> -Original Message-
> From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Wednesday, 10 October 2001 4:06 a.m.
>
> It was a hypothetical that Bruno used. It's pretty certain nobody knows
> how to do it now and it might never be practical. But if the
> processes, including the sensory
Hello Charles
On 09-Oct-01, Charles Goodwin wrote:
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>> Sent: Wednesday, 10 October 2001 2:23 a.m.
>>
>> But then why do you say that a duplicate of your brain processes in
>> a
>> computer would not be conscious. You
> -Original Message-
> From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Wednesday, 10 October 2001 2:23 a.m.
>
> But then why do you say that a duplicate of your brain processes in a
> computer would not be conscious. You seem to be
> discriminating between
> a biological duplicate a
Hello Marchal
On 09-Oct-01, Marchal wrote:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
...
>> But this seems to still leave the problems of dualism because it
>> allows that a consciousness (e.g. mine) can be generated without any
>> associated material (e.g. a brain) and also that consciousnesses can
>> generate anot
Does this list have a moderator?
>From: rwas <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: Re: Immortality
>Date: Mon, 8 Oct 2001 22:08:37 -0700 (PDT)
>
> > a few weeks ago. One of the interesting things I learned was that the
> > reason many Christians can't accept the theory of evolutio
Juergen Schmidhuber wrote:
>We need a prior probability distribution on possible histories.
OK. I agree with that. But of course we differ on the meaning of
"possible histories". And we tackle also the "prior probability"
in quite different ways.
>Then, once we have observed a past history,
Hal Finney wrote:
Bruno:Your desktop computer cannot be conscious, nor can my brain.
If you succeed putting my mind (software) in your desktop
computer, your desktop computer will still not be conscious, but
it will make possible for me to talk with you (as my brain does
Brent Meeker wrote:
>OK, I think I understand this. You are making the point that
>duplication of consciousness entails the inability to predict the
>sequence of conscious experience.
Exactly.
>The indeterminism comes from the fact that
>> 1) You can 3-duplicate a 3-person (with comp).
>>
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