First, Third Person and Continuum
Hi Bruno and all Everythingers In my opinion, the concept of first person and third person perspective is really a special case of a continuum. A first person observation of an event occurs when the event is 100% coupled with the continued existence of the observer. A third person observation of an event occurs when the coupling between the event and the observer's existence is 0%. A continuum of possibilities exists between the two. In Tegmark suicide experiment for example, the observation of the very preliminary phase of the experiment is third person. The observation of the non-explosion of the pack of dynamite is first person. Modifying that experiment slightly, let's say that the detonation of the deadly explosive is intended if a quantum coin lands tail. Let's say the the mechanism operates in two steps in rapid non-observable succession with the following probabilities:. 1) A 50% chance p1 that the electrical circuit fires, which is a function of the outcome states of the coin. If or when the circuit fires it generates a visible spark intended to trigger the explosive. 2) A 50% chance p2 that the chemical responds to the spark and detonates. (because it is (quantum?) wet for example) Here is the Third Person Perspective: Coin Head - Probability = (1-p1) = 0.50 Coin Tail => Spark => Non Detonation; Probability = (1-p1)(1-p2) = 0.25 Coin Tail => Spark => Detonation; Probability = (1-p1)p2 = 0.25 The third person probability of live outcome is (1-p1) + (1-p1)(1-p2) = 0.75 The First Person Perspective is obtained by normalizing the third person probabilities such that the sum of the live outcomes equals 1. Coin Head => Probability = (1-p1)/((1-p1) + (1-p1)(1-p2)) = 0.50/0.75 = 0.67 Coin Tail => Spark => Non Detonation; Probability = (1-p1)(1-p2)/((1-p1) + (1-p1)(1-p2)) = 0.33 Coin Tail => Spark => Detonation; Probability = 0.0 This illustrates the difference in the observations. Observing a spark with no detonation has a probability of 0.25 for a third person observer but 0.33 for a first person observer. The spark itself is neither a first nor third person event. It is in-between. George
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Thank you Bruno for the clear explanation.
Let me rephrase your explanation in my own words.
For any point X in the Plenitude corresponding to an observer-moment, a state of
consciousness, or state of a CA, the UD* is just that portion of the Plenitude
constrained by
1) that point taken as a boundary condition
2)LOGICAL and LOCAL consistency from any point to any point in the transition
("extensions" , "projections") paths.
Hence the concept of "cone" since the number of points reacheable from a given
initial boundary condition is expected to grow. In fact, we may have a double
cone joined at the vertex to represent the logical past and the logical future.
(I do not want to introduce yet the concept of time)
The cone also illustrates the indeterminacy associated with point X. The further
we are from X the greater the indeterminacy. This indeterminacy is of course a
first person perspective from X.
Please also notice my emphasis on the concept of logical and local consistency
on any point along that cone. It may imply that a consciousness my change along
the way.
Bruno, so far, I agree with you 100%.
One more point. In my opinion, the concept of first person and third person
perspective is really a special case of a continuum. I will discuss this in a
new thread
George
Marchal wrote:
> Levy wrote:
>
> >Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> It is better to read (change in capital):
> >>
> >> < >> from a third person point of view. But, as you aknowledge in
> >> question 7, the delays does not count for the first person, so
> >> the domain of 1-indeterminacy, which BEARS ON first persons EXPERIENCE
> >> is, thanks of that delays elimination, given by the
> >> union (which is just the set theoretical interpretation of the or)
> >> of all portion of UD* (the execution of the UD, an infinite
> >> three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a
> >> two dimensional cellular automaton) in which my "preparing coffee"
> >> state appear. (Reread that sentence slowly, I have written
> >> it slowly, and without doubts it's too long).>>
> >>
> >> So it is a third person measure on first person experiences.
> >
> >iigghhh!!
> >I read the sentence many times and it still does not make sense to me.
> >Should I read it again?
>
> Read it three times at breakfast, and one time in the evening
> jumping the parenthesis.
>
> Ok, ok. My diagnostic is that either you have forget the question
> 7 or 8, (see below) or you are forgetting what the UD does.
>
> >What is:
> >"the union of all portion of UD* in which my "preparing coffee" state
> >appear."
>
> Suppose that the UD is written in Fortran. I guess you know what the
> trace of a program is.
>
> UD* is the infinite trace of the UD. It is describe by the
> sequence of its subsequent states (as a program fortran).
>
> It is an infinite tree describing all possible computations in fortran.
