Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com :
>
>   
>> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that
>> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our
>> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
>> belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't seem to
>> occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the
>> brain.
>> 
>
> I don't see why periods of shared consciousness should result in
> fusion. Suppose S and B experience 3 consecutive minutes of
> consciousness, S1-S2-S3 and B1-B2-B3. The first and third minutes are
> distinct, but the second minute consists of staring at a blank wall
> with only minimal self-awareness and has identical subjective content
> in each case. What this means is that S2 and B2 are interchangeable,
> and when S3 or B3 is recalling the previous minute, it doesn't make
> sense to sense to say he definitely experienced S2 or B2 respectively.
> In other words, it would make no difference to the stream of
> consciousness of either S or B if one or other of S2 or B2 did not
> occur. And yet, even though S2 and B2 could be one and the same, there
> is no fusion of of consciousness, since B1, B3, S1 and S3 are all
> distinct.
>
>
>   
If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream 
of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2.  Supposedly 
it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that 
case why couldn't B3 also include some memory of both S1 and B1?  Why 
wouldn't that be as close a continuation as B3 containing only B1 memories?

Brent

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Brent Meeker]

russell standish wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
>   
>> I think I am often *not* self-aware.  But aside from that, I have definitely
>> been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though
>> probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time.  So an closest
>> continuation of observer moments theory of personal identity would predict
>> that I would regain consciousness as a mixture of those others who shared my
>> unconscious period.
>>
>> 
>
> I don't think so. The only way you notice the periods of
> unconsciousness is by virtue of the discontinuity between two observer
> moments that you recall (as evidenced by a clock or some other
> irreversible process). The moments of unconsciousness are not observer
> moments.
>
>   
A fair objection (maybe).  But still it seems that I could easily share 
an OM with someone else and then end up in an observerer "superposition".

Brent

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Re: language, cloning and thought experiments

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/2/25 Jack Mallah :

> 1) The fair trade
>
> This is the teleportation or Star Trek transporter thought experiment.  A 
> person is disintegrated, while a physically identical copy is created 
> elsewhere.
>
> Even on Star Trek, not everyone was comfortable with doing this.  The first 
> question is: Is the original person killed, or is he merely moved from one 
> place to another?  The second question is, should he be worried?
>
> The answer to the first question depends on the definition of personal 
> identity.  If it is a causal chain, then if the transporter is reliable, the 
> causal chain will continue.  However, if the copy was only created due to 
> extreme luck and its memory (though coincidentally identical to that of the 
> original) is not determined by that of the original, then the chain was ended 
> and a new one started.
>
> The second question is more important.
>
> Since we are considering the situation before the experiment, we have to use 
> Caring Measure here.  The temptation is to skip such complications because 
> there is no splitting and no change in measure, but skipping it here can lead 
> to confusion in more complicated situations.
>
> The utility function I'll use is oversimplified for most people in terms of 
> being so utilitarian (as opposed to conservatively history-respecting, which 
> might oppose 'teleportation') but will serve.
>
> So if our utility function is U = M Q, where M is the guy's measure (which is 
> constant here) and Q is his quality of life factor (which we can assume to be 
> constant), we see that it does not depend on whether or not the teleportation 
> is done.  (In practice, Q should be better afterwards, or there is no reason 
> to do it.)  Therefore it is OK to do it.  It is a fair trade.
>
> 2) The unfair trade
>
> Now we come to the situation where there are 2 ‘copies’ of a person in the 
> evening, but one will be removed overnight, leaving just one from then on.  
> I’ll call this a culling.
>
> I pointed out that in this situation, the person does not know which copy he 
> is, so subjectively he has a 50% chance of dying overnight.  That is true, 
> using causal chains to define identity, but the objection was raised that 
> ‘since one copy survives, the person survives’ based on the ‘teleportation’ 
> idea that the existence elsewhere of a person with the same memory and 
> functioning is equivalent to the original person surviving.
>
> So to be clear, we can combine a culling with teleportation as follows: both 
> copies are destroyed overnight, but elsewhere a new copy is created that is 
> identical to what the copies would have been like had they survived.
>
> Is it still true that the person has a subjective 50% chance to die 
> overnight?  If causal chains are the definition, then depending on the 
> unreliability of the teleporter and how it was done, the chance of dying 
> might be more like 100%.  But as we have seen, definitions of personal 
> identity are not important.  What matters is whether the person should be 
> unhappy about this state of affairs; in other words, whether his utility 
> function is decreased by conducting the culling.
>
> Using U = M Q, it obviously is decreased, since M is halved and Q is 
> unchanged.  So as far as I can see, the only point of contention that might 
> remain is whether this is a reasonable utility function.  That is what the 
> next thought experiment will address.

