Re: A profound lack of profundity

[John Clark]

On Tue, Aug 8, 2017 at 3:52 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​> ​
> We obviously agree. The man in Moscow will not believe that "you will see
> Moscow and noting else" would have been correct. He knows already that this
> would be reftuted by the man in Washington, and, as a computationalist, he
> knows than BOTH answer are correct,
>

​Yes.​


​> ​
and so, only the prediction "W v M" was the correct one.

​That does not compute. If ​
 BOTH answer are correct
​ then the Helsinki man will see Moscow AND Washington not ​
Moscow
​OR​
 Washington
​. Come on Bruno, this isn't rocket science.​



> The point is only that the H-man precited to be in one city and not
> knowing one,
>

No Bruno, you just said " BOTH answer are correct" and one answer is "The
Helsinki man will be in Moscow" and the other answer is " he Helsinki man
will be in Washington" and
​if both are true ​
th
​en​
you don't need to be a Kurt Gödel
​to make the logical conclusion that ​
The Helsinki
​with be in BOTH Moscow AND Washington. And I can't see the slightest
difficulty in t
he Helsinki man
​ being in 2 different cities at the same time if he has been duplicated
and is 2 different people at the same time.​
​

> ​>
>>> ​>>​
>>> ​and both vindicates the fact that they were unable to predict it in
>>> advance.
>>
>>
> ​>> ​
>> ​Of course "THEY" couldn't predict it and it's not just predictions that
>> "THEY" can't do, before the duplication "THEY" couldn't do a damn thing
>> because "THEY" didn't exist before the duplication.
>
>
> ​> ​
> Then you just change the identity criterion on which we have agreed since
> long.
>

​Bruno Marchal ​introduced the pronoun "they" not John Clark. And it is ​Bruno
Marchal not John Clark who insists that inability of "they" to make a
prediction before "they" exists tell us something deep about the nature of
reality.


> ​> ​
> Or worst, you are telling me that the H-man is dead, and that
> computationalism is false, making my point.
>

​The H-man is not dead if "the  H-man" means somebody who remembers being a
man in H. If "the H-man" ​

​means something else then the H-man may of may not be dead depending on
​what the hell "the H-man" is supposed to mean. I've already told you what
I mean be "the H-man". What do you mean?

​> ​
> You fail very badly to convince us you do not understand ...
>

​Huh?  I couldn't fail to disagree with you less.​


​>> ​
>> and​ *two* can see *two* cities simultaneously
>> ​ with no difficulty whatsoever.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> That is playing with word.
>

​IT'S THINKING WITH WORDS*!*  Try "playing" with some words ​yourself and
see if you can show that my words are incorrect. I don't think you can.


> ​> ​
> None of each copy can see the two cities at once.
>

​So what?!​ The question wasn't about what one of the 2 copies will see,
the question was was about what the Helsinki man will see. And the Helsinki
man has been duplicated. And "duplicated" means there are 2 where
previously there was one. And 2 things *CAN* be in 2 different places at
the same tine, in fact that's what "2 things" means.

>
> ​> ​
> None of the personal diaries contain "I opened the door and saw W and M at
> once".
> ​ ​
> Obviously.


​Very obviously. So what's the point of those idiot diaries other that to
put additional convolutions in the the thought experiment to cover up
logical flaws?  ​


​​


> ​>> ​
>> I didn't need to interview them to get that information, I already knew
>> it and they would too if they had any brains.​
>
>
> ​> ​
> ?
>

​!​

​> ​
> If you agree in advance they both get one bit of information,
>

​
They got ZERO bits on new information. Both before the duplication and
afterward everybody knew Mr. W would see W and Mr. M would see M. That fact
is true and if it's not also profound
​
that's your fault not mine, it is after all your thought experiment.
​

> ​>>  ​
>> What is incompatible about* two* people having *two* first person
>> experiences? It couldn't be otherwise unless one is a zombie and have no
>> first person experience.
>
>
> ​> ​
> Very good!  Obviously: what is incompatible with this protocol is having
> the two first experience at once.
>

Then ​obviously the "protocol" is imbecilic.

​
>> ​>> ​
>> And we've already correctly made that prediction, Mr. W will see W
>> because seeing W is the only thing that can turn Mr. H into Mr. W, and ​
>> Mr.
>> ​ ​
>> ​M​
>> will see
>> ​M​
>>  because seeing
>> ​M​
>>  is the only thing that can turn Mr.
>> ​ ​
>> H into Mr.
>> ​M.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> That is not a prediction.
>

​It's a prediction, not a very daring prediction I admit but there is
nothing else to predict. ​


> ​> ​
> It is a tautology.
>

​I know, but the great thing about tautologies is they're always true. ​



> ​> ​
> You got the correct "1 bit" above, so why fake already you did not now.
>

​T​
he correct "1 bit" above
​? What are you talking about? Faking about what?​

​>
>> ​>>​

Re: My model, comp, and the Second Law

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Hal,

Welcome back.





Unfortunately I have been very ill for the last 15 months or so.

I am working on this project again and hope to post soon.



Note that when something is not computable, it rarely makes a machine  
stop. It makes it not stopping.


When a machine stop, its non computability is accidental, and the non  
computable function can be extended into a computable function. When a  
function is essentially not computable, it will not stop, without  
anyone being sure of this.


It is related to the difference between undecidability and essential  
undecidability (a notion introduced by Tarski). The first can lead to  
complete-able incomplete theories, like the theory of abelian groups,   
and the second one lead to incomplete-able incomplete theories (like  
elementary arithmetic).


