Le 16-août-06, à 18:36, Tom Caylor a écrit :
I noticed that you slipped in infinity (infinite collection of
computations) into your roadmap (even the short roadmap). In the
technical posts, if I remember right, you said that at some point we
were leaving the constructionist realm. But are
Le 16-août-06, à 18:04, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The self-reference logics are born from the goal of escaping circular
difficulties.
I think here I may have experienced a 'blinding flash' in terms of your
project. If, as I've said, I begin from self-reference -
Le 16-août-06, à 22:54, John M a écrit :
But 2 is just another notation for xx.
Why is x 'just another notation for 2? or
why is xx not (just) a notation of 3?
Mathematician have all the right! As a mathematician you are free to
name the number two as you want. *polite* mathematician,
Comp is false. Let's see where *that* leads. I'm erecting
this as a signpost to indicate a direction, and I would beg the
list's indulgence in helping me to look in this direction, rather
than confining its comments to the ramshackle construction of the
signpost itself. My hope is that you will
Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit :
Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just
assume).
A bold assumption, if I may say so.
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit :
Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just
assume).
A bold assumption, if I may say so.
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
assumption, but number
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Hi,
A lot of the dialog below is a mismatch of ideas which indicates that I
have underestimated the degree of difficulty to be expected in getting the
idea of hierarchical structures across. Nevetheless..
I think you are assuming a separateness of structure
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note that if you understand the whole UDA, you should realize that the
price of assuming a physical universe (and wanting it to be related
with our experiences *and* our experiments) is to postulate that you
(and us, if you are not solipsistic) are not turing
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 17-août-06, à 16:41, 1Z a écrit :
Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical
structures *exist* independently of you,
not just that they are true independently of you.
What is the difference between the proposition it exists a prime
number is true
David,
your post has wits. Yet it reminded me of 'atheism' which starts from the
belief it is supposed to deny. I am not an atheist, because I do not know
what to deny: what do people 'think' to call god?
My question to comp was (and I think it is different from your position):
Let me IN into
Bruno Marchal writes:
There is no authoritative argument in math. There are fashion,
prejudice, stubbornness and many human things like that, but nobody
serious in math will believe something because the boss said so.
Interesting: this marks mathematics as different from just about
every
Brent Meeker writes:
Empirical science is universe-specific: eg., any culture, no matter how
bizarre its psychology compared to ours, would work out that sodium
reacts exothermically with water in a universe similar to our own, but
not in a universe where physical laws and
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated
form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the
propositions of elementary arithmetic
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
John
Thanks for taking the trouble to express your thoughts at such length.
I won't say too much now, as I have to leave shortly to meet a long
lost relative - from Hungary! However, I just want to make sure it's
clear, both for you and the list, that:
Comp is false.
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Hi,
A lot of the dialog below is a mismatch of ideas which indicates that I
have underestimated the degree of difficulty to be expected in getting
the
If they are different substructures within a further (different)
structure, they are also unified, in that
Peter Jones writes:
A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot
support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist.
It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene
on the physical. This is far from a generally accepted fact,
but there but I am not yet aware of
Bruno: is your
I do indeed find plausible that the number six is perfect,...
an argument?
I asked about the sixness of six, without counting or quantizing. I honor
your opinion, but it is no evidence. 6 is so nice round, VI is not.
If you want, numbers are what makes any counting possible
- Original Message -
From: David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 8:16 PM
Subject: Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Dave,
thanks fir the friendly and decent words. It was not questionable that
I don't think there is a problem with science, but only with some
scientist (and alas with those who are often more refer too in
popularization).
Actually I don't believe in any scientific field. I believe only in
scientific attitude, which is almost just modesty, along with
curiosity,
I don't think there is a problem with science, but only with some
scientist (and alas with those who are often more refer too in
popularization).
Actually I don't believe in any scientific field. I believe only in
scientific attitude, which is almost just modesty, along with
curiosity,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Empirical science is universe-specific: eg., any culture, no matter how
bizarre its psychology compared to ours, would work out that sodium
reacts exothermically with water in a universe similar to our own, but
not in a universe where
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated
form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the
propositions
Norman Samish wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Brent, you say, . . . It seems to me that an information theoretic
analysis should be able to place a lower bound on how small a
probability can be and not be zero.
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