Hal Ruhl wrote on 17/1/05:
Do you really mean that your "theory" would made you say no to a doctor
presenting you an artificial brain (even with a very low substitution
level description of yourself) ?
First assume that choice is available to sub components of a world state.
I would not accept be
Hi Bruno:
At 09:51 AM 1/17/2005, you wrote:
Hello Hal,
snip mine
Now if one envisions the physical reality evolution of sub components of
the world kernels in such a sequence the result would be the same.
?
So I find I must also reject "..." "Comp: I (you) am (are)
computable/Turing emulable
Hello Hal,
In my particular All/Nothing approach my world kernels are packets of
information necessary and sufficient to describe a particular state of a
universe. The dynamic of the approach provides physical reality to world
kernels in sequences [worlds] in a manner that is inconsistent with
At 01:32 16/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 15/1/05 Bruno Marchal wrote:
Obviously! But it is so only because you dismiss the "failure induction
problem". Also: third person identity is arguably an illusion. But I
hardy doubt first person identity can ever be an illusion or that it
c
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