Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

2007-01-19 Thread Jason

William wrote:
> A simple way of picturing this, would be that at the big bang; the
> universe is 1 piece of paper, and from then on, every second, the
> piece(s) of paper is cut in half; giving 1, 2, 4, 8, ... universes. The
> total area of paper remains the same and all the pieces get smaller all
> the time, this means that the chance of being in a particular universe
> as the universe splitting progresses, even decreases :).

I consider this a very insightful way of looking at it.  Starting with
the universe's intitial conditions defined to have probability 1, every
branched history that follows will occur with some fractional
probability, and the sum of all the histories in any single point of
time will all have equal probabilities.  In effect every point of time
would be equally weighted statistically.


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

2007-01-19 Thread Jason


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> That is, once you are a conscious entity, you will follow a constrained 
> branching
> path through the multiverse giving the illusion of a single linear history. 
> Measure is
> redefined at every branching point: the subjective probability of your next 
> moment.
> Since the branches of the multiverse will never come to an abrupt stop, there 
> will always
> be a "next moment" and your stream of consciousness will never end. This the 
> quantum
> immortality idea, underpinned by what this list has called the relative 
> self-sampling
> assumption (RSSA).
>
> Stathis Papaioannou

I think a lot of confusion comes from the use of pronounds such as
"you".  In the realm of multiverses, block time, and many-worlds, the
word "you" becomes much harder to define.  Consider time: since your
brain is in a different state from one moment to the next how can you
be said to be the same person?  As you examine your branched selves in
more and more distantly branched universes, you will find a greater and
greater discrepancy.  You could even imagine at the moment of your
conception a different sperm may have fertalized you, would a copy of
"you" with only one gene's difference still be enough like you to be
you?  Where can the line be drawn as to who you are and who you are
not?

I believe that if one accepts that he or she will be conscious of their
perspective five minutes from now, they must accept that they will
perceive conscious perspectives of their selves in other branched
universes.  If one accepts they will be conscious of and perceive these
other perspecties, they must also therefore be conscious of everyone
else's perspective.  And if you accept that, then you must be conscious
of every conscious creatures perspective, in every point of time, in
every branched history, in every universe.

To illustrate problems with personal identity, consider these thought
experiments:

1. Imagine a technologically advanced race that created simulations of
their brains that run on computers. If two brains were being simulated
on the same computer by sharing time on the CPU, both individuals would
be conscious within the computer at the same time, but neither
simulated individual remembers being the other because the programs are
restricted from accessing each other's memory space. In the same way
those brains were simulated on the same computer, our brains are
computed by the physics of this universe. The universe experiences all
conscious perspectives simultaneously, yet we as individuals do not
remember being conscious of these other perspectives since our memory
is not shared.

2. For a second example, consider that with each successive point in
time, a new copy of you is created in a slightly modified state.
However, if that state is constantly changing, you are essentially a
different person from one point in time to the next. If time is indeed
discrete, it should be even more apparent that we have no continuous
identity. If we have no continuous identity, by what means could
consciousness be tied to one creature's perspective? There could be no
simple rule to define whose brain state you will perceive from one
point in time to the next. All that could be said is that all conscious
perspectives will be perceived, but no one could say who will perceive
them.

3. Imagine that using advanced technology, the current state of your
body was recorded and then an exact duplicate of you was constructed.
Would you perceive the world from the viewpoint of your double? Common
sense says no, but then consider this slightly different example: A
recording of your state is recorded, and then you are completely
destroyed. Every atom in your body is taken apart. Then the recording
of your state is used to reconstruct you. Would you not have been
brought back to life by this procedure? Would you not perceive the
viewpoint of this recreation? In the first scenario we are less likely
to claim we would perceive the duplicate's perspective, but it is no
different from the second scenario where you are destroyed and
recreated. Now consider this even more bizarre scenario: Your state is
recorded, you are destroyed, and then 5 duplicates of yourself in the
recorded state are created. Which one's perspective do you take? There
can be only one answer: You take all of them.  The above scenario seems
unlikely and you probably have doubts as to whether or not is
technically feasible. Nevertheless, duplicates of you are being created
all the time as the universe branches. In each case you end up in a
slightly different universe, in some you end up slightly changed
yourself.


