explanation of consciousness is required.
Right. But note that the notion of fist person experience already involved
consciousness, and that we are assuming comp, which at the start assume that
consciousness makes sense. The explanation per se comes when we have
understand that physics emerge from numbers, and this in the double way
imposed by the logic of self-reference. All logics (well, not all, really)
are splitted into two parts: the provable and the non provable (by the
machine into consideration).
I think the explanation of how physics emerges from the number
theology as you put it is a great contribution and certainly *part*
of an explanation of consciousness, especially in that it reduces the
mind/body problem to computer science, as you say.
But it is not enough to merely deal with the mind/body problem. The
hard problem of how qualia arise needs to be explained. I know you
have identified a logical framework that is capable of distinguishing
qualia and quanta from the point of view of the lobian machine, but
again, that strikes me as a description, not an explanation.
Another way to put it perhaps is that such a logical framework may
well be a *necessary* condition of a machine that can experience
qualia, but not a sufficient one. An example of a hypothesis that
takes this further towards an explanation is that an experiencing
machine needs to be embodied (a closed system) in some context (even
if in platonia) with a boundary that can be perturbed as a result of
that embodiment (i.e. what we think of as a sensory apparatus); and
that the machine synthesize these perturbations within the context of
a recursively updated model of the world, grounded in the patterns
generated by those perturbations, and this model is the content of its
experience. Once the machine develops a model its world sophisticated
enough to include itself, it perhaps achieves Lobianity, although my
grasp of mathematical logic is too limited to say, unfortunately.
This hypothesis is what I happen to believe, but I'm not attempting to
argue for it or defend it here (if I were, I'd include much more
detail!) My point here is only that I think there's an explanatory
gap that is possible to bridge, but that the self-references logics
that give rise to incommunicable beliefs don't bridge that gap
more on this later.
Using the descriptor Bp to signify a machine M's ability to prove p is
fine. But it does not explain how it proves p.
It proves p in the formal sense of the logician. Bp suppose a translation
of all p, of the modal language, in formula of arithmetic. Then Bp is the
translation of beweisbar('p'), that is provable(gödel number of p). If the
machine, for example, is a theorem prover for Peano Arithmetic, provable'
is a purely arithmetical predicate. It is define entirely in term of zero
(0), the successor function (s), and addition + multiplication, to gether
with some part of classical logic. It is not obvious at all this can been
done, but it is well known by logicians, and indeed that is done by Gödel
in his fundamental incompleteness 1931 paper.
When you say if the machine is a theorem prover, are you referring
to a trivial machine? Something you can assign to your students?
If yes, then I struggle to see how we can relate such a machine to the
consciousness we have access to (our own), see below. If no, then I
struggle to see how invoking a 'theorem prover' is not a and then the
magic happens leap of faith.
snip
Löbian machines are mere descriptions, absent
explanations of how a machine could be constructed that would have the
ability to perform those operations.
Those are very simple (for a computer scientist). I give this as exercise to
the most patient of my students.
Then as above, I struggle to see how we can interpret the biological
machines we are familiar with (namely, us) in terms of Löbian logic.
Is human language an adequate substitute for the precise logical
domain of arithmetic and Gödelian numbering of propositions? Natural
language is so messy and imprecise, but I may be missing the point.
Taking the biological as an
Re: Bruno's blasphemy.
nice On Jul 15, 12:41 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that math is about immaterial relation between non material beings. Could you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 by using a physics which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers. || Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
