Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?
On Oct 24, 9:25 pm, "Wei Dai" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Rolf Nelson wrote: > > 1. Provides a possible explanation for the "Measure Problem" of why we > > shouldn't be "extremely surprised" to find we live in a lawful > > universe, rather than an extremely chaotic universe, or a homogeneous > > cloud of gas. > > One thing I still don't understand, is in what sense exactly is the "Measure > Problem" a problem? Why isn't it good enough to say that everything exists, > therefore we (i.e. people living in a lawful universe) must exist, and > therefore we shouldn't be surprised that we exist. If the "Measure Problem" > is a problem, then why isn't there also an analogous "Lottery Problem" for > people who have won the lottery? I don't have anything novel to say on the topic, but maybe if I restate the existing arguments, that'll help you expand on your counter-argument. The "Lottery Problem" would be a problem if I kept winning the lottery every day; I'd think something was fishy, and search for an explanation besides "blind chance", wouldn't you? Let's rank some classes of people, from chaotic (many rules) to lawful (few rules): 1. An infinite number of people live in "an infinite universe that obeys the Standard Model until November 1, 2007, and then adopts completely new laws of physics." If you live here, we predict that strange things will happen on November 1. 2. An infinite number of people live next-door in "an infinite universe that obeys the Standard Model through all of 2007, and maybe beyond." If you live here, expect nothing strange. 3. An infinite number of people live across the street in "a universe that looks like it obeys the Standard Model through November 1, 2007 because we are in the middle of a thermodynamic fluctuation, but the universe itself is extremely lawful, to the point where it's just a homogeneous gas with thermal fluctuations." We predict that strange things will happen on November 1. Your observations to date are consistent with all three models. What are the odds that you live in (2) but not (1) or (3)? Surely the answer is "extremely high", but how do we justify it *mathematically* (and philosophically)? If we can find mathematical solutions to satisfy this "Measure Problem", we can perhaps see what else that mathematical solution predicts, and test its predictions. Your UD+ASSA is the best solution I've seen so far, so I'm surprised there's not more interest in UD+ASSA (or some variant) as a "proto-science". >From the view of a potential scientific theory (rather than a philosophical "formalization of induction"), it's a *good* thing that it predicts "no oracles exist", because that is a falsifiable (though weak) prediction. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?
Rolf Nelson wrote: > 1. Provides a possible explanation for the "Measure Problem" of why we > shouldn't be "extremely surprised" to find we live in a lawful > universe, rather than an extremely chaotic universe, or a homogeneous > cloud of gas. One thing I still don't understand, is in what sense exactly is the "Measure Problem" a problem? Why isn't it good enough to say that everything exists, therefore we (i.e. people living in a lawful universe) must exist, and therefore we shouldn't be surprised that we exist. If the "Measure Problem" is a problem, then why isn't there also an analogous "Lottery Problem" for people who have won the lottery? I admit that this "explanation" of why there is no problem doesn't seem satisfactory, but I also haven't been able to satisfactorily verbalize what is wrong with it. > Of course, I could solve the problem by deciding that I'd rather be > self-destructive and evil than be inconsistent; then I could consider > adopting UD+ASSA as a philosophy. But I think I'll pass on that > option. :-) I think our positions are pretty close on this issue, except that I do prefer to substitute 'counter-intuitive'. :-) The problem is, how can we be so certain that our intuitions are correct? > An example > that Yudowsky gave: you might spend resources on constructing a unique > arrow pointing at yourself, in order to increase your measure by > making it easier for a search algorithm to find you. While I no longer support UD+ASSA at this point (see my posts titled "against UD+ASSA"), I'm not sure this particular example is especially devastating. UD+ASSA perhaps implies an ethical theory in which all else being equal, you would prefer that there was a unique, easy to find arrow pointing at yourself. But it doesn't say that you should actually spend resources constructing it, since those resources might be better used in other ways, and it's not clear how much one's measure would actually be increased by such an arrow. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Wolfram 2,3 Turing Machine
This might be of interest to some of you, for instance Bruno, since one of the ideals expounded here is "keep it simple". Sorry I haven't been participating here. >From Wolfram Science Group: We're excited to announce that the $25,000 Wolfram 2,3 Turing Machine Research Prize has been won. Alex Smith, a 20-year-old undergraduate in Birmingham, UK, has given a 40-page proof that Wolfram's 2,3 Turing machine is indeed universal. This result ends a half-century quest to find the simplest possible universal Turing machine. It also provides strong further evidence for Wolfram's Principle of Computational Equivalence. The official prize ceremony is planned for November at Bletchley Park, UK, site of Alan Turing's wartime work. For more information about the prize and the solution, see: http://www.wolframprize.org Stephen Wolfram has posted his personal reaction to the prize at: http://blog.wolfram.com/2007/10/the_prize_is_won_the_simplest.html --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?