To me this leaves two equally valid definitions for the term "you".
Either it refers to one conscious observer's perspective, at one point
of time, in one universe, in one branched history line OR it could
refer to reality's single first-person perspective of itself.

For this reason I don't believe there can be a simple definition of
"observers", 

Multi-universes probably doesn't exist

2007-01-19 Thread Mozart21


I think it is impossible that multiuniverses exist. The reason is
located in chapter 27 of a paper I wrote. You can download
this paper at www.grand-theory.com. The problem is that
I develop a new idea about universe and to understand it,
you may probably read the previous chapter before chapter 27.


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

2007-01-19 Thread Brent Meeker


William wrote:


I have been reading up on this subject a little bit and about the
quantum immortality, I believe it is a common misconception that this
means you will never die; if all future branches involve your death,
then you will die ... Quantum immortality does not imply that you can
dodge every bullet and that the "you of today" will still live
tomorrow, although the "you of yesterday" could still live tomorrow
whilst the "you of today" does not.

Also I personally do not believe ASSA favours a MWI interpretation of
quantum mechanics over a deterministic one because a "single MWI
universe" will be less probable than a "single deterministic universe".
But it might favour MWI over Copenhagen interpretation.

If the universe splits into 2 universes each second; I do not
necissarily see an issue as explained by Stathis Papaioannou in his
post. And it is even a fact that you are more probable to live in the
year 2000 than in the year 1000 because the human population has grown;
but once we go to infinities, the same approach might not work anymore
(although I am still debating about this myself) ...

Anyway, I do not believe that MWI favours later moments in time over
earlier moments in time. Although the number of universes increases,
their individual probability decreases, keeping the total probability
equal (although relativity might complicate a more rigorous approach).
A simple way of picturing this, would be that at the big bang; the
universe is 1 piece of paper, and from then on, every second, the
piece(s) of paper is cut in half; giving 1, 2, 4, 8, ... universes. The
total area of paper remains the same and all the pieces get smaller all
the time, this means that the chance of being in a particular universe
as the universe splitting progresses, even decreases :).


That's a good way to look at it.  Everett originally called his interpretation 
a 'relative state'; emphasizing that observed states were relative to the 
observer.  'Multiple universes' is a convenient way of talking, but the idea 
comes from holding onto the unitary evolution of the state vector in a Hilbert 
space describing states of the universe.  So there is only one universe and it 
is the projection onto different semi-classical subspaces (the only kind we can 
experience) that correspond to different 'universes'.  In QM you can have 
negative information (due to the correlations of entanglement) and so from the 
Hilbert space view the total information may be zero, even though the 
projection onto subspaces is very complex.

I also think that the modeling of the inner product in Hilbert space as real 
number is probably and approximation.  QM and general relativity together  
imply that there are smallest units of time and space, the Planck units.  When 
a quantum theory of gravity is invented I think it may imply a smallest unit of 
probability - so that the arbitrarily small probabilities required for Tegmark 
to survive his machine gun will not exist.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life

2007-01-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


Brent,

I must go, so I will just comment one line before commenting the other 
paragraph (tomorrow, normally).



Le 18-janv.-07, à 06:38, Brent Meeker a écrit :

Why isn't the computer (or rock) associated with an infinity of 
computations?  I'm assuming you mean a potential countable infinity in 
the future.



I don't know if computers or rocks "really exist", nor what you mean 
exactly by such words, but as far as you can associate a computational 
state to the computer or to the rocks, it belongs to a (first person 
actual) NON COUNTABLE infinity of computational histories, including 
quite dummy one, like a program which dovetails on some loopy local 
simulation of the rock (or the computer) together with a (infinite) 
dovetailing on the real numbers. Cf my old conversation with Jurgen 
Schmidhuber. OK?


That is why comp predicts a priori not only some white rabbits, but 
continua of white rabbits. QM eliminates them by "destructive 
interference", and my point is just that if we take comp seriously 
enough, then we have to justify those destructive interference by 
classical computer science/number theory alone.


