Re: Some thoughts from Grandma
On 03/07/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > But it might then be > questioned how observer and physical narratives could somehow > 'converge' on a common or consistent environmental interface as a > result of any form of co-evolution. Such a notion would seem to imply > that equivalent selection effects could be operating on both > environments despite their orthogonal orientation. It is not > immediately apparent why this should be so. As far as I understand, this is *the* problem. It seems insoluble untill you take into account explicitly the incompleteness phenomenon which put high constraint of what sound machines can believe, bet, observe, feel ... (that what the hypostases are all about). DN: On reflection, I have something else to ask about this. If I have understood, the comp project is to give an account, as you say, of what emerges from interviewing (computationally) sound machines about their beliefs, bets, observations, feelings etc. In other words, the maximal description of their mental and physical worlds that is possible under such constraints. What would still be indeterminate would be exactly how a specific machine's account could be correlated with a physical description of the machine itself: i.e. the perennial 'mind-body problem'. But do you believe that there can be a way of closing this question theoretically? Is comp agnostic to this correlation being 'functional' or 'physical'? Or will 'yes doctor' remain always a gamble in the sense of "you picks your theory and you takes your choice"? David > > > Le 02-juil.-07, à 18:12, David Nyman a écrit : > > > > > After very kindly concurring with bits of my recent posts, Bruno > > nonetheless quite reasonably questioned whether I followed his way of > > proceeding. Having read the UDA carefully, I would say that in a > > 'grandmotherly' way I do, although not remotely at his technical > > level. > > > Concerning the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA) a subtle > prerequisite is Church Thesis, if only to understand the relation with > arithmetical realism and also to understand the term "Universal" in the > UD. Coming back from Siena I am not sure "Church thesis" is well > understood today. > BTW I have discovered that the book edited by Martin Davis "The > undecidable" has been republished in 2004 by Dover. This is really the > comp basic bible. It contains the readable original paper by Godel, > Church, Kleene, Rosser, and, above all the incredible anticipation by > Post. Actually Post did even anticipate my thesis, that is the > platonistic reversal physics/number-computer-science. To be sure he > adds a footnote (footnote 118) saying he changed his mind ... I think I > will write a paper just on that footnote > > > > > > But I had been doing thought experiments of a somewhat similar > > nature literally for decades, based on questions like "why am I me and > > not you?" or "how do I know that me now is the same as me 5 minutes > > ago?" or "is the person who gets out of the transporter the same > > person as the one who began the journey?" For some time, faced > > largely with incomprehension or disinterest, and seeing hardly > > anything remotely like this referred to in print, I despaired of > > finding others who believed these questions were anything but > > irrelevant or crazy. But gradually these topics seemed to emerge into > > discussion from a variety of directions, and now I've found a > > community of similarly crazy people on the Internet. > > > Actually those typical comp or mechanist thought experiences > (reasonings) exist since humans use tools. Reference are in the biblios > of "conscience et mécanisme". Many Sc. fiction book go through such > experience, and the book "Mind's I" (ed. by Hofstadter and Dennett) > contains relevant thought (but miss my favorite sc. fi. book, the > "SIMULACRON III" by Daniel Galouye). > Mind'I eyes missed the first person comp indeterminacy and the > subsequent reversal. > > > > > > > The conclusion I had come to is broadly summarised in my recent > > posts. It seemed to me that the 'transporter' questions could only be > > resolved if I thought in terms of my being incorporated in some unique > > or 'global' pre-differentiated manner, which nonetheless > > multifariously self-localised by differentiation of structures that > > embodied distinct 'histories'. > > > I would say that, once we accept comp, the only problem which remains > is the "white rabbit problem", that is: the problem of isolating from > computer science the measure on the relative computational histories > capable of justifying the apparent normality of the observable laws. > > > > > This seemed somehow to entail the > > emergence of finitude from the not-finite, which seemed weirdly > > right. > > > ? (comp presupposes the natural numbers. Indeed they constitute the > absolutely unsolvable mysteries). > > > > > Anyway, it would be the histories that differed, not the > > 'self'. > > > This
Re: Asifism revisited.
