`I agree with everything you say in this post, but I am not sure that`

`settles the issue. It does not change my mind on the preceding post`

`where we were disagreeing; which was that IF I must choose between`

A) splitted between 10000 finite hells and 1 infinite paradise B) Splitted between 1 infinite hell and 10000 finite paradises

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`where "finite" and "infinite" refer to the number of computational`

`steps simulating the stories of thoise hells and paradises, THEN I`

`should choose A.`

`This is because all finite stories have a measure "0". Infinite`

`stories, by their "natural" DU multiplications will have a measure one.`

`But we are on the verge of inconsistency, because in practice there is`

`no way to garantie anything like the finiteness of any computation`

`going through our states (this is akin to the insolubility of the`

`self-stopping problem by sufficiently rich (lobian) turing machine).`

`The idea that I try to convey is that if I am in state S1, the`

`probability of some next state S2 depends on the proportion, among the`

`infinite stories going through S1 of those *infinite* stories going`

`also through S2. And all finite stories must be discounted.`

`(It is not necessary I remain "personally" immortal in those infinite`

`stories, the measure is given by the stories going through my states`

`even if I have a finite 3-life-time in all of those stories).`

`(btw, this entails also that comp implies at least infinite past and/or`

`future for any universes supporting our present story).`

`[Note that here I am going far ahead of what I can ask to the lobian`

`machine, because our talk involves quantifiers on stories and that's`

`very complex to handle. Well, to be sure I have till now only been able`

`to translate the case of "probability one", in machine term; but it is`

`enough to extract non trivial information on the logic of "observable"`

`proposition.]`

Bruno Le 13-juin-05, à 13:00, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

I have been arguing in recent posts that the absolute measure of anobserver moment (or observer, if you prefer) makes no possibledifference at the first person level. A counterargument has been that,even if an observer cannot know how many instantiations of him arebeing run, it is still important in principle to take the absolutemeasure into account, for example when considering the total amount ofsuffering in the world. The following thought experiment shows how,counterintuitively, sticking to this principle may actually be doingthe victims a disservice:You are one of 10 copies who are being tortured. The copies are allbeing run in lockstep with each other, as would occur if 10 identicalcomputers were running 10 identical sentient programs. Assume that thetorture is so bad that death is preferable, and so bad that escapingit with your life is only marginally preferable to escaping it bydying (eg., given the option of a 50% chance of dying or a 49% chanceof escaping the torture and living, you would take the 50%). Thetorture will continue for a year, but you are allowed one of 3 choicesas to how things will proceed:(a) 9 of the 10 copies will be chosen at random and painlessly killed,while the remaining copy will continue to be tortured.(b) For one minute, the torture will cease and the number of copieswill increase to 10^100. Once the minute is up, the number of copieswill be reduced to 10 again and the torture will resume as before.(c) the torture will be stopped for 8 randomly chosen copies, andcontinue for the other 2.Which would you choose? To me, it seems clear that there is an 80%chance of escaping the torture if you pick (c), while with (a) it iscertain that the torture will continue, and with (b) it is certainthat the torture will continue with only one minute of respite.Are there other ways to look at the choices? It might be argued thatin (a) there is a 90% chance that you will be one of the copies who iskilled, and thus a 90% chance that you will escape the torture, betterthan your chances in (c). However, even if you are one of the oneskilled, this does not help you at all. If there is a successorobserver moment at the moment of death, subjectively, yourconsciousness will continue. The successor OM in this case comes fromthe one remaining copy who is being tortured, hence guaranteeing thatyou will continue to suffer.What about looking at it from an altruistic rather than selfishviewpoint: isn't it is better to decrease the total suffering in theworld by 90% as in (a) rather than by 80% as in (c)? Before makingplans to decrease suffering, ask the victims. All 10 copies will pleadwith you to choose (c).What about (b)? ASSA enthusiasts might argue that with this choice, anOM sampled randomly from the set of all possible OM's will almostcertainly be from the one minute torture-free interval. What wouldthis mean for the victims? If you interview each of the 10 copiesbefore the minute starts, they will tell you that they are currentlybeing tortured and they expect that they will get one minute respite,then start suffering again, so they wish the choice had been (c).Next, if you interview each of the 10^100 copies they will tell youthat the torture has stopped for exactly one minute by the torturechambre's clock, but they know that it is going to start again andthey wish you had chosen (c). Finally, if you interview each of the 10copies for whom the torture has recommenced, they will report thatthey remember the minute of respite, but that's no good to them now,and they wish you had chosen (c).--Stathis Papaioannou _________________________________________________________________Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it'sFREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/

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