Now, a way to see what happens ( a shortcut!) consists in interviewing 
a correct lobian machine which looks inward, and, because such a 
machine has to take into account the modal nuances forced by the 
incompleteness phenomenon, i.e. the nuance between p,  Bp,  Bp & p,  Bp 
& Dp, etc., the structure of the space of possible histories appears to 
be arithmetically quantized in some way. Enough to associate a 
universal quantum field in the neighborhood of universal machine? Well, 
that is still an open problem.



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

2007-01-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

Dear John,


Le 17-janv.-07, à 18:11, John M a écrit :


Dear Bruno,
may I ask you to spell out your "B" and "D"?
in your:
>Let D = the proposition "God exists", "~" = NOT, B = believes.<
Where I think I cannot substitute your "~" for the "=NOT"  - or, if 
the entire line is meaning ONE idea, that "B" believes both the 
affirmative and the negatory.

Also: the difference between ~BD and ~B~D?



In this paragraph you should interpret B by "believes" or by "the 
subject believes". And D is an abbreviation of "God exists" (careful! 
in other context D is an abbreviation of "~B~", that is "the subject 
does not believe in the negation of ".


Example: B(it rains) = the subject believes it rains.
   BD = the subject believes that God exists.

the tilde symbol  ~represents the classical negation. A logician 
will write~(it rains) for saying that it does not rain. So we 
recover the four modal negation cases already known by Aristotle (as 
the aristotelian square):


BD = the subject believes that God exists

B(~D) = the subject believes that God does not exist

~BD = the subject does not believe that God exists

~B~D = the subject does not believe that God does not exist.

We have:

BD is true for the so-called "believer" (in God)

B(~D) is true for the atheist (he is a believer: he believes that God 
does not exist)


~BD is true for a (consistent) atheist or for an agnostic

~B~D is true for a (consistent) believer or for an agnostic.

To characterize an agnostic, you have to say that both ~BD and ~B~D are 
true for him. He does neither believe in God, nor in the inexistence of 
God.


If you replace God by Santa-Klaus, or by "Primary matter" you get the 
corresponding notion of believer, atheist, agnostic relatively to Santa 
Klaus existence or Matter existence ...





 
I have the feeling that we both are on the same ground in our 
nonexistent beliefs and I expressed that also as being an agnostic, 
rather than the atheist (who needs a god-concept (incl. matter, for 
that matter) to DENY.)



We agree on this, and I think we even agree that we agree on this :)



 It is contrary to the German common usage of "gottlos" (same in my 
language) - but we try to step further than the conventional common 
historically used  vocabulary.


Yes.



Br:
>I do neither believe in the inexistence of God, nor in the 
>inexistence of Matter. I wait for more data.<
I took a more straightforward stance when a 'believer' challenged me 
to prove: there is NO god, I said I can disprove only if he proved the 
existence.



This is the quasi-definitive proof that you are a lobian machine ... in 
case, you accept to interpret arithmetically Plotinus' ONE by "truth". 
Lobian machine can disprove any attempt to define truth ...   (this is 
mainly a consequence of Tarski theorem)





 
Another (redface) ignorance of mine: it seems that your Wi and Fi 
references appeared in the parts more technical than I could 
consciously absorb, so I am at a loss.



It is not very difficult. According to Norman Samish it looks too much 
technical for the list, but I am not sure. In general those who have 
some problem with the technical stuff have just some lack of elementary 
"modern math". I will have to come back on the Wi and the Fi, if people 
are interested in the real stuff 





Computable must mean more than "Turing emulable" (R.Rosen) since the 
unrestricted totality is not available in toto for this later concept.


"total computable" means more than "turing emulable" (partially 
computable).  Let us not enter in the technics right now, but keep 
insisting :-)





Br asked:
>You seem quite sure about that. How do you know? >Why couldn'it be 
that *you* find this "limited" due to your >own prejudice about 
numbers and machines? <
I was impregnated by some commi dialectic materialism over 2 decades 
and found a perspective of things developing gradually reasonable. AI 
emulates (some) human mental characteristics and I don't believe that 
this process has been completed.


Of course, but I am a theoretician interested in guessing where 
"matter" and "mind" comes from. Also I have theoretical reasons to 
believe that AI will never proVably succeed. Comp can be used to 
predict that even some of the AI products will never believe in AI. 
Some machine will be anticomputationalist.




