On 07 Aug 2017, at 18:34, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 4:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​Nobody expect one answer , but everybody can see that BOTH agrees having one obtained one answer,

​Hmm ...does the Moscow man really believe the correct answer to the Helsinki man's question "What city will I see?" should have been "you will see Moscow and nothing else"; well perhaps he does believe that, or perhaps he believes the correct answer would have been "you will see lollipop land​"​​, but if he believes either of those things then the Moscow man is a fool.​

We obviously agree. The man in Moscow will not believe that "you will see Moscow and noting else" would have been correct. He knows already that this would be reftuted by the man in Washington, and, as a computationalist, he knows than BOTH answer are correct, and so, only the prediction "W v M" was the correct one. The point is only that the H-man precited to be in one city and not knowing one, and that prediction is confirmed by BOTH copies.

​> ​and both vindicates the fact that they were unable to predict it in advance.

​Of course "THEY" couldn't predict it and it's not just predictions that "THEY" can't do, before the duplication "THEY" couldn't do a damn thing because "THEY" didn't exist before the duplication.

Then you just change the identity criterion on which we have agreed since long. Or worst, you are telling me that the H-man is dead, and that computationalism is false, making my point.

The only one capable of even asking the question "What city will I see?" is the Helsinki man.

Of course. But after pushing on the button, only the copies can judge if the prediction is verified by both. And the point is that both find themselves in one city, with a cup of coffee. The prediction P(coffee) = 1 = P(W)+P(M) is verified.

As for the answer, if "I" means a person who remembers asking the question (and what else could it mean?) then the answer is obviously Moscow and Washington.

No. P(Moscow and Washington) = 0. Trivially. The question is on the 1p- I. At no pint will ever any copies feel to be in two place at once.

You fail very badly to convince us you do not understand ...

​>​ we have agreed that Mr. W is Mr H, and Mr. M is Mr H, and the point is that we have now​ ​Mr H see W *and* Mr H see M, but none can see them simultaneously

​It's true no-one ​can see both cities simultaneously​ but that is irrelevant because the Helsinki man is now two,

In the 3p view. Never in the 1p-view. When the H-man has push on the button, he can feel to be in only one city, and he knows that in advance.

and​ two can see two cities simultaneously​ with no difficulty whatsoever.

That is playing with word. None of each copy can see the two cities at once.

So how many cities will the Helsinki man see? Two. ​

Easy wordplay based on the voluntarily decision of blurring the 3p/1p difference.

You mock the use of the personal diaries, but they help to prevent that type of joke. None of the personal diaries contain "I opened the door and saw W and M at once". Obviously.

​> ​from the 1p view

​I get tired of saying this so I wish you'd get tired of writing that but there is no THE 1p view in a world that contains 1p duplicating machines, there is only A 1p view.

Not from the perspective of the H-man when he opens the door, in both cities.

​> ​so now, there is a Mr H in W saying that he see W and not M, and vice versa. In M, and in W, they BOTH admit that what they see in particular was not predictable when they were(fused, so to speak) in Helsinki.

​What do you mean not predictable?? You just predicted that Mr. W will see W and not M and that Mr. M will see M and not W, and your prediction turned out to be 100% correct! What have you failed to predict that will be revealed after the duplication?

You do understand. Reread above. The point is that in H, the guy does not know with certainty if he will feel to be Mr W, or Mr M. Of course.

This is only a hand waving to hide you get the point.

​>> ​What more is there to say? What have we failed to predict that will be revealed after the duplication?

​> ​The city is which you, both of you, find themselves.

​If "you" uses a you duplicating machine and becomes two then there is no THE city that you will end up in, there is only A city you will end up in.

Wrong. Again, this means you don't listen two what the copies said.

All this assumes that "you" means a person who remembers asking the question "what city will I end up in?". If that is not what "you" means then please explain what "you" does mean. ​

Since 50 years, I have never change the identity criteria. Same in this list.

​>> ​I don't care what anyone expects to happen, I care about what does happen. ​I'd much rather interview the 2 people that came out of the duplicator than the one person that went in.

​> ​OK. So you interview them, and both explains that they have obtained one bit of information, illustrating the indeterminacy

​But I didn't need to interview them to get that information, I already knew it and they would too if they had any brains.​


If you agree in advance they both get one bit of information, the proof of the existence of the first person indeterminacy is closed. QED.

>​>​ If there are 2 people there is no THE​ ​first person, and that's why it's not a question, and without a question there can be no answer.

​>​There are two people, but they have both incompatible first person experience,

​What is incompatible about two people having two first person experiences? It couldn't be otherwise unless one is a zombie and have no first person experience.

Very good! Obviously: what is incompatible with this protocol is having the two first experience at once.

​> ​so it makes sense to predict which will be lived.

​And we've already correctly made that prediction, Mr. W will see W because seeing W is the only thing that can turn Mr. H into Mr. W, and ​Mr.​ ​​M​ will see ​M​ because seeing ​M​ is the only thing that can turn Mr.​ ​H into Mr. ​M.

That is not a prediction. It is a tautology. You still need to compute the proba that Mr. H becomes the one feeling being Mr. W (resp. Mr. M).

And both Mr. ​W and Mr. M remember asking the question "What city will I see?". So what more is there to predict?

We want to evaluate the expectation of the specific results possible. Just compare to the coin, and keep in mind the 3p/1p difference. You got the correct "1 bit" above, so why fake already you did not now.

​> ​We have accepted that a good prediction, or theory, is supposed to remain correct after the duplication)

​No. In a good theory after the duplication there is a way to tell if the prediction made by the theory was correct or incorrect. If it can't do that then it's not a theory and it's not even a incorrect theory, it's just gibberish. It's so bad it's not even wrong. ​

We keep up with QM because its prediction are always verified. You talk cheer nonsense.