If you're not worried about the fair trade, then to be consistent you
shouldn't be worried about the unfair trade either. In the fair trade,
one version of you A disappears overnight, and a new version of you B
is created elsewhere in the morning. The unfair trade is the same,
except that there is an extra version of you A' which disappears
overnight. Now why should the *addition* of another version make you
nervous when you wouldn't have been nervous otherwise? Sure, you don't
know whether you are A or A', but the situation is symmetrical: if you
are A the presence of A' should make no difference to you, and if you
are A' the presence of A should make no difference to you. And if
something makes no difference to you, it shouldn't impact on your
utility function.

> 3) The Riker brothers
>
> Will T. Riker tried to teleport from his spaceship down to a planet, but due 
> to a freak storm, there was a malfunction.  Luckily he was reconstructed back 
> on the ship, fully intact, and the ship left the area.
>
> Unknown to those on the ship, a copy of him also materialized on the planet.. 
>  He survived, and years later, the two were reunited when Will’s new ship 
> passed by.  Now known as Tom, the copy that was on the planet did not join 
> Star Fleet but went on to have many adventures of his own, often supporting 
> rebel causes that Will would not.  Will and Tom over their lifetimes played 
> important but often conflicting roles in galactic events.  They married 
> different women and had children of their own.
>
> The 

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Feb 2009, at 03:39, russell standish wrote:

>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com  
> wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal   
>> wrote:
>>> Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
>>> to fusion of first persons.
>>> And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person
>>> plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in
>>> "nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is
>>> the normal candidate.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >
>>>
>>
>> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to  
>> imply that
>> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of  
>> nothing our
>> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
>> belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't  
>> seem to
>> occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity  
>> of the
>> brain.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Perhaps you're not really thinking nothing after all. I have already
> stated that we must be self-aware to be conscious, otherwise we suffer
> the Occam catastrophe. The sense of ego would be enough to explain why
> you don't merge with Stathis.
>
> Not being a Salvia user though, I'd like to ask the question - does  
> the
> ensuing amnensia (whilst remaining conscious) extend to erasure of the
> ego?

It depends of course of what you mean by the "ego". "Ego Death" is a  
well discussed topic in Entheogen Forums, especially on Salvia, but  
also DMT.
If by "ego" you mean the "terrestrial self" I would say yes.

I think we do similar experiences in the "deep sleep" (= the non REM  
sleep), but like with Salvia, it seems we have to forget the main  
point to "come back on Earth". Even the part which we don't forget is  
"ineffable", probably of the type G* minus G, or more accurately Z*  
minus Z, or even more accurately: X1* minus X1 (cf your Nothing book  
page 129)

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com :

> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that
> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our
> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
> belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't seem to
> occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the
> brain.

I don't see why periods of shared consciousness should result in
fusion. Suppose S and B experience 3 consecutive minutes of
consciousness, S1-S2-S3 and B1-B2-B3. The first and third minutes are
distinct, but the second minute consists of staring at a blank wall
with only minimal self-awareness and has identical subjective content
in each case. What this means is that S2 and B2 are interchangeable,
and when S3 or B3 is recalling the previous minute, it doesn't make
sense to sense to say he definitely experienced S2 or B2 respectively.
In other words, it would make no difference to the stream of
consciousness of either S or B if one or other of S2 or B2 did not
occur. And yet, even though S2 and B2 could be one and the same, there
is no fusion of of consciousness, since B1, B3, S1 and S3 are all
distinct.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Feb 2009, at 02:51, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal   
> wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
> > 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker :
> >
> >> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential
> >> component of
> >> personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like
> >> "observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are  
> not
> >> being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years
> >> at a
> >> time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not
> >> consciously
> >> recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be
> >> essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then
> >> ask,
> >> "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"
> >
> > The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant  
> memories
> > as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the
> > music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent
> > parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same  
> way, if
> > you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment,  
> then
> > during that moment you might be a generic human having such a  
> similar
> > experience.
>
> Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
> to fusion of first persons.
> And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person
> plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in
> "nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is
> the normal candidate.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to  
> imply that after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of  
> thinking of nothing our "closest continuations" might be mixtures,  
> each having some memories belonging to Stathis and some belonging to  
> me.