 I see additional possibilities to extend into, especially in mental 
events we have not yet discovered.



Hmmm... Careful with this type of argument. It is like saying that I 
don't believe in quantum mechanics because it does not explain how Uri 
Geller can change the shape of a fork without touching it. I mean few 
theories can explain things not yet discovered (even theoretically).





This 'feeling' is not due to my - as you say - prejudice about numbers 
and machines.
I could not spell out such 'prejudice', not in the least because of my 
above argument in agnosticism: I did not get so far a firm support for 
the 'numbers' being the

Re: The Meaning of [your] Life

2007-01-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Mark,

Le 16-janv.-07, à 13:41, Mark Peaty a écrit :

 Bruno: 'To be honest I always fear a bit those who want to help me or 
others,
 but thanks anyway for the good intentions (which pave the way to hell 
... :) '


 MP: yes, I can relate to that. Be reassured then that as I understand 
it [AIUI], helping you and others is very much in my own interest.


Cool.


I must feel that my life has meaning. Without this, getting up in the 
morning would become a terrible effort never mind going to work in the 
oxymoronic, Sisyphus-world of bureaucracy. Amongst other things this 
entails belief that the things I do contribute to the well being and 
survival prospects of those I love and also to the benefit of those 
upon whom my children and their children will depend in the future. As 
I like to say: the human universe is always potentially infinite, so 
long as it exists and we believe it to be so.


OK.



However I have not met anyone who can reassure me that the human 
species has anything much more than a 50% chance of surviving beyond 
the next 200 years.



Ah but this is something else. To comment this I need to comment your 
last paragraph before, so ... see below.







 I can see how all the pieces necessary to create sustainable and 
enduring social and cultural networks and systems already exist; the 
technology has already been invented, the theory has all been written 
down. What is not clear to me however is how to ensure that everybody 
with the need [effectively everybody on the planet] can access the 
information they need to make fully informed decisions about the 
crucial issues which affect us. I am pretty much convinced that the 
answer/s involves person to person dialogue rather than propaganda and 
oratory, and the empowerment of individuals to undertake human sized 
projects rather than the regimenting of industrial clone armies in 
massive organisations.


Well ... OK.


AIUI the practice of sceptical inquiry is fundamental to getting 
things right.



I agree. (But I think skeptical inquiry in the field of scientific (= 
modest, doubting) has been abandoned since 1500 years when the academy 
of Athena has been closed. The Enlightenment has been only 
half-Enlightenment: scientific theology remained stuck in the 
authoritative mode of thinking).




In this vein, we all need to help each other to see on the one hand 
the formidable danger which affects absolutely ALL of us, and on the 
other hand to see the utterly amazing potential for creatively solving 
all the practical problems that confront us. Such is the nature of the 
modern world as it is transformed again and again by the fruits of the 
application of scientific method.



I would say it is like that since the very beginning.





 Bruno: 'Then I can explain you with all details why the proposition 
"we will all 1-die" is provably "put in doubt" once we assume either 
just comp or even just quantum mechanics. With QM this is not wishful 
thinking but "terrorful" thinking: a priori the QM immortality is not 
fun: each time we die clinically (in a relative third person way), 
from our personal point of view we survive in the closer normal comp. 
history. A case can been made that this entails a sort of eternal 
agony. Of course this can be nuanced too. With comp some weird gap 
seems to exist ... '


MP: I do not understand this. I am surprised to notice, however, a 
faint resemblance to something I read once concerning the teachings of 
George Gurdjieff, an ethnic Armenian who became a teacher of 'esoteric 
religion' and some very deep insights into how humans function, in the 
early 20 Century. He died in 1952 in France. Gurdjieff was asked what 
was the truth about reincarnation, and the reply was along the lines 
of: talk of souls transmigrating from body to body over millennia was 
misleading, it is more like that if a person could not see what they 
were really doing, and what they are, then they [we] are condemned to 
live and relive that same life - until we realise what is happening [I 
suppose, or some such ... ].
 Well once upon a time I was very enthusiastic about George 
Gurdjieff's teachings but now I think just that his psychological 
insights and practical methods were good but too much of his 
metaphysics, for want of a better word, is pre-scientific in origin.



