Surely consciousness is both granular (much of what we are conscious of is pre-processed by the brain and body, and not part of our direct experience. This gives a huge amount of leeway for underlying ambiguity) and limiting (two people holding hands or talking do not become one conscious entity). If we say this is a strict equality then we dilute the meaning of consciousness beyond usefulness. Conscious-space being a subset of computational-space seems more reasonable.
On 28/03/2008, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states > with mind states as COMP assumes, and if this universe is computable, > would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular > mind? I think this is a consistent viewpoint not contradicted by > experience. Of course I don't know what you, or anyone else is > experiencing right now but that is only due to a lack of communication > and accessibility. If you take a normal brain and cut the link > between hemispheres you create two separate minds, but are they not > the same mind only limited in transfer of information? What if we > grafted nerve fibers between two individual's brains so they could > share thoughts and experiences, two minds can become one via > communication. Since all particles in this universe are interacting, > the computational history of a mind must include the whole universe, > or at least what is in its light cone for a given extent of time. If > this universe is one mind, then the universal dovetailer would be a > maximally conscious omega point, conscious of everything that can be > perceived. > > Jason > > On Mar 25, 7:35 am, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > wrote: > > > Dear Bruno, > > > > I have used the Easter holidays to read again through your SANE 2004 > > paper, and I have a question regarding step 7. > > > > (I am fine with step 1-6, step 8 seems OK but I will withhold judgment > > until I understand step 7 ;-) > > > > The things I am unclear about are: > > 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state -> > > what are these? > > > > 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you > > define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no > > contradiction; or differently?)- > > > > 3) And how do you treat the Boltmann brain issue which crops up in > > modern cosmology but also in a UD generating _all_ computational > histories? > > > > Cheers, > > Günther > > > > -- > > Günther Greindl > > Department of Philosophy of Science > > University of Vienna > > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > .athttp://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/ > > > > > Blog:http://dao.complexitystudies.org/ > > Site:http://www.complexitystudies.org > > > -- "They couldn't hit an elephant at this dist-" Last words of Gen. John Sedgwick, spoken as he looked out over the parapet at enemy lines during the Battle of Spotsylvania in 1864. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
