Hi Günther,
Le 25-mars-08, à 13:35, Günther Greindl a écrit :
Dear Bruno,
I have used the Easter holidays to read again through your SANE 2004
paper, and I have a question regarding step 7.
(I am fine with step 1-6, step 8 seems OK but I will withhold judgment
until I understand step 7
Hi Brian,
Your idea of a universal set, in case it works, would indeed meet one
of the objection I often raised against Tegmark-like approaches, mainly
that the whole of mathematical reality cannot be defined as a
mathematical object. Of course this is debatable, and a case can been
made
I have been following this discussion and I wanted to respond to this
point because I fail to see why this is such a damning criticism of
the MUH. How is in inconsistent to affirm the existence and reality of
mututally exclusive axiom sets? I realize how that sounds so I would
like to amplify
To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states
with mind states as COMP assumes, and if this universe is computable,
would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular
mind? I think this is a consistent viewpoint not contradicted by
experience. Of course I
Surely consciousness is both granular (much of what we are conscious of is
pre-processed by the brain and body, and not part of our direct experience.
This gives a huge amount of leeway for underlying ambiguity) and limiting
(two people holding hands or talking do not become one conscious entity).
On Wed, Mar 26, 2008 at 04:19:44PM -, Alastair Malcolm wrote:
The minimal specification including all OMs in a universe could not be
sufficient to specify the OMs completely. There must always be some random
component to the complete specification of an OM.
Bang goes AI! I can't
On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 05:07:30PM -0700, Jason wrote:
To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states
with mind states as COMP assumes, and if this universe is computable,
would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular
mind? I think this is a
On Wed, Mar 26, 2008 at 02:16:06PM -0700, Jason wrote:
A common theme on the everything list is the idea of an Observer
moment, which is a snapshot of an observer's mind in a point of time,
or the smallest amount of time a single conscious moment can be
experienced in. However I think this
I just had a cold call from an editor of a fairly new journal called
NeuroQuantology (http://www.neuroquantology.com/), which has its focus
area on the intersection of cognitive science and quantum physics. The
nature of this topic, of cause, gives rise to no end of kookiness, but
this doesn't
On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 7:32 PM, Michael Rosefield
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Surely consciousness is both granular (much of what we are conscious of is
pre-processed by the brain and body, and not part of our direct experience.
This gives a huge amount of leeway for underlying ambiguity) and
On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 8:16 PM, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The situation is surely more subtle. To recognise a physical process
as a computation requires an observer to interpret it as such. One of
the key features of conscious is the ability to recognise a certain
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