To make things simple, let me say that I think somehow the contrary. I 
believe that his metaphysics insights are basically "correct" or at 
least coherent with facts, theories, and philosophical principles which 
I think are almost beyond reasonable doubts, but I am less far 
convinced in the practical use of such insights. Now if that can help 
some people, why not, but, like sometimes with mystics, I'm afraid his 
disciples didn't got him right.
I don't think Gurdjieff metaphysics is pre-scientific, it is 
pre-aristotelian perhaps, and in that sense, it could be visionary. I 
know that I have much more to explain to you for making such things 

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

2007-01-19 Thread Quentin Anciaux


Hi,

Le Vendredi 19 Janvier 2007 12:20, William a écrit :

I have been reading up on this subject a little bit and about the
quantum immortality, I believe it is a common misconception that this
means you will never die; if all future branches involve your death,
then you will die ... Quantum immortality does not imply that you can
dodge every bullet and that the "you of today" will still live
tomorrow, although the "you of yesterday" could still live tomorrow
whilst the "you of today" does not.


It would be the case if the multiverse contains "cul-de-sac" places... If you 
take the approach that every moments have a successor moment, then quantum 
immortality predict you'll never loose conscioussness.



Also I personally do not believe ASSA favours a MWI interpretation of
quantum mechanics over a deterministic one because a "single MWI
universe" will be less probable than a "single deterministic universe".
But it might favour MWI over Copenhagen interpretation.


I personnaly believe ASSA is broken... because for one thing it cannot explain 
stream of consciousness, arrow of time and so on... RSSA can.


With RSSA you don't assume that "you" is sampled from all moments, but only 
sampled from moments consistent where the current "you" is in.



If the universe splits into 2 universes each second; I do not
necissarily see an issue as explained by Stathis Papaioannou in his
post. And it is even a fact that you are more probable to live in the
year 2000 than in the year 1000 because the human population has grown;
but once we go to infinities, the same approach might not work anymore
(although I am still debating about this myself) ...

Anyway, I do not believe that MWI favours later moments in time over
earlier moments in time. Although the number of universes increases,
their individual probability decreases, keeping the total probability
equal (although relativity might complicate a more rigorous approach).
A simple way of picturing this, would be that at the big bang; the
universe is 1 piece of paper, and from then on, every second, the
piece(s) of paper is cut in half; giving 1, 2, 4, 8, ... universes. The
total area of paper remains the same and all the pieces get smaller all
the time, this means that the chance of being in a particular universe
as the universe splitting progresses, even decreases :).



All of this is to kept ASSA which I don't think is true (not even logically 
true).


Quentin

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

2007-01-19 Thread William


I have been reading up on this subject a little bit and about the
quantum immortality, I believe it is a common misconception that this
means you will never die; if all future branches involve your death,
then you will die ... Quantum immortality does not imply that you can
dodge every bullet and that the "you of today" will still live
tomorrow, although the "you of yesterday" could still live tomorrow
whilst the "you of today" does not.

Also I personally do not believe ASSA favours a MWI interpretation of
quantum mechanics over a deterministic one because a "single MWI
universe" will be less probable than a "single deterministic universe".
But it might favour MWI over Copenhagen interpretation.

If the universe splits into 2 universes each second; I do not
necissarily see an issue as explained by Stathis Papaioannou in his
post. And it is even a fact that you are more probable to live in the
year 2000 than in the year 1000 because the human population has grown;
but once we go to infinities, the same approach might not work anymore
(although I am still debating about this myself) ...

Anyway, I do not believe that MWI favours later moments in time over
earlier moments in time. Although the number of universes increases,
their individual probability decreases, keeping the total probability
equal (although relativity might complicate a more rigorous approach).
A simple way of picturing this, would be that at the big bang; the
universe is 1 piece of paper, and from then on, every second, the
piece(s) of paper is cut in half; giving 1, 2, 4, 8, ... universes. The
total area of paper remains the same and all the pieces get smaller all
the time, this means that the chance of being in a particular universe
as the universe splitting progresses, even decreases :).


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