> (which includes fortran simulation of all program in Lisp, all Fortran
> simulation of the COBOL version 5.3 emulation of all linear
> transformations,
> all the unitary transformations, etc.
>
> Some of those computations will generate the 3-states corresponding to my
> "preparing coffe 1-state". Because we accept comp. Now if I prepare a
> cup of coffee, my brain will go through a sequence of states (third person
> describable computational state, at the right level of description
> of myself). and I have pick one of those state---like in a duplication
> experiment).
>
> So the UD generates that state eventually (by going through a computation
> which emulates my doing or dreaming of doing that cup of coffe).
>
> The UD will generates that state eventually. Let us say in 10^googol
> years (or steps). Our poor "universe" has disappeared, but we don't
> care because the UD run in Plato Heaven, or if you prefer,
> the whole UD* (the trace of the UD) lies staticaly but completely
> in Plato heaven). UD* is the block "mindscape" (mindscape borrowed to
> Rudy Rucker's "Infinity and the Mind".).
>
> And we don't care of the number of steps and of the time that UD would
> have
> take to get that states because, as first person we cannot be aware
> of those delays. Ok?
>
> Please reread ten billions times, after lunch, the question 7 and 8.
> Especially 8. (copy and past from
> http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2992.html below)
>
> Note in passing that a copy and paste is a duplication without
> annhilation of the original.
>
> The apparition in UD* of that third person description of the precise
> state "where is my cup now?" (occuring when I am preparing my
> cup of coffee (existing by comp)) is provided by the fact that
> the UD generates all computations.
>
> Saying yes to 7 and 8, makes that "event", executed by the UD
> equivalent with a delayed reconstitution without demolition of the
> original.
>
> So with comp you *must* bet that at each instant you are copy and paste
> somewhere in your domain of indeterminacy.
>
> But, after a much longer tim
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Levy wrote: >Marchal wrote: > >> It is better to read (change in capital): >> >> <> from a third person point of view. But, as you aknowledge in >> question 7, the delays does not count for the first person, so >> the domain of 1-indeterminacy, which BEARS ON first persons EXPERIENCE >> is, thanks of that delays elimination, given by the >> union (which is just the set theoretical interpretation of the or) >> of all portion of UD* (the execution of the UD, an infinite >> three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a >> two dimensional cellular automaton) in which my "preparing coffee" >> state appear. (Reread that sentence slowly, I have written >> it slowly, and without doubts it's too long).>> >> >> So it is a third person measure on first person experiences. > >iigghhh!! >I read the sentence many times and it still does not make sense to me. >Should I read it again? Read it three times at breakfast, and one time in the evening jumping the parenthesis. Ok, ok. My diagnostic is that either you have forget the question 7 or 8, (see below) or you are forgetting what the UD does. >What is: >"the union of all portion of UD* in which my "preparing coffee" state >appear." Suppose that the UD is written in Fortran. I guess you know what the trace of a program is. UD* is the infinite trace of the UD. It is describe by the sequence of its subsequent states (as a program fortran). It is an infinite tree describing all possible computations in fortran. (which includes fortran simulation of all program in Lisp, all Fortran simulation of the COBOL version 5.3 emulation of all linear transformations, all the unitary transformations, etc. Some of those computations will generate the 3-states corresponding to my "preparing coffe 1-state". Because we accept comp. Now if I prepare a cup of coffee, my brain will go through a sequence of states (third person describable computational state, at the right level of description of myself). and I have pick one of those state---like in a duplication experiment). So the UD generates that state eventually (by going through a computation which emulates my doing or dreaming of doing that cup of coffe). The UD will generates that state eventually. Let us say in 10^googol years (or steps). Our poor "universe" has disappeared, but we don't care because the UD run in Plato Heaven, or if you prefer, the whole UD* (the trace of the UD) lies staticaly but completely in Plato heaven). UD* is the block "mindscape" (mindscape borrowed to Rudy Rucker's "Infinity and the Mind".). And we don't care of the number of steps and of the time that UD would have take to get that states because, as first person we cannot be aware of those delays. Ok? Please reread ten billions times, after lunch, the question 7 and 8. Especially 8. (copy and past from http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2992.html below) Note in passing that a copy and paste is a duplication without annhilation of the original. The apparition in UD* of that third person description of the precise state "where is my cup now?" (occuring when I am preparing my cup of coffee (existing by comp)) is provided by the fact that the UD generates all computations. Saying yes to 7 and 8, makes that "event", executed by the UD equivalent with a delayed reconstitution