Re: against UD+ASSA, part 1
On 26 Sep., 14:39, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ASSA implies that just before you answer, you should think that you have 0.91 probability of being in the universe with 0 up. Does that mean you should guess yes? Well, I wouldn't. If I was in that situation, I'd think If I answer 'no' my survivors are financially supported in 9 times as many universes as if I answer 'yes', so I should answer 'no'. How many copies of me exist in each universe doesn't matter, since it doesn't affect the outcome that I'm interested in. Notice that in this thought experiment my reasoning mentions nothing about probabilities. I'm not interested in my measure, but in the measures of the outcomes that I care about. I do agree with you, Wei. Sometimes, it's not useful to consider the expectation for your next observer moment---in particular, if you are interested in what happens to other people (thus in the observer moments they must expect for themselves). As I pointed out in my recent message A question concerning the ASSA/RSSA debate, an absolute measure over observer moments isn't necessary. Every specific problem we are concerned with leads to a specific measure over observer moments. In this context, I would refer the ideas of the ASSA/ RSSA to the problem What will I experience next? This is a problem we are very often concerned with (for example if we perform an observation or a measurement, also leading to the Born rule). But it's not the only problem we might be interested in! So, this new perspective can be seen as a generalization of the ASSA/RSSA. In our rational decisions, we can include other aspects (e.g. other people) than ourselves. Rationality is not restricted to self-sampling. We could call this 'general rationality'. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
On Wed, Sep 26, 2007 at 05:24:33PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Of course. But I also put Darwinian evolution up there with that
(variation/selection is a powerful theory).
This to vague for me. I have no (big) conceptual problem with Darwinian
Evolution, but this is not something fundamental at all. This has to be
derived from a more fundamental theory, as even today's Darwinist would
say (thinking about physics but we know that is wrong).
It may well be that Darwinism is some marriage of information theory
with a multiverse idea, but it is not obvious how this works. I'd take
it as a fairly fundamental building block at this stage.
Your problem may be in the lack of formal precision. The real problem
is that there are too many formal models of evolution (eg any Genetic
Algorithm is a formal model of evolution), and not enough is known
about what features unite evolutionary processes.
As is stated in Why Occams Razor, and made more explicit in
Importance of the Observer and Theory of Nothing, what is the U
used in computing the universal prior? It can be nothing other than
the observer. U needn't even be a machine, any partition of the
strings into measurable subsets suffices.
?
Which part didn't you understand? The partition bit? If S is the set
of strings, with a measure mu such that mu(S)=1, then a function
f:S-N such that
mu( f^{-1}(N) ) = 1
defines a partition { S_i = { x\in S| f(x)=i } | i \in N} of S.
And this identification turns an essentially 3rd person account
into a
1st person account. To talk about ASSA or RSSA one has to introduce
some notion of time, or at least successor states.
Which we have without ay physical time notion, nor subjective time
notion with comp. Successor states are definable by use of numbers and
successor of numbers. This can be important given that everybody agrees
on numbers (except ultrafinitist, but I know only one in Russia), but
nobody agrees on what time could be (even the third person physical
one, or first person plural).
Well I, for one, have not made the connection between the successor of
a number, and subjective time in COMP.
In order to do this, I need to assume whatever is needed to even
make
sense of these concepts. At a minimum it would seem to include some
of
set theory, of measure theory and classical logic, but maybe it can
pared down to a more spartan set of axioms. The point is I
don't really care what is involved, but someone else will bother
themselves
with these details. That is why I say I'm acting like a physicist.
Yes. A problem (at least for communicating) in a non necessarily
physical context.
Its all about covering as much territory as possible to work out if
there's anything interesting there.
One way of connecting with what you do is to say that I assume the
existence of UD*, without concerning myself about the existence of
the
UD.
This does not make sense at all for me, given that the UD is
interesting only through the UD*. UD is just a rigorous definition
(logical name) of the UD*.
Don't you see that the UD* is just the set of infinite strings?
The CT thesis comes into play to justify the use of information
theory
Why? Actually information theory use CT only when it becomes
Algorithmic Information Theory. CT is needed to give scientific
meaning to expression like computable and above all expression like
NON computable. And with comp this is important given that comp makes
reality, whatver it is, partially but fundamentally NOT computable.