Le 21-oct.-07, à 20:33, Rolf Nelson a écrit : > > (Warning: This post assumes an familiarity with UD+ASSA and with the > cosmological Measure Problem.) I am afraid you should say a little more on UD + ASSA. to make your points below clearer. I guess by UD you mean UDist (the universal distribution), but your remark remains a bit to fuzzy (at least for me) to comment. Of course I am not convinced by ASSA at the start, but still. The absence of recation of ASSA defenders is perhaps a symptom that you are not completely clear for them too? Bruno > > Observational Consequences: > > 1. Provides a possible explanation for the "Measure Problem" of why we > shouldn't be "extremely surprised" to find we live in a lawful > universe, rather than an extremely chaotic universe, or a homogeneous > cloud of gas. > > 2. May help solve the Doomsday Argument in a finite universe, since > you probably have at least a little more "measure" than a typical > specific individual in the middle of a Galactic Empire, since you are > "easier to find" with a small search algorithm than someone surrounded > by enormous numbers of people. > > 3. For similar reasons, may help solve a variant of the Doomsday > Argument where the universe is infinite. This variant DA asks, "if > there's currently a Galactic Empire 1 Hubble Volumes away with an > immensely large number of people, why wasn't I born there instead of > here?" > > 4. May help solve the Simulation Argument, again because a search > algorithm to find a particular simulation among all the adjacent > computations in a Galactic Empire is longer (and therefore, by UD > +ASSA, has less measure) than a search algorithm to find you. > > 5. In basic UD+ASSA (on a typical Turing Machine), there is a probably > a strict linear ordering corresponding to when the events at each > point in spacetime were calculated; I would argue that we should > expect to see evidence of this in our observations if basic UD+ASSA is > true. However, we do not see any total ordering in the physical > Universe; quite the reverse: we see a homogeneous, isotropic Universe. > This is evidence (but not proof) that either UD+ASSA is completely > wrong, or that if UD+ASSA is true, then it's run on something other > than a typical linear Turing Machine. (However, if you still want use > a different machine to solve the "Measure Problem", then feel free, > but you first need to show that your non-Turing-machine variant still > solves the "Measure Problem.") > > > Decision Theory Consequences (Including Moral Consequences): > > Every decision algorithm that I've ever seen is prey to paradoxes > where the decision theory either crashes (fails to produce a > decision), or requires an agent to do things that are bizarre, self- > destructive, and evil. (If you like, substitute 'counter-intuitive' > for 'bizarre, self-destructive, and evil.') For example: UD+ASSA, > "Accepting the Simulation Argument", Utilitarianism without > discounting, and Utilitarianism with time and space discounting all > have places where they seem to fail. > > UD+ASSA, like the Simulation Argument, has the following additional > problem: while some forms of Utilitarianism may only fail in > hypothetical future situations (by which point maybe we'll have come > up with a better theory), UD+ASSA seems to fail *right here and now*. > That is, UD+ASSA, like the Simulation Argument, seems to call on you > to do bizarre, self-destructive, and evil things today. An example > that Yudowsky gave: you might spend resources on constructing a unique > arrow pointing at yourself, in order to increase your measure by > making it easier for a search algorithm to find you. > > Of course, I could solve the problem by deciding that I'd rather be > self-destructive and evil than be inconsistent; then I could consider > adopting UD+ASSA as a philosophy. But I think I'll pass on that > option. :-) > > So, more work would have to be done the morality of UD+ASSA before any > variant of UD+ASSA can becomes a realistically palatable part of a > moral philosophy. > > -Rolf > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Request to form 'Social Contract' with SAI
