Re: subjective reality
On Wed, Aug 24, 2005 at 10:34:30AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> [RS]
> Interestingly, someone pointed me at a paper by Esche the other day,
> arguing that alternative "projection postulates" are compatible with
> the MWI. The precise alternative projection postulate they supplied
> turns out to be riddled with white rabbits - which makes me speculate
> that the Born rule is precisely what you need to kill off all the
> white rabbits in the MWI.
>
> [GK]
> I can't say I follow you here. MWI + Projection postulates should
> reproduce
> regular Copenhagenian QM since MWI is basically QM - Projection
> Postulates!
> Now killing white rabbits with the Born rule!??? If that could be
> done, seems to
> me, would obviate all the need for MWI in the first place, no?
>
Don't worry too much - I'm indulging in a bit of idle speculation for
the benefit of Brent, amongst others. See my post msg07791.html
(available from
http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg07791.html
as the other archive appears to be out of action).
Cheers
--
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A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
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Re: subjective reality
Godfrey: 'MWI + Projection postulates should reproduce regular Copenhagenian QM since MWI is basically QM - Projection Postulates!' Imagine a superposition like this |'spin_z' +1> |'detector' +1> + |'spin_z' -1> |'detector' -1> It describes a superposition of spin up/down states, and the entagled (or relative) states of a detector. Now imagine a second - whatever, human? - device, to measure a specific observable of the above superposition. Let this observable be such that the ray generated by the above superposition state is an eigenspace of this observable, corresponding to a definite eigenvalue, the eigenvalue 'yes'. Since neither component of the above superposition state lies in the eigenspace of this observable, this observable fails to commute with the 'spin_z' observable, and fails to commute with the 'detector' observable. We can write (canonically) ... |'z-spin' +1> |'detector' +1> |yes> + |'z-spin' -1> |'detector' -1> |yes> In a MWI, a world should instantiate an eigenvalue for an observable if the superposition term associated with that world is an eigenstate of the observable corresponding to that eigenvalue. So, after the (second) measurement, what would an Everettista write? This one? |'z-spin' +1> |'detector' +1> |?> <=> world A |'z-spin' -1> |'detector' -1> |?> <=> world B (Since, in each world, the observable measured by the second - whatever, human? - device does not commute with the 'spin_z' observable, so it has no predeterminate value, that is to say that the outcome of the (second) measurement must occur by chance.) Or this one? |'z-spin' +1> |'detector' +1> |yes> <=> world A |'z-spin' -1> |'detector' -1> |yes> <=> world B (In this case the fact that the second device would later record the state |yes> seems to be fixed ... in advance of the measurement itself. And this is magic. White Rabbit? What else?) Godfrey: 'I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM which I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus Collapse, by the way.' Maybe. s. [It is too late here, I cannot write more, and I cannot check the above :-)]
Re: archive?
I'm not sure what's going on with escribe.com, but there's a second archive at http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list%40eskimo.com/. - Original Message - From: "Hal Ruhl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 9:14 PM Subject: archive? Hi All: I have not been able to access the list's archive for awhile. Is there a problem? Hal Ruhl
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey: At 03:10 PM 8/24/2005, you wrote: snip [GK] Hi Hal, My first comment was directed at your previous sentence which read something like: "The list of course would have properties that seem incompatible as simultaneous properties of a single object, but nevertheless definitions create such objects as the "is not" member of the definitional pair. So the All is - in total - self incompatible, but so what? " I thought, from it, that you meant to say that your Everything list contains contradictory attributions like "X is a car" and "X is not a car" for the same X. I obviously misunderstood you. The distinction is between existence and reality. While the whole list is taken as existing the assumption does not hold that every "is" and "is not" definable object can also have reality. I find it difficult to accept some combinations of "X is ***..." and "X is not ***..." as being simultaneous properties of the same object that can have reality or of any of its sub components but "round square" is perhaps not so unacceptable. For example in a discrete point universe where for one of its components half the applicable points are arranged "square" and half "round" this being a state in some sort of transition sequence of states wherein that component goes from being round to being square. Now when this particular state has reality in a sequence of such states does it not contain a "round square"? About your first assumption, as you restate above, I would venture to say that QM suggests that the existence of such list is very unlikely if by 'reality" one understands "physical reality" as defined by EPR, that is, as composed by distinct elements bearing properties that are independent of the means of observation used to assign them to such objects. This is the gist of Einstein's famous question "Is the moon there when nobody looks?" and all that folklore. I am making a distinction between existence and reality. Reality is a transitory state that some definable objects can have. Further I think it is incorrect to try to exclusively argue from a very small sub set [sample] of the objects that can have reality - presumably the states of our universe - back to the system that embeds them. If it turns out that quantum mechanics is part of the valid description of our universe [The issue is I believe an open one] then the embedding system should allow for that. This does not preclude other universes for which quantum mechanics is not part of the description. Now if by "reality" you mean platonic reality, I think it is a good question whether such list may exist or not. You will have to ask a mathematician... I am of the opinion that the line items on my list are just numbers. I believe that most participants in this venue would allow that "Numbers exist" is a possible starting point and that this is could be considered a type of Platonism. I just renamed numbers as "properties" so as to include all their interpretations [sets of other numbers]. (I am assuming it is contains an countable infinity of entries, no?) Well there is a difference between listing and counting. I may not be able to count the reals [at least in this universe] but I think a mathematician who allows for continuous dimensions in a 3D space will also allow that in such a space I can list the reals just by drawing a line segment of arbitrary length on a note pad. Since my list has no dimensionality restrictions I suspect it can be one for one with the continuum. Hal Ruhl
Re: subjective reality