And I get tired of typing algorithmic every time I mention information
theory.
Sure, the complexity measure I use is more general than the
algorithmic prefix complexity on which it is based. But it still needs
the concept of universal machine to get the link to Kolmogorv complexity.
Regardless of what is really out there, all that we can know
about it must come to us in the form of strings, and so we can just
start with considering sets of strings.
This reminds me the particular case of the iterated Washington-Moscow
self-duplication. But in this case comp predicts random noise (even no
white rabbits).
Are you really sure of this? What if it is a newborn child placed
inside the W-M duplication experiment, that repeats (100 times a
second might be fast enough). Don't you think the child might end up
distilling some sort of reality from what it observes? Perhaps most
don't, but only those that manage to build up some kind of coherent
reality from the random sequences of W's and M's ever become conscious.
...
Let's consider a non-Brunotheological case. Your hypostases for
instance. I don't understand what makes some of them 1st person,
and
others 3rd person.
Good questions. It seems to me I have answered them, but don't hesitate
Re: against UD+ASSA, part 1
On Sep 27, 2:15 pm, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes. So my point is, even though the subjective probability computed by ASSA is intuitively appealing, we end up ignoring it, so why bother? We can always make the right choices by thinking directly about measures of outcomes and ignoring subjective probabilities. OK, new thought experiement. ;) Barring a global disaster which wiped out all of the humanity or its descendents, there would exist massively more observers in the future than currently exist. But you (as an observer) find you born amongst the earliest humans. Since barring global disaster there will be massively more observers in the future, why did you find yourself born so early? Surely your probability of being born in the future (where there are far more observers) was much much higher than your chances of being born so early among a far smaller pool of observers? The conclusion appears to be that there is an overwhelming probability that we are on the brink of some global disaster which will wipe out all humanity, since that would explain why we don't find ourselves among the pool of future observers (because there are none). Is the conclusion correct? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Conscious States vs. Conscious Computations
Jason, let me split your ideas into two problems. The first problem is to understand why and how observers interpret data in a meaningful way despite of the fact that the data has no unique meaning within itself. On 26 Sep., 21:09, Jason [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: A given piece of data can represent an infinite number of different things depending on the software that interprets it. What may be an mp3 file to one program may look like snow to an image editor. If we invited an inhabitant of a strange universe to our universe (e.g. to an interuniversal conference), he would most probably perceive nothing but random noise (if his senses allow him to perceive anything at all). He would feel like the image editor confronted with an mp3 file. Though, the fact that we being humans perceive something useful is self-evident since we are a product of evolution within our universe. Useful interpretation of the environment has been a necessary condition for survival. The successful analogy between an observer and a computer program shows that the process of observation has a computational character: The observer 'calculates' a meaning for his perception in a systematic way (which was elaborated evolutionary). We can formalize this similar to Russell and introduce the map from descriptions to meanings as a property of the observer. The second problem you address in your message concerns the embedding of the observer in the universe's description (you write of self- aware substructres). You give a very nice example: Some piece of advanced technology maps out the neural network of one's brain, including which neurons are firing at the instance the brain was scanned and then saves it as a file. Does this file on the computer constitute an observer moment? Does duplicating this file increase that observer moment's measure? Or for it to constitute an observer does some software have to load the file and simulate future evolutions of brain states in a manner consistent with how a real brain would to create a valid observer moment? Before I'm writing an uncompleted answer, I'd prefer to read what the long-time participants (Russell, Bruno and others) are thinking about this point. Youness --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Conscious States vs. Conscious Computations
