Saibal Mitra writes:
Because no such thing as free will exists one has to consider three
different universes in which the three different choices are made. The
three
universes will have comparable measures. The antropic factor of 10^100 will
then dominate and will cause the observer to find hi
On Mon, Jun 13, 2005 at 11:45:52AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> To Russell: I don't understand what you mean by a "conscious
> description". Even the expression "conscious" machine can be misleading
> at some point in the reasoning.
A description could be conscious in the same way that with
IMO belief in the ASSA is tantamount to altruism. The ASSA would imply
taking action based on its positive impact on the whole multiverse of
observer-moments (OMs).
We have had some discussion here and on the extropy-chat (transhumanist)
mailing list about two different possible flavors of altrui
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Godel's theorem:
~Bf -> ~B(~Bf),
which is equivalent to B(Bf -> f) -> Bf,
Just a little aside a la Descartes + Godel: (assume that "think" and
"believe" are synonymous and that f = "you are")
B(Bf -> f) -> Bf can
"No tortue".
Now, sit and contemplate if you felt a difference when, after reading message after message with the opposite words in it, and then suddenly you see "No tortue".
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Because no such thing as free will exists one has to consider three
different universes in which the three different choices are made. The three
universes will have comparable measures. The antropic factor of 10^100 will
then dominate and will cause the observer to find himself having made choice
b
Hal Finney wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
> If you impose the condition I discussed earlier that absolute
probabilities
> don't change over time, or in terms of my analogy, that the water levels
in
> each tank don't change because the total inflow rate to each tank always
> matches the total outf
Jesse Mazer writes:
> If you impose the condition I discussed earlier that absolute probabilities
> don't change over time, or in terms of my analogy, that the water levels in
> each tank don't change because the total inflow rate to each tank always
> matches the total outflow rate, then I don'
At 06:00 AM 6/13/2005, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I have been arguing in recent posts that the absolute measure of an
observer moment (or observer, if you prefer) makes no possible difference
at the first person level. A counterargument has been that, even if an
observer cannot know how many in
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I have been arguing in recent posts that the absolute measure of an
observer moment (or observer, if you prefer) makes no possible difference
at the first person level. A counterargument has been that, even if an
observer cannot know how many instantiations of him a
Oops sorry. I did misunderstood you. Thanks for the clarification. I
agree with your preceding post to Hal now.
Bruno
Le 13-juin-05, à 16:23, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal:
To Jesse: You apparently completely separate the probability of x
and x' from the simi
Hi Quentin,
concerning "finite/infinite" number of steps, it seems to me that it is
always possible to have a computation that will take an infinite number
of steps to arrive at a particular state, since for any state, there
exists an infinity of computational histories which go through it, so
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal:
To Jesse: You apparently completely separate the probability of x and x'
from the similarity of x and x'.
I am not sure that makes sense for me.
In particular how could x and x' be similar, if x', but not x, involves a
'white rabbit events'.
It's not c
Hi Brent,
You didn't answer my last post where I explain that Bp is different
from Bp & p.
I hope you were not too much disturbed by my "teacher's" tone (which
can be enervating I imagine). Or is it because you don't recognize the
modal form of Godel's theorem:
Le 13-juin-05, à 15:39, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
Bruno Marchal:
To Jesse: You apparently completely separate the probability of x and
x' from the similarity of x and x'.
I am not sure that makes sense for me.
In particular how could x and x' be similar, if x', but not x,
involves a 'white rab
Bruno Marchal:
To Jesse: You apparently completely separate the probability of x and x'
from the similarity of x and x'.
I am not sure that makes sense for me.
In particular how could x and x' be similar, if x', but not x, involves a
'white rabbit events'.
It's not completely separable, but
I agree with everything you say in this post, but I am not sure that
settles the issue. It does not change my mind on the preceding post
where we were disagreeing; which was that IF I must choose between
A) splitted between 1 finite hells and 1 infinite paradise
B) Splitted between 1 infini
I have been arguing in recent posts that the absolute measure of an observer
moment (or observer, if you prefer) makes no possible difference at the
first person level. A counterargument has been that, even if an observer
cannot know how many instantiations of him are being run, it is still
imp
Le 12-juin-05, à 14:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
But the basic idea is simple perhaps: Suppose I must choose between
a) I am 3-multiplied in ten exemplars. One will get an orange juice
and 9 will be tortured.
b) I am 3-multiplied in ten exemplars. One will be
Le 12-juin-05, à 06:30, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
My speculation is that p(y -> x) would depend on a combination of some
function that depends only on intrinsic features of the description of
x and y--how "similar" x is to y, basically, the details to be
determined by some formal "theory of consc
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