-Original Message- From: Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 24 Aug 2005 14:15:43 -0400 Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Godfrey: At 12:03 PM 8/24/2005, you wrote: >Hi Hal, > >Just a minimal comment to what you state below. >I erase a bit of the previous exchange. > >Godfrey Kurtz >(New Brunswick, NJ) snip >[GK] > If I understand you correctly your List-of-Everything is pretty much > like our own everything-list (;-)! So it contains YD, CT and AR and also > their negations which makes it self-contradictory a priori and thus > imprevious to any charges of contradiction and in > all likelyhood beyond any argument that anyone may devise (since it obviously contains it too). My first assumption says: "There exists a list of all possible properties of objects that can have reality." Are you saying that this list taken as a whole is necessarily self contradictory and therefore you can not show it does not exist due to this internal self contradiction and this is your proof that it does not exist? Let me first point out that the list is just a list - not a system of logic. I give it only one property by assumption - existence. Hal Ruhl [GK] Hi Hal, My first comment was directed at your previous sentence which read something like: "The list of course would have properties that seem incompatible as simultaneous properties of a single object, but nevertheless definitions create such objects as the "is not" member of the definitional pair. So the All is - in total - self incompatible, but so what? " I thought, from it, that you meant to say that your Everything list contains contradictory attributions like "X is a car" and "X is not a car" for the same X. I obviously misunderstood you. About your first assumption, as you restate above, I would venture to say that QM suggests that the existence of such list is very unlikely if by 'reality" one understands "physical reality" as defined by EPR, that is, as composed by distinct elements bearing properties that are independent of the means of observation used to assign them to such objects. This is the gist of Einstein's famous question "Is the moon there when nobody looks?" and all that folklore. Now if by "reality" you mean platonic reality, I think it is a good question whether such list may exist or not. You will have to ask a mathematician... (I am assuming it is contains an countable infinity of entries, no?) Kindly, Godfrey Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey: At 12:03 PM 8/24/2005, you wrote: Hi Hal, Just a minimal comment to what you state below. I erase a bit of the previous exchange. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) snip [GK] If I understand you correctly your List-of-Everything is pretty much like our own everything-list (;-)! So it contains YD, CT and AR and also their negations which makes it self-contradictory a priori and thus imprevious to any charges of contradiction and in all likelyhood beyond any argument that anyone may devise (since it obviously contains it too). My first assumption says: "There exists a list of all possible properties of objects that can have reality." Are you saying that this list taken as a whole is necessarily self contradictory and therefore you can not show it does not exist due to this internal self contradiction and this is your proof that it does not exist? Let me first point out that the list is just a list - not a system of logic. I give it only one property by assumption - existence. Hal Ruhl
Re: subjective reality
Hi Hal, Just a minimal comment to what you state below. I erase a bit of the previous exchange. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 23 Aug 2005 10:33:45 -0400 Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Godfrey At 01:09 PM 8/22/2005, you wrote: [HR] I do not derive YD, CT or AR. The model is based on a list of properties that objects can have. Definition divides this list into two sub lists. The Nothing has the sole property "empty", the All has all the remaining properties. The list of course would have properties that seem incompatible as simultaneous properties of a single object, but nevertheless definitions create such objects as the "is not" member of the definitional pair. So the All is - in total - self incompatible, but so what? [GK] If I understand you correctly your List-of-Everything is pretty much like our own everything-list (;-)! So it contains YD, CT and AR and also their negations which makes it self-contradictory a priori and thus imprevious to any charges of contradiction and in all likelyhood beyond any argument that anyone may devise (since it obviously contains it too). (skipped) [HR] As to falsifiability of my model I will try to list my assumptions, etc.: 1) There exists a list [call it the Everything] of all possible properties of objects that can have reality. 2) The list is divided into two sub lists by the process of definition [definition forms a definitional [is:is not] pair]. 3) The definition resulting in the [Nothing:All] definitional pair is unavoidable and thus this pair has simultaneous existence with the list. It is then noted that the Nothing can not respond to any meaningful question about itself and there is such a question: Does it persist? Thus the Nothing is incomplete. The necessary attempt at resolution of this incompleteness by the Nothing by accessing [incorporating] parts of the list [a symmetry breaking?] results in a random dynamic within the All producing a randomly evolving Something [that which the Nothing has become by incorporating parts of the list] [an evolving universe]. But by #3 the Nothing must be restored so the process of creating randomly evolving Somethings repeats [a form of an MWI]. A random evolution can produce long strings of states of universes that can support Self Aware Structures [SAS], YD, comp etc. [A state of a universe is one side of a definitional pair - a sub list, and I have in the past called sub lists "kernels" [of information] to tie in with some of my previous posts.] That is my model in a nut shell. [GK] Sounds solid to me! And because it includes Everything and more(!) what can I possibly add beyond the suggestion that you name it the... "Whatever Theory" (:-). >I don't want to sound like a big stickler for Popper or >anything but I am sure you are familiar with the infamous >libel often directed at String Theory that "it is not even false!" I believe that particular description is actually more like "that is not even wrong" [citation unknown] and may be older than string theory. In any event I think we should be careful how we use descriptions such as true/false, right /wrong, compatible/incompatible, in contradiction with, etc. because they seem to have different domains. I am now interested in how you and Bruno use such terms re comp, YD, UDA, QM, MWI, etc. [GK] Oh, those tired dichotomies, true/false, right/wrong, bla-bla! There so confining, aren't they? No match for Everything/Nothing that is for sure(/unsure?)! I am sorry, Hal, but I am afraid my views may strike you as old fashioned as I am still a bit attached to those old notions you have already so dashingly transcended, like... common sense (;-) In that regard I think it is time you present your argument re YD/QM and see what the list has to say about it. Hal Ruhl [GK] Working on it. Regards, -Godfrey, Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Russell,
Thanks for the clarification on the White Rabbit issue.