Youness, your initial remark touches a valid point. I would go a bit further, even further than Hal's reply which still addressed the topical map within the Jason-idea - and deeper into Jason's well crafted position and considerations in computer science thinking. * Remember, when the human mind was a steam-engine? then later it was a telephone-switchboard? Now it is computer with the image in mind of that embryonic contraption IBM et al. fabricate in binary primitiveness. Would have Leibnitz, or Plato imagine a computer-based OM? of course not. Why do we assume that NOW we have reached the ultimate in omniscience? that our present toy is representing all? Do we have any criticism for the new gadget coming about in the 25th c.? Are we denying any advancement? (This list 'humbly' agreed in views representing a century ahead, Bruno's: 2 centuries, - the reason why I suggested the 25th c. 'new gadget' which may be just as unforeseeable for people before its arrival as was a computer and its workings before Charles Babbage.) * Those 'strings' in a 'software' are our present limitations for (wider?) meanings that may go way beyond the 'perceived reality' of today. Which is itself partial and incomplete. I appreciate the 'present level' inventiveness and the discussions about (logical?) incompleteness found in such, but always in mind that the 'position' is early 21st c. and prone to changing. * Jason wrote: A given piece of data can represent an infinite number of different things depending on the software that interprets it The unidentified 'information: bit in our binary machine, (0 or 1). Strings identify it better, still applicable to any relation if in 'reasonable' length. As Hal wrote: My guess is that sufficiently long, meaningful data strings have their meaning implicitly within themselves, because there is no reasonable-length program that can interpret them as anything else. Where I feel the 'doubt' to represent unlimitedly related meanings by strings, that are representing only ...'meaning implicitly within themselves'... Infinite length strings maybe a solution, but maybe also an impractical cop-out. John Mikes On 9/27/07, Youness Ayaita [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Jason, let me split your ideas into two problems. The first problem is to understand why and how observers interpret data in a meaningful way despite of the fact that the data has no unique meaning within itself. On 26 Sep., 21:09, Jason [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: A given piece of data can represent an infinite number of different things depending on the software that interprets it. What may be an mp3 file to one program may look like snow to an image editor. If we invited an inhabitant of a strange universe to our universe (e.g. to an interuniversal conference), he would most probably perceive nothing but random noise (if his senses allow him to perceive anything at all). He would feel like the image editor confronted with an mp3 file. Though, the fact that we being humans perceive something useful is self-evident since we are a product of evolution within our universe. Useful interpretation of the environment has been a necessary condition for survival. The successful analogy between an observer and a computer program shows that the process of observation has a computational character: The observer 'calculates' a meaning for his perception in a systematic way (which was elaborated evolutionary). We can formalize this similar to Russell and introduce the map from descriptions to meanings as a property of the observer. The second problem you address in your message concerns the embedding of the observer in the universe's description (you write of self- aware substructres). You give a very nice example: Some piece of advanced technology maps out the neural network of one's brain, including which neurons are firing at the instance the brain was scanned and then saves it as a file. Does this file on the computer constitute an observer moment? Does duplicating this file increase that observer moment's measure? Or for it to constitute an observer does some software have to load the file and simulate future evolutions of brain states in a manner consistent with how a real brain would to create a valid observer moment? Before I'm writing an uncompleted answer, I'd prefer to read what the long-time participants (Russell, Bruno and others) are thinking about this point. Youness --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: against UD+ASSA, part 1
On Thu, Sep 27, 2007 at 12:06:42PM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: OK, new thought experiement. ;) Barring a global disaster which wiped out all of the humanity or its descendents, there would exist massively more observers in the future than currently exist. But you (as an observer) find you born amongst the earliest humans. Since barring global disaster there will be massively more observers in the future, why did you find yourself born so early? Surely your probability of being born in the future (where there are far more observers) was much much higher than your chances of being born so early among a far smaller pool of observers? The conclusion appears to be that there is an overwhelming probability that we are on the brink of some global disaster which will wipe out all humanity, since that would explain why we don't find ourselves among the pool of future observers (because there are none). Is the conclusion correct? This is the standard Doomsday argument, which has been well discussed. In this case, disaster just means population decline. A world population decline to say 1 billion over the next couple of centuries, with a slower decline after that is probably enough to ensure the SSA predicts a near peak population observation. Although I haven't done the maths on this one - I did it on assuming current exponential growth continues, how long have we got until the crash, and it's less than 100 years, so we can say there must be a population decline of some sort before then (assuming validity of the DA). The only other historical time the Doosmday Argument predicts disaster before our current time was during the Golden Age of ancient Greece. And, sure enough, there was a significant population decline around 200 BCE. This is in appendix B of my book - I really must get around to writing this up as a peer reviewed article though. Cheers A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
