Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > Russell Standish writes:
> >
> > > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
> > > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
> > > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all informa
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 08:53:07PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > OMs are defined by some information. Very clearly more than 1 bit is
> > involved, but it is presumably finite.
> >
> > Let us say that within this OM I am aware of two apples - 1 red and
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
> > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
> > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information
> > that can be extracted from
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > >
> > > The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists
> > > are partially right.
> >
> > The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point
> > about a block universe is that there is no A
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > Also see my reply to Russell below:
> >
> >
> > >Russell Standish
> > >
> > >The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described
> > >by the Schroedinger equation. I make the id
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> I was using "quantum state" as synonymous with "physical state", which I guess
> is what you are referring to in the above paragraph. The observer sees a
> classical
> universe because in observing he collapses the wave function or selects one
> branch
> of the mult
Russell Standish writes:
> OMs are defined by some information. Very clearly more than 1 bit is
> involved, but it is presumably finite.
>
> Let us say that within this OM I am aware of two apples - 1 red and 1
> green. The information describing one of these apples is the
> "component" I was r
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 07:00:19PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
> > they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
> > information, a particular meaning to a parti
Russell Standish writes:
> I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
> they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
> information, a particular meaning to a particular observer.
Computationalists do sometimes say things like "cognition is comput
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