without demolition of the original. So with comp you *must* bet that at each instant you are copy and paste somewhere in your domain of indeterminacy. But, after a much longer time (much longer that 10^googol (the DU *dovetails*, so that it has a lot of work while generating and executing the other programs) it generates a new reconstitution of that states, so he builds little by little your entire domain of 1-indeterminacy. The fact that the DU builds the reconstitutions so slowly does not change the first person experience because of the non awareness of the delay. So when I am preparing my coffee cup, if I want to predict my next possible instant, I must have a measure on the set of computational histories generated by the DU going through the state corresponding to my particular "preparing my coffee cup" state. Or a measure on all the "reconsitution" in UD*. We just cannot care that some of those reconstitution appears at step n1, some other at step n2, other at step n3, The domain of reconstitution will be the union of all the portion (subset or substring or subspace, or whatever depending on the choice of representation) ... portion containing the virtual (or arithmetical) reconstitution. Find a LISP interpreteur, run the UD at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2793.html If you don't like LISP, write yourself a UD in COBOL (why not) Run it. Stop it after two days. You have a portion of UD*. Stop it after three days, you get a bigger portion of UD*. By comp there is a day it will generate (and "reconstitute" de facto) my coffee-state of mind (the 3-comp state corresponding for that state whic
Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)
Brent Meeker wrote: >OK. So do you invoke an anthropic principle in the step (computer law) >=> (mind law) ... Let us a say a Church Turing Markov -tropic principle, eventually. If you want I (re)define the physical by what is observable by a sound universal machine. And observable is eventually defined by a measure on her set on consistent extension, and I must add "as seen by her". >and then hope to show that will entail the step (mind >law) => (physical law)? It seems to me that the UDA entails that "reversal". We must recover physical laws and physical sensations from the discourse of "average" sound universal machine about their most probable computational neighborhood. >And why do you take this approach rather than >(number law) => (computer law) => (physical law) => (mind law)? Just for the "kantian" reason that I can access only to my first person knowledge, even when I just look to a needle of a physical measuring apparatus. The UDA shows I must integrate on all computational histories going through, similar enough, from a first person point of view, states. Those states-point of view are psychological concept. It could still be possible that, in fine, (physical law) <=> (mind law) That could happen if our level of description is very low. But then we will know it, without having put the mind-body problem under the rug. What is very promising with the arithmetical transformation is that all logics are doubled (G and G*, Z and Z*, ...) so that we get information on both communicable and incommunicable propositions. The arithmetical quantisation seems to put light on both qualia and quanta. Also, independently, Maudlin and me have shown in some more direct way that, with comp, there is no hope for (physical law) => (mind law). (It is the crackpot proof in Jacques Mallah's terms!, look in the archive at key words like "Maudlin", "movie", "crackpot". (But with Occam it is not necessary). >Perhaps you could briefly elucidate what you think goes into each " => >"? For example, I assume that the step (number law) => (computer law) >is motivated by saying our TOE must be finitely describable and so it >must lie in a subset of all mathematics that is most explicitly defined >by computation. Is this right? Mmh ... Arithmetical truth is not finitely describable and I doubt there is a TOE for any first person plenitude (Levy's term). You should realise that Godel shows that the structure (N, +, x, >, =, 0) is far more complex than the equivalent structure for the reals, which are completely captured by the notion of archimedian algebraicaly closed field. Natural numbers are in a sense much more complex than reals. We have no TOE for them. The step "(number law) => (computer law)" comes from the fact that you can, by chosing some number encoding (like Godel's one) embed proposition on programs in pure arithmetical terms. An example is Godel's encoding of provability, which I promise George to discuss about, and so will I ASAP or perhaps later. But in a nutshell, Godel did build, uniquely from the symbole O, =, X, +, x, s, (intended for the successor function) an arithmetical predicate B(x,y) meaning x is the godel number of a proof for the formula with godel number y. So that provable(y) is just the arithmetical sentence ExB(x,y). (E = the existencial quantifier). I'm not sure I can give "precise" meaning to an expression like "all mathematics". Perhaps this is the Cantor "inconsistenz". But I don't ask mathematics to be made explicit by computations. In fact most of the truth *about* computations are not reachable by univoquely determined computations. This is the foremost origin of the gap between G and G*. Computerland, which is just an intentional variant of numberland, is not computable, not finitely describable. A brain, or any "implementation" of a universal machine is really nothing other than a door on many (many) realities. Bruno