On 04/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: TT: You can look at the Game-of-Life-Universe, where you can see how the "gliders" move. If you look at "Conway's game of Life" in Wikipedia, you can look at how the Glider Gun is working in the top right corner. This is possible although there is no observer integral to that Universe. DN: Please, if we are to make progress, may we have more precision? You clearly specified a hypothetical B-Universe which you invited us to consider might be different in some fundamental way to ours. GoL is clearly in no way a different 'universe' in this sense - you're making a loose, conversational use of the term which has an entirely different entailment. GoL is a part of the A-Universe just as we are, so as integral observers of course we can observe it. You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting and important IMO. This concerns the necessary entailment of 'existence'. When we perform the thought experiment, we cause a B-Universe to 'exist'. What kind of existence is this? Well, it's a thought pattern, so you may wish to consider it as an aspect of brain, or mind, or both. Either way, its part of us, and as such, its 'existence' consists of participation in the A-Universe. Simply put, the entailment of 'existence' is participation. So we may grant real existence to the *idea* of the B-Universe whilst recognising that its putative reference is non-existent in the A-Universe. Nevertheless, we may still 'flesh-out' the metaphor of the B-Universe, but crucially, if we are to do so without misleading ourselves, we must grant events within it the equivalent category of actual - not metaphorical - existence as that possessed by events within the A-Universe: that of participation, or self-relation. David David Nyman skrev: > > On 04/07/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > SP: We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes A > and B side by side, interviewing their occupants. > > DN: Yes, and my point precisely is that this is an illegitimate sleight > of imagination where the thought experiment goes amiss. When one imagines > the 'external' observer 'looking' at two universes, one constructs precisely > the false relationship that is the source of the confusion with respect to > consciousness. Any possible observer must in fact be integral to their own > universe. > > You can look at the Game-of-Life-Universe, where you can see how the > "gliders" move. If you look at "Conway's game of Life" in Wikipedia, you > can look at how the Glider Gun is working in the top right corner. This is > possible although there is no observer integral to that Universe. > > The same is true about the B-Universe. You can look at it as an outside > observer. > > -- > Torgny Tholerus > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism revisited.
You're doing a giant step for considering current GoL as an universe... but anyway you can, but it's not because you see one glider in your tiny framed GoL that the interaction of billions of cells does not generate a consciousness inside the GoL universe and you as an "external" observer couldn't see/recognize it as it is. Quentin 2007/7/4, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > David Nyman skrev: > On 04/07/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > SP: We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes A > and B side by side, interviewing their occupants. > > DN: Yes, and my point precisely is that this is an illegitimate sleight of > imagination where the thought experiment goes amiss. When one imagines the > 'external' observer 'looking' at two universes, one constructs precisely the > false relationship that is the source of the confusion with respect to > consciousness. Any possible observer must in fact be integral to their own > universe. > You can look at the Game-of-Life-Universe, where you can see how the > "gliders" move. If you look at "Conway's game of Life" in Wikipedia, you > can look at how the Glider Gun is working in the top right corner. This is > possible although there is no observer integral to that Universe. > > The same is true about the B-Universe. You can look at it as an outside > observer. > > -- > Torgny Tholerus > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism revisited.
David Nyman skrev: On 04/07/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: SP: We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes A and B side by side, interviewing their occupants. DN: Yes, and my point precisely is that this is an illegitimate sleight of imagination where the thought experiment goes amiss. When one imagines the 'external' observer 'looking' at two universes, one constructs precisely the false relationship that is the source of the confusion with respect to consciousness. Any possible observer must in fact be integral to their own universe. You can look at the Game-of-Life-Universe, where you can see how the "gliders" move. If you look at "Conway's game of Life" in Wikipedia, you can look at how the Glider Gun is working in the top right corner. This is possible although there is no observer integral to that Universe. The same is true about the B-Universe. You can look at it as an outside observer. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism revisited.
Your example suppose many things which are not granted to be possible: 1- The one who compare them is in neither of them... What is comparing these universes ? a conscious being ? 2- The fact that they are identical implies that both have consciousness. If one really lacked it then they would be no one to ask what it feels as they're would be no person in it and that would be a huge difference. I don't remember having read participants of this list arguing for a dualism of consciousness. Consciousness must be a process created by properties of this universe, it is not a component that can be thrown out, it is part of it. If behavior is the same as a conscious being (please mind that for this comparison you acknowledge the existence of at least one to compare) then the being is conscious too. You can't say they're the same but are different, it is not consistant. Regards, Quentin 2007/7/4, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > Jason skrev: > > Note that you did not say "thought" was non-existent in B-universe, I > > think one can construct complex conscious awareness to the collection > > of a large number of simultaneous thoughts. > I had the intention to include "thoughts", but I was unsure about how to > spell that word (where to put all those "h":s...), so I included the > thoughts in "all that kind of stuff". The B-Universe should not include > any thouths(!). The B-Universe should be a strictly materialistic Universe. > > -- > Torgny Tholerus > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism revisited.
Jason skrev: > Note that you did not say "thought" was non-existent in B-universe, I > think one can construct complex conscious awareness to the collection > of a large number of simultaneous thoughts. I had the intention to include "thoughts", but I was unsure about how to spell that word (where to put all those "h":s...), so I included the thoughts in "all that kind of stuff". The B-Universe should not include any thouths(!). The B-Universe should be a strictly materialistic Universe. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism revisited.