Basically, all theories in which you can define a universal machine,  
like elementary arithmetic, is essentially undecidable, i.e. not  
complete-able. I recommend the little cheap Dover book by Tarski,  
Mostowski and Robinson (Raphael). It shows, at page 62, theorem 11,  
that if you take RA and drop any axiom you get a complete-abe  
incomplete theory, but RA itself is incomplete and incomplete-able  
(essentially undecidable), and indeed Turing-universal.


Best wishes,


Bruno






Hal Ruhl

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com 
] On Behalf Of auxon

Sent: Thursday, February 9, 2017 3:08 PM
To: Everything List 
Subject: Re: My model, comp, and the Second Law

I can't wait to dig into this.

On Friday, January 27, 2017 at 7:02:13 PM UTC-5, hal Ruhl wrote:

Hi Everyone:

Its been a while since I posted.

I would like to start a thread to discuss the Second Law of  
Thermodynamics
and the possibility that its origins can be found in perhaps my  
model, or comp, or their combination.


As references I will start with use are:

"Time's Arrow: The Origin of Thermodynamic Behavior" ,
1992 by Micheal Mackey

"Microscopic Dynamics and the Second Law of Thermodynamics"
2001 by Michael Mackey.

my model as it appears in my posts of March and April of 2014.

My idea comes from the fact that almost all the real numbers fail to  
be computable and this
causes computational termination and/or computational precision  
issues.


This should make the operable phase space grainy.  This ambiguity  
causes
entropy [system configuration uncertainty] to increase or stay the  
same

at each evolutionary [trajectory] step.

The system should also not be reversible for the same reason.

If correct, would [my Model,Comp] be observationally verified?

Hal






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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Aug 2017, at 18:34, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 4:22 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​> ​Nobody expect one answer , but everybody can see that BOTH  
agrees having one obtained one answer,


​Hmm ...does the Moscow man really believe the correct answer to  
the Helsinki man's question "What city will I see?" should have been  
"you will see Moscow and nothing else"; well perhaps he does believe  
that, or perhaps he believes the correct answer would have been "you  
will see lollipop land​"​​, but if he believes either of those  
things then the Moscow man is a fool.​



We obviously agree. The man in Moscow will not believe that "you will  
see Moscow and noting else" would have been correct. He knows already  
that this would be reftuted by the man in Washington, and, as a  
computationalist, he knows than BOTH answer are correct, and so, only  
the prediction "W v M" was the correct one. The point is only that the  
H-man precited to be in one city and not knowing one, and that  
prediction is confirmed by BOTH copies.





​> ​and both vindicates the fact that they were unable to predict  
it in advance.


​Of course "THEY" couldn't predict it and it's not just predictions  
that "THEY" can't do, before the duplication "THEY" couldn't do a  
damn thing because "THEY" didn't exist before the duplication.



Then you just change the identity criterion on which we have agreed  
since long. Or worst, you are telling me that the H-man is dead, and  
that computationalism is false, making my point.




The only one capable of even asking the question "What city will I  
see?" is the Helsinki man.


Of course. But after pushing on the button, only the copies can judge  
if the prediction is verified by both. And the point is that both find  
themselves in one city, with a cup of coffee. The prediction P(coffee)  
= 1 = P(W)+P(M) is verified.




As for the answer, if "I" means a person who remembers asking the  
question (and what else could it mean?) then the answer is obviously  
Moscow and Washington.


No. P(Moscow and Washington) = 0. Trivially. The question is on the 1p- 
I. At no pint will ever any copies feel to be in two place at once.


You fail very badly to convince us you do not understand ...






​>​ we have agreed that Mr. W is Mr H, and Mr. M is Mr H, and the  
point is that we have now​ ​Mr H see W *and* Mr H see M, but none  
can see them simultaneously


​It's true no-one ​can see both cities simultaneously​ but that  
is irrelevant because the Helsinki man is now two,



In the 3p view. Never in the  1p-view. When the H-man has push on the  
button, he can feel to be in only one city, and he knows that in  
advance.




and​ two can see two cities simultaneously​ with no difficulty  
whatsoever.


That is playing with word. None of each copy can see the two cities at  
once.






So how many cities will the Helsinki man see? Two. ​


Easy wordplay based on the voluntarily decision of blurring the 3p/1p  
difference.


You mock the use of the personal diaries, but they help to prevent  
that type of joke. None of the personal diaries contain "I opened the  
door and saw W and M at once". Obviously.







​> ​from the 1p view

​I get tired of saying this so I wish you'd get tired of writing  
that but there is no THE 1p view in a world that contains 1p  
duplicating machines, there is only A 1p view.



Not from the perspective of the H-man when he opens the door, in both  
cities.









​> ​so now, there is a Mr H in W saying that he see W and not M,  
and vice versa. In M, and in W, they BOTH admit that what they see  
in particular was not predictable when they were(fused, so to  
speak)  in Helsinki.


​What do you mean not predictable?? You just predicted that Mr. W  
will see W and not M and that Mr. M will see M and not W, and your  
prediction turned out to be 100% correct!  What have you failed to  
predict that will be revealed after the duplication?


You do understand. Reread above. The point is that in H, the guy does  
not know with certainty if he will feel to be Mr W, or Mr M. Of course.


This is only a hand waving to hide you get the point.





​

​>> ​What more is there to say? What have we failed to predict  
that will be revealed after the duplication?


​> ​The city is which you, both of you, find themselves.

​If "you" uses a you duplicating machine and becomes two then there  
is no THE city that you will end up in, there is only A city you  
will end up in.


Wrong. Again, this means you don't listen two what the copies said.



All this assumes that "you" means a person who remembers asking the  
question "what city will I end up in?". If that is not what "you"  
means then please explain what "you" does mean.  ​


Since 50 years, I have never change the identity criteria. Same in  
this list.





​>> ​I don't care what anyone expects to happen, I care about  
what does happen. ​I'd much rather interview the 2 people