​> ​So,  In H the best prediction was "W v M".

​If that's a exclusive OR and that prediction is correct then afterwards ​one and only one of those cities can be proven by the experiment not to have been seen. So which city was it, W or M?

<sigh> Already answered. reread the post before asking the same question repetitively.

​> ​ both the W-man and the M-man confirms it, and got the each the precise result expected but not predictable in advance

 ​Expected but not predictable​? That does not compute.​

Wordplay. The context makes clear that it is "precise city" was expected, and "which city" was the unknown in Helsinki.

​> ​Do you agree or not that each copies have got one bit of information.

​Neither copy has any information I didn't already have long before the duplication. ​

This means that you don't put yourself in the shoes of any copy. The W man could not have know he (the H-man, JC) would be the one feeling to be in W. If he could have known this in advance, he would have written in H in his diary "I know I will be the one in W and not in M", and, obviously, this is incorrect as the M-man will confirm without doubt.

​> ​you are denying the first person experience

​Yes I am denying THE ​first person experience​ in a world that contains ​first person experience​ duplicating machines, ​but I am not denying A first person experience​.​

You go out of your body, and never reintegrate it. What you say here contradict P("only one city") = 1.


Other post:

On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 4:44 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​If there is no indeterminacy, what is the bet in Helsinki?

​That is a excellent question! It's never been clear what the bet back in Helsinki was, but it's your thought experiment not mine so you tell me.

The 1p/3p difference entails it is isomorphic to a throw of a coin. You bet what you want. P(W) = P(M) = 1/2.

​​>> ​Which "THE ​first person​"​​ decides what the Helsinki man should have been told yesterday about what he was going to see today, the one in Washington ​or the one in Moscow?

​> ​BOTH. You keep coming back on this question again!!!!
THE result that the H-man obtained in W is W.
THE result that  the H-man obtained in M is M.

​Great! We need never go over this again because at last you agree the H-man will see BOTH.​

In the 3p view, this has never been doubted even a second. It is part of the protocol that every party is aware of.

​> ​And none of them were able to predict THE result that each of them got, from they first person pov, on which the question in Helsinki was all about.

​I correctly predicted it and so did you. W will be seen by Mr. W's point of view,

That is a tautology. To get P(M) = P(W) = 1/2, you still need to predict in H if you will be Mr W OR Mr M.

and M will be seen by Mr. M's point of view. Mr. H also predicted it but neither Mr. W nor Mr. M did, they couldn't have done so or done anything else for that matter because at the time neither of them existed. Everything about this is predictable.

Yes. It is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2.

I don't think we're going to get anywhere until you answer the question I asked in my last post, I repeat it now and look forward to your answer:

Are the following 2 questions equivalent?

1) What will I see tomorrow?
2) Tomorrow what will the person who remembers being me right now see?

1) I will see either W or M, but not both. I (in Helsinki) know this with certainty, but I can only evaluate at 1/2 if it will be specifically M (resp. W).

2) The person remembering being me will see either either W or M, but not both. He (in Helsinki) know this with certainty, but he can only evaluate at 1/2 if it will be specifically M (resp. W).

If you think​ the questions​ are equivalent and if tomorrow 2 people remember being you today then it would be ridiculous to expect only one answer is correct just as it would be silly to expect that the equation X^2 =4 only has one solution.

That is why it is better to make precise if you were talking about the 1p and 3p in 2). Using 1p, as we shopuld to tackle step-3, 1) and 2) are equivalent.

If you think they are not equivalent then please explain what the word "I" in the question means extrapolated into the future.

​>>​I don't know what else you want me to say.​ ​I don't know what you want me to predict that I haven't already predicted. ​

What did you predict?

I predicted that​ Mr.W will see W

But you need to evaluate P(I will feel to be Mr. W) to get a prediction on your first-personal future in Helsinki.

and Mr.M will see M​ ​and both will remember asking the question "what will I see?".You predicted the same thing and it turned out we were 100% correct. Exactly what have we failed to predict?

The specific city that the H-man will live in particular. yes, it is BOTH in the 3p or 3-1p, but it is an unknown city for the future first- personal view.

Mr. JC push on a button, and is incapable to say if W or M will be ralized for any of its future first-personal experience.

​>> ​​Nobody can predict it because knows what it is they're being asked to predict. Nobody knows what "it" is.

​> ​?​
"it" refer to the city the candidate can expect to feel herself in after pushing the button.

The above beautifully illustrates why "it" is gibberish. "It" is a demand of the name of THE one city that THE one candidate will see after THE one candidate is no longer one candidate and becomes TWO candidates in TWO cities.

Exactly, and there is only gibberish when you fail to take the 1p/3p distinction into account. If you can do the prediction, do it.

And you claim that from the failure to predict "it" all sorts of profound philosophical consequences can be derived.

No. I ask you only to move to step 4. Or step 5. Your post shows that you agree with step 4, which is normal, as it is a mix of step 2 and 3.

It's amazing that grown adults are spending so much time on something so incredibly dumb.

Ah, the insult ... The argument of people without argument.

​> ​Move to step 5, now.

​Are you kidding? You can't even defend the first 3 steps! ​

I know only one person having a problem with this. You know another one? Please, invite that person to make his point, because yours is based on the 3p/1p confusion, all the time. Your play fails nobody.

I have not much time those next days. If you comment this, I will answer only the paragraph which does not repeat things already answered, if you get a better idea ...


​John K Clark​

  John K Clark

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