On Jul 3, 10:07 am, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Imagine that we have a second Universe, that looks exactly the same as > the materialistic parts of our Universe. We may call this second > Universe B-Universe. (Our Universe is A-Universe.) > > This B-Universe looks exactly the same as A-Universe. Where there is a > hydrogen atom in A-Universe, there will also be a hydrogen atom in > B-Universe, and everywhere that there is an oxygen atom in A-Universe, > there will be an oxygen atom i B-universe. The only difference between > A-Universe and B-Universe is that B-Universe is totally free from > consciousness, feelings, minds, souls, and all that kind of stuff. The > only things that exist in B-Universe are atoms reacting with eachother. > All objects in B-Universe behave in exactly the same way as the objects > in A-Universe. > > The objects in B-Universe produces the same kind of sounds as we produce > in A-Universe, and the objects in B-Universe pushes the same buttons on > their computers as we do in our A-Universe. > > Questions: > > Is B-Universe possible? In my opinion, for B-universe to be particle-for-particle identical to A-universe yet not contain consciousness/feelings/minds/souls it requires that consciousness as it appears in A-universe is due to some manner of dualism, that is to say, consciousness in A-universe must not be an innate feature of the material, mathematical or informational structures that correspond to observers. > If we interview an object in B-Universe, what will that object answer, > if we ask it: "Are you conscious?"? > I assume you are looking for people who will say B-universe is possible, and that the non-conscious observers will answer identically to those in A-universe, thereby proving that consciousness is an unneeded theory to be done away with by Occam's razor. In any case if the atoms interact identically in both universes the B-universe occupants will answer the same way as A-universe observers, but I don't think it is possible for B-universe occupants to be non- conscious. Here is why: Note that you did not say "thought" was non-existent in B-universe, I think one can construct complex conscious awareness to the collection of a large number of simultaneous thoughts. Let me define the most basic thought as an excited/firing neuron which is increasing the likelihood of neighboring neurons firing. Now consider the most primitive form of vision possible for an organism, it is only able to tell lightness from darkness and only see one pixel. The information content of its vision is a single bit. The conscious experience of seeing white could correspond to a certain neuron firing, which though its neural network increases the likelihood of thoughts such as warmth, safety, daytime, etc. And also increases the likelihood of certain behaviors, such as saying "I see white." This will be the same in both A and B universes. Now scale up the capabilities of that primitive vision to human vision, which contains hundreds of millions of pixels, differentiating millions of colors, and receiving new information from the optic nerve at 1 Gbps. The current state of your brain's visual center corresponds to billions of individual, simultaneous, and involuntary "thoughts"; this I believe is responsible for the phenomenon of consciousness, and you can't eliminate it without also eliminating the functionality of the brain. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Data Ecologies 07: Symposium Announcement
Data Ecologies 07 2nd Announcement Data Ecologies is a symposium series investigating the connections between data systems, processes, physical systems as well as constructed and natural ecologies. This year's meeting investigates the problems of model building, complexity, communication and interaction. How do we see what we see, how do we build systems that seamlessly integrate with natural systems, what is the mathematics of reality, what is complexity at all? This meeting is aimed at those operating on the boundary layers between disciplines, where the investigation of perception meets the construction of realities, where quantum theories of language and perception meet complexity analysis of ecosystems, where the ever present divide between the "arts" and the "sciences" can be looked at hard and deep. The format will be a series of talks with extended discussions. The whole process will be streamed, so remote participation is possible. Confirmed Speakers are: * Kirsty Kitto (Adelaide) on models, interpretations, alife, process physics. * Hans Diebner (Frankfurt) hermeneutics, cybernetics, endophysics, performative logic. * Julie Tolmie (London) visualisation, maths-arts-physics-games connections. * Peter Bruza (Brisbane) ecologies of services, quantum nature of cognition and language. * Bruno Marchal (Brussels): physics, computation, psychology, mathematicalism. * Maja Kuzmanovic (Brussels) complex ecologies, man-made and organically-grown structures. * Stephen (Pix) Pickles (Berlin): programmer, performance, complex systems as explored systems. Further speakers may be added at short notice. There is no participation fee in order to encourage independent researchers to attend. Location is the Time's Up Workshops Industriezeile 33b A-4020 Linz http://www.timesup.org/contact.html http://www.timesup.org/laboratory/DataEcologies/ For any enquiries please contact [EMAIL PROTECTED] --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism revisited.
On 04/07/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: SP: We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes A and B side by side, interviewing their occupants. DN: Yes, and my point precisely is that this is an illegitimate sleight of imagination where the thought experiment goes amiss. When one imagines the 'external' observer 'looking' at two universes, one constructs precisely the false relationship that is the source of the confusion with respect to consciousness. Any possible observer must in fact be integral to their own universe. David > On 04/07/07, David Nyman < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > TT: This B-Universe looks exactly the same as A-Universe. > > > > DN: IMO your thought experiment might as well stop right here. No > universe > > can "look" like anything to anyone except a participant in it - i.e. an > > 'observer' who is an embedded sub-structure of that universe. The > "looking" > > that you refer to here is an illusory artefact of syntax - i.e. the > relation > > is to an imaginative construct which in fact is part of A-Universe. IOW > > this sort of 'existence' is a metaphor which is relative to *us*, not > the > > self-relation of any realisable B-Universe. What you describe as > B-Universe > > "looking exactly the same" is really an implicit relation to an observer > in > > *that* universe, and consequently that observer is already accepted as > > conscious. Alternatively, it doesn't "look" like anything to anyone, > and > > hence is by no stretch of the imagination "exactly the same". > > We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes A > and B side by side, interviewing their occupants. > > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
