On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 8:16 PM, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > The situation is surely more subtle. To recognise a physical process > as a computation requires an observer to interpret it as such. One of > the key features of conscious is the ability to recognise a certain > process as self, so that (assuming comp) we can objectively say that > some processes are conscious, because they recognise themselves as > computations. Otherwise computation is just in the eye of the > beholder, and so would consciousness be, which is absurd. > > I think it unlikely that the entire universe is conscious. >
I think we agree in some sense with the self-interpretation. Let me explain what I believe for the given thought experiment proposed by John Serle. From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Searle#Artificial_intelligence "Since then, Searle has come up with another argument against strong AI. Strong AI proponents claim that anything that carries out the same informational processes as a human is also conscious. Thus, if we wrote a computer program that was conscious, we could run that computer program on, say, a system of ping-pong balls and beer cups and the system would be equally conscious, because it was running the same information processes. Searle argues that this is impossible, since consciousness is a physical property, like digestion or fire. No matter how good a simulation of digestion you build on the computer, it will not digest anything; no matter how well you simulate fire, nothing will get burnt. By contrast, informational processes are observer-relative: observers pick out certain patterns in the world and consider them information processes, but information processes are not things-in-the-world themselves. Since they do not exist at a physical level, Searle argues, they cannot have causal efficacy and thus cannot cause consciousness. There is no physical law, Searle insists, that can see the equivalence between a personal computer, a series of ping-pong balls and beer cans, and a pipe-and-water system all implementing the same program." I am in complete disagreement with Searle's assertion that consciousness is a physical property. I further disagree with his assertion that a computer based on pipes and water or ping pong balls could not be conscious. I think you would agree, saying that observers within those computed realities can interpret the computations that create their realities. When something is burned in a simulation, the heat of the fire and smell of the smoke can be felt by observers within that simulated reality. Where you and I might diverge in opinion is that I think something still burns in a simulated reality even if there are no observers within that reality to sense it. It's the basic "If a tree falls in the woods.." idea. I would say the simulation of the tree falling doesn't make a sound without an observer in the simulation to hear it, but I would say a tree still falls, in that simulation even without there being an interpreter at that level of simulation. I am interested to know your opinion on this and how if at all it differs from mine. Regards, Jason --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