Le 20-oct.-07, à 18:06, David Nyman a écrit : > > On Oct 19, 2:26 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> David, do you mind if I send next week your solution (which were >> correct) of the exercises I gave online once to the list? I am sure >> it could help some other. All that is needed to get Church's thesis >> eventually right. Recall that Church thesis is one half of COMP. >> > > Just saw this. Sure, no problem. Thanks. So I will answer the question below asap. I have a bit more time next week, so I think I will able to do it soon, For the other I recall that a good understanding of Cantor diagonalization (the point of those exercises) is needed to, not only grasp Church thesis (which is 1/2 of comp), but to grasp the impact of Church thesis in the science in general. Thanks again for your patience, Bruno >>> On Oct 16, 11:37 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> > If it is ''a'-rtificial' I question the 'natural one' (following > Bruno's fear of the (natural?) 'super stupidity'.) Yet I don't > think > Marc wants to let himself denature into an artifact. >> Not necessarily, but look at Saibal's recent answer! This raises a question for Mark. What if the "future "SAI"", "SI" should we say, are computationalist? Marc, is it ok if those SI reincarnate you digitally? Could they decide without your consent (without being super-stupid?). >> >>> Your points are well taken Bruno. We should be highly suspicious of >>> any 'authority' that thinks to act without our consent. >> >>> As for cryonics, Saibal , I think it's a good option. If necessary, >>> I'm quite prepared to put myself in the freezer - I have no intention >>> of getting any older than a biological age of 65 - if I live that >>> long >>> I might be the first guy in the world to volunteer for a 'live >>> freeze' (I would probably have to move to a country where there are >>> laws allowing for assisted suicide though!) >> Again, not necessarily. Buddhism, unlike Christianity, has always been very aware that "religious truth", once "institutionalized" get wrong ... To kill the buddha, or sompetimes just the master, is a way to remind the monk that they have to find the truth in themsleves and never to take any master talk for granted. >> > In our (definition-wise) lower mentality it is not likely that we > can > 'kill' the smarter. So the condition involves the un-possibility, > even > if we are capable to recognise them > - what we are not likely to be. >> Agreed. It was just a parabola for driving attention against any use of authoritative argument in the field of fundamentals. Ah! But the lobian machine too can be shown allergic to such argument. It's a universal dissident. Unforunately, humans, like dog are still attracted to the practical philosophy according to which the "boss is right" (especially when wrong!) >> Bruno >> PS Perhaps this week I will got the time to send the next post in the "observer-moment = Sigma_1 sentence". >> >>> Well, I'm pleased to hear the lobian machine is a 'universal >>> dissident'. I wouldn't want to imply that 'the boss is right'. All >>> I >>> was implying was that (in the case of super-intelligence) the boss >>> would be *stronger*. Whether the boss is right or not, we little >>> guys >>> wouldn't have much power so our negotiating power would be seriously >>> limited initally. The best that could be hoped for from such a >>> hypothetical 'social contract' in the beginning is that the SI >>> doesn't >>> hurt us. >> >> OK. >> >> You know I am confident that "real" SI would not hurt you, except by >> accident. The problem is that we cannot distinguished "real" SI from >> "real" SI, er I mean real super-intelligent (Sintel) from real >> super-idiot (Sidiot). >> >> I guess that is why democracy, when it is normally functioning, is >> the >> best of the system, allowing to change your mind about the people we >> are delegating power to.(by democracy I mean mainly here: >> education + "repeated" well organized election). >> >> Note that normally "real SIntell" will never present themselves as >> "SIntell", only real Sidiot would do that. So, although, there does >> not exist a way to test Super intelligence , there are some cases >> where >> we can be almost sure to be in front of Super-stupidity ... >> >> Good week-end Marc, and All,(please revise the notion of >> bijection. >> Are everybody convinced that N is in bijection with N X N, and with N >> X >> N X N X N X... ? >> >> David, do you mind if I send next week your solution (which were >> correct) of the exercises I gave online once to the list? I am sure >> it could help some other. All that is needed to get Church's thesis >> eventually right. Recall that Church thesis is one half of COMP. >> >> Brun