Re: Journals
Hi Russell, > [...] >I have a question in light of this for the group. Come September (2nd >anniversary of Why Occams Razor), if I've had no joy with >J. Theoretics, I would like to try another journal. All I ask is that >my paper be properly peer reveiwed. Does anyone have any suggestions? >What about Teorie e Modelli? Well, I have published (and it appeared very recently btw) my "Computation, Consciousness and the Quantum" in Teorie e Modelli, after some Italians hears my talk at Dubrovnik. Also because they were doing a special issue of Teorie e Modelli on Quantum and Consciousness. But I am not sure about the general thema of the journal. If you agree I can ask Vincenzo Fano and give you (or him) his mail address (or the address of your paper). Have you try the "Journal of Philosophy", or ... (The journals which come to my mind turn around philosophical logics, I will think about it ...). Perhaps you should try to transform your paper in the form of a response to a similar paper you could find in the literature. (This means spending lot of times in libraries ..., but I found Maudlin's paper in this way). The problem with "our domain" is that it is very inter or trans disciplinary. And a lot of "specialists" doesn't like that too much. Our epoch is not so easy for those who attempts clarity, rigor, and open-mindeness, in fundamental matters. There is still a lot of energy wasted by both scientist and philosophers for ignoring each other. About publication, I must perhaps confess that, a long time ago, between publish or perish, I have chosen perish!... Until now I have never submit a paper to a journal. I publish only when people, after hearing oral talk of mine, ask me to send a paper. Talking about publishing, I guess it is about time I try myself to publish in some "serious" International Journal. The paper by Rawling and Selesnick in the J. of the ACM 2000 gives me perhaps the opportunity to send a technical paper on my "arithmetical quantization". I will try to write it this summer holliday(°). ... So I hope this one will not be driven into company of my ten thousand unfinished papers ... :-) I certainly wish better fortune for your Occam paper! Bruno (°) My idea was to write such thesis-paper after the presentation of my thesis, but I got a prize which consists in the promise of publishing the thesis. But being to technical I wrote a third "book" in french! The book is written but I am not glad with it. That's the problem: I am my worst referee.
Re: Journals
Correction: the journal is called Foundations of Physics.
Re: Journals
Try Foundation of Physics Letters!
Saibal
Russel wrote:
> As many of you are aware, I have been attempting to publish "Why
> Occams Razor" for about 18 months now. In September, it will have been
> two years since I wrote the paper. I first tried Phys Rev - which
> rejected it on editorial policy grounds ("no fundamentals of QM
> please") then Annals of Physics (who published Tegmark's
> paper). Annals of Physics found one referee, who completely failed to
> understand the main point of the paper, and was not prepared to
> discuss it. The ended up rejecting the paper because they couldn't
> find any other referees to handle it. In February of this year, I have
> submitted it to Journal of Theoretics, for two reasons:
>
> i) It is an Internet Journal, with open access to its
> archives. Philosophically, I am in favour of free open access to
> journals since
>
> a) scientists do not charge to write articles,
> b) scientists do not charge to referee articles,
> c) scientific editors often do not charge to edit journals, or the
> editors are subsidised by a society or institution
> d) the Internet reduces distributions charges to practically zero.
>
> I have been a long supporter of the journal Complexity International
> for these reasons, although its subject matter is not so relevant for
> this group. It perhaps does not have the cachet of other journals, but
> I believe so strongly in this principle, I would like to raise its
> quality by contributing good articles.
>
> ii) J. Theoretics editorial policy is summed up by:
>
> "Unlike most journals were the theory has to be validated or
> invalidated by the article, the Journal of Theoretics must use a
> different process due to the nature of the subject matter. Because a
> theory by definition is a hypothesis not yet proven, we must show that
> the premises, logic, or use of language of the article submitted
> contains a significant error in order for a rejection to occur."
>
> ie something obviously wrong gets rejected, but otherwise ideas of
> merit get to see the light of day.
>
>
> However, it seems that Internet journals do not have a speedier
> refereeing process. It galls me a bit, since I've always turned around
> papers I've refereed within a couple of weeks, that other referees may
> not be taking the refereeing process seriously.
>
> I have a question in light of this for the group. Come September (2nd
> anniversary of Why Occams Razor), if I've had no joy with
> J. Theoretics, I would like to try another journal. All I ask is that
> my paper be properly peer reveiwed. Does anyone have any suggestions?
> What about Teorie e Modelli?
>
> Cheers
>
>
> --
--
> Dr. Russell StandishDirector
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