That is helpful.
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 24 Aug 2005 13:27:19 +1000
Subject: Re: subjective reality
On Tue, Aug 23, 2005 at 10:19:34AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> My argument is not based on the White Rabbit Problem since I don't
> even know what that is, in all honesty! From reading Brunos's
"popular
> account" I gather it has something to do with the possibility of
> finding
> unruly or unexpected things once you believe the kind of "theory" he
> and, I guess you, profess. No?
>
[RS]
Another name for the White Rabbit problem is failure of
induction. Basically, it is the possibility that any/all of our laws of
science may suddenly stop being applicable. It bedevils most ensemble
theories of everything.
[GK]
Oh! In that case I don't think my argument qualifies as a White Rabbit
but you may think otherwise. I have set it up the other way around,
that
is, imagining a situation in which the laws (or consequences) of QM
defeat
the possibility of the "substitution" envisaged in the YD hypothesis.
You can
always appeal for "an exemption from the laws of physics" that would
still make
the process go and that would be a White Rabbit, I guess. But I don't
think
that qualifies as a loophole...
There is a subtler style of argument involving the "need" for laws of
nature
altogether that occurs sometimes in QM and, blocks out an exit route
from my
argument which is referred to sometimes as the "Demiurge Problem".
> Without meaning to disrespect your solutions, I think Quantum
> Mechanics
> produces a very good deal of "White Rabbits" on its own, and by this
> I mean predictions that thwart any of the everyday type of
expectations
> you place on reality!
[RS]
That is not what is meant by White Rabbits. Predictions of QM are
entirely lawlike even they're unexpected.
[GK]
Agreed (even if I would put the "lawlike" between quotes).
[RS]
Interestingly, someone pointed me at a paper by Esche the other day,
arguing that alternative "projection postulates" are compatible with
the MWI. The precise alternative projection postulate they supplied
turns out to be riddled with white rabbits - which makes me speculate
that the Born rule is precisely what you need to kill off all the
white rabbits in the MWI.
[GK]
I can't say I follow you here. MWI + Projection postulates should
reproduce
regular Copenhagenian QM since MWI is basically QM - Projection
Postulates!
Now killing white rabbits with the Born rule!??? If that could be
done, seems to
me, would obviate all the need for MWI in the first place, no?
>
> The argument I believe I have is just a simple working out of the
> premise
> of YD till you get to a situation that our current knowledge of QM
can
> defeat. I am sure there are many more that you can think up with a
> bit of reflection.
No, I have a complete "failure of imagination" in this department.
> [RS]
> So it is time to put up or shut up Godfrey! If you have some genuine
> argument against the YD, let's hear it.
>
> Cheers
>
> [GK]
> As I stated before I don't react very well to that style of macho
> pressure
> in spite of my (clumsy) attempts to use it on Bruno!
I'm hardly pressuring you, but it is very frustrating to be constantly
told by you that you have an interesting point to make, without you
ever making the point. This is not an email list for egotistical
posturings - people come here to learn stuff. It is fine to post
poorly thought out speculations, noone think any the less of you -
other bright minds can quickly find the glaring flaws in these, and
one learns something in the process, often including the very person
demolishing an argument.
Cheers
[GK]
I get your point and I do agree with you, somewhat.
I am leaning towards sketching the argument even
if not for Bruno's benefit any longer. Though it occurred to me as a
fly
in his ointment I think it may play a more constructive role in another
dispute which I find interesting. I am much less certain about that
last possibility and could certainly use your wits and those of the
other
member of the list in checking it out
Please, bear with me for a little longer while I work this out in some
communicable shape.
Kindly,
Godfrey
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics 0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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archive?
Hi All: I have not been able to access the list's archive for awhile. Is there a problem? Hal Ruhl
