Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-12-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


There are many ways to escape from this scenario. If you are Tookie, you 
will find yourself shunted into increasingly less likely situations: not 
being caught in the first place; being caught but not being found guilty; 
being sentenced to death but getting off on appeal; being pardoned by the 
Governer at the last moment; finding that you are one of the 1/billion 
people who have a natural resistance to the lethal agent. If that all falls 
through, you might find that your arrest and execution was all part of a 
dream, or that you were actually executed but your head was preserved and 
you were resurrected as a computer upload in the future, or you were 
resurrected as a result of brute force emulation of every possible human 
mind in the very far future. These latter possibilities may be more likely 
than quantum tunneling to a tropical island, but in the final analysis, 
however unlikely the escape route may be, if its probability is non-zero, 
then it *has* to happen, doesn't it?


Stathis Papaioannou


Jonathan Corgan wrote:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> In the multiverse, only other people end up in dead ends.

Kind of makes you wonder what Tookie is doing right now.  To us, he died
as a result of lethal injection.

What sort of successor observer-moments can follow a thing like that?

Better question--what is the most likely type of 1st-person
observer-moment that would follow experiencing lethal injection?

Sure, there is an infinitesimal probability that all his constituent
particles quantum-tunneled to a Pacific island paradise and right now
somewhere in the multiverse he's enjoying a drink with an umbrella in
it, thanking the fine State of California for his new life.

More likely, but still infinitesimally small, is the probability that
only the molecules of toxin in the injection syringe quantum-tunneled
away and right now there are execution officials puzzling over whether
to pardon him after this "act-of-God" miraculous reprieve from death.

But seriously, when the overwhelmingly vast majority of successor
moments to an instant in time are all 3rd-person dead-ends, what would
would be an example of a high-expectation 1st-person successor
observer-moment from the tiny sliver of physically possible (but
extremely unlikely) ones left?

Is there in fact always one left, no matter how unlikely?

-Johnathan



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Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-12-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Quentin Anciaux writes:


Hi Jesse,

> unless you are willing to say that white rabbit universes have a
> lower absolute measure than stable-laws-of-nature universes, you have no
> justification for expecting that you are unlikely to experience such 
events

> in your future.
>
> Jesse

You have no justification, but in (everything like) multiverse, it is for 
sure

(probability 1) that an extension of your present self *will* experience
weird events. Because all possibilities are fullfiled in the multiverse...

The problem arise because of what we call "I"... the "I" that will 
experience

weird thing will remember being the present "I"... So when you say that you
have to explain why *you* are unlikely to experience weird event, who is
"you" ? All next "you" will remember being current "you".


This is true, but you can only experience being one person at a time. When I 
contemplate what may happen to me tomorrow, I have to consider all the 
future versions of me in the multiverse as having equal right to consider 
themselves "me". So if half the versions of me tomorrow are expected to 
suffer, I am worried, because I might be one of those who suffers. But when 
tomorrow comes and I am not suffering, I am relieved - even though those who 
are suffering have as much right to consider themselves the continuation of 
yesterday's version of "me" as I do. Our psychology creates an asymmetry 
between the present and the future when it comes to personal identity. Some 
on this list (eg. Lee Corbin) have argued that this is irrational: copies 
that are "me" in the future should also be considered "me" in the present 
and past. However, our psychological makeup is as it is: our future 
encompasses many possibilities, but our present and past is fixed and 
single.


Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-12-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 15-déc.-05, à 03:04, Saibal Mitra a écrit :




To me it seems that the notion of ''successor'' has to break down at 
cases
where the observer can die. The Tookies that are the most similar to 
the
Tookie who got executed are the ones who got clemency. There is no 
objective
reason why these Tookies should be excluded as ''successors''. They 
miss the
part of their memories about things that happened after clemency was 
denied.
Instead of those memories they have other memories. We forget things 
all the
time. Sometimes we remember things that didn't really happen. So, we 
allow
for information loss anyway. My point is then that we should forget 
about
all of the information contained in the OM and just sample from the 
entire

set of OMs.

The notion of a ''successor'' is not a fundamental notion at all. You 
can

define it any way you like.



?




It will not lead to any conflict with any
experiments you can think of.





?

Counterexamples will appear if I succeed to explain more of the 
conversation with the lobian machines.


But just with the Kripke semantics we have a base to doubt what you are 
saying here. Indeed, it is the relation of accessibility between OMs 
which determine completely the invariant laws pertaining in all OMs. 
For example, if the multiverse is reflexive the Bp -> p is true in all 
OMs (that is, Bp -> p is invariant for any walk in the multiverse). If 
the mutliverse is "terminal" of "papaioannou-like) then Dt -> ~BDt  is 
a law. In Kripke structure the accessibility relation determined the 
invariant laws.
later, the modal logic is given by the machine interview, and from 
that, we will determine the structure of the multiverse, including the 
"observable" one.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-12-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 14-déc.-05, à 01:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

In the multiverse, only other people end up in dead ends. Although 
from a third person perspective every entity in the multiverse could 
be said to exist only transiently because at every point of an 
entity's history we can say that there sprouts a dead end branch of 
zero extent, from a first person perspective, these branches cannot by 
definition ever be experienced.



All right.
Could I take this as a defence of the "Papaioannou multiverse" for some 
third person description: those where each world where you have a next 
state leads to a dead end?
I call them "realist frames" in Conscience & Mechanism". Sometimes they 
are called "terminal frames" in the literature.


I know you have solved the "only if" part of following exercise:

(W, R) is reflexive iff  (W,R) respects Bp -> p.

I will come back on the "if" part later.

Have you done this: showing that

(W,R) is a "Papaioannou multiverse"   iff(W,R) respects Dt 
-> D(Bf).


Note that this question is a little bit academical. I have already 
explain how I will choose the modal logics. Actually I will not choose 
them, I will extract them from a conversation with the machine (and its 
"guardian angel"). This will leave no choice. It will happen that the 
formula
Dt -> D(Bf) will appear in the discourse machine; indeed perhaps some 
of you know already that this is just the second incompleteness of 
Godel, once you interpret Bp by "the machine proves p", coded in some 
language the machine can use.


=
Exercises for those who begins the study of modal logics:
Does every one see that all the following formula are equivalent? :

Dt -> ~B(Dt)
Dt -> D(Bf)
BDt -> Bf
~Bf -> ~B(~Bf)


Those are equivalent (in all the modal logics we will meet), and the 
only things people should know to prove those equivalences are that:


1)
~Bp   is equivalent with D~p (not necessary p = possible not p)
~Dp is equivalent with B~p  (not possible p = necessary not p)
Bp is equivalent with ~D~p
Dp is equivalent with ~B~p

From this you can deduce a nice memo: a not "~" can jump over boxes by 
transforming  them into diamonds, and reciprocally:

For example:
~BBf is equivalent with Dt

and 2)
the contraposition law:  (A -> B) is equivalent with (~B -> ~A).


I urge people who have difficulties NOT to hesitate to ask me question 
OUT of line. Too bad to miss the marvel of all marvels (G and G*) for 
reason of math-notation-anxiety!!!


Bruno






http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/