I don't see why. But Brent with amnesia could become Stathis if we put  
Stathis memories in Brent's brain. That's all. After complete amnesia  
you are potentially anyone, but there is no reason to become both  
Stathis and Brent simultaneously, no more that you could feel to be in  
both Washington and Moscow after a duplication experience.



> But this doesn't seem to occur - which we easily explain in terms of  
> the causal continuity of the brain.

I agree. UDA just shows that if you assume comp you have to explain  
the causal continuity of the brain in term of addition and  
multiplication of numbers.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: AUDA (was David Shoemaker, Personal Identity)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2009, at 23:44, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Hi,
>
>> I would say the Universal Soul.  To be the ONE? The difficulty is  
>> that
>> Plotinus is not always clear.
>
> I go now from my reading of mystical texts, not from the arithmetic
> interpretation  - and here mystics often report feeling at one with  
> the
> universe, everything etc.
>
> I would say that this is the realization that your true nature (to be
> more precise than before) is not different than that of the ONE/dao/ 
> etc.


I am OK with this. But it is "beyond word".
Lao Tse said "the Dao which has a name is not the Dao". Plotinus said  
the ONE is ineffable, ...


>
>
>> The "universal soul" hypostase *is* a first person (or a theory about
>> a first person). Some would say it is just an "abstract person". That
>> it is just the least common part of all souls, or in the arithmetical
>> "toy" theology, that is the common part of all first persons
>
> Ok, I think attaining this "minimal person" is also a meditative  
> state,
> but the full mystical experience reported in all cultures etc would be
> union with the ONE:
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophia_perennis
>
> QUOTE:
> The Perennial Philosophy is expressed most succinctly in the Sanskrit
> formula, tat tvam asi ('That thou art'); the Atman, or immanent  
> eternal
> Self, is one with Brahman, the Absolute Principle of all existence;  
> and
> the last end of every human being, is to discover the fact for  
> himself,
> to find out who he really is.
> Aldous Huxley
> END QUOTE

I agree. But up to now I can really talk about this trough both comp  
and the arithmetical self-reference.
This leads to open mathematical problems.




>
>
>> total amnesia (forgetting not just who you are, but that you are, +
>> forgetting everything up to the idea of time and space), yet  
>> remaining
>> conscious, if not being even much more conscious with the feeling  
>> that
>> memories are making you less conscious, and that a memory-brain is a
>> filter on histories. Stable memories differentiate consciousness
>
> Yes, I agree, I think brains/memories are filters on histories; but  
> the
> above description of pure consciousness - what introspective reason
> leads you to believe that that is still the experience of a (minimal)
> person an not already experience of the "source"? (I like to change
> words for the "ONE" so that no connotations become entrenched; after
> all, it is "described" as the ineffable)

OK, but the term "source" has many connotations too. All terms are  
wrong.
With comp "truth" is the less wrong, in the language of a Lobian  
machine working out the "theology" of a simpler machine.
No introspective reason leads me to believe the experience of the  
Universal Soul" is different from the fusion with the One.
It is purely mathematical reason which leads me to make a distinction  
in the mathematical theology.
Any machine *asserting* it has fused with the ONE, is provably wrong.

>
>
>> A problem for comp is that, well at least I have thought that comp
>> makes the soul (the first person, the third hypostase) conscious only
>> through its building or generating time. But the salvia reports and  
>> my
>> own experiences make me think I could be wrong there.
>
> Indeed, a first person, namely, what we call a person (narrative,
> history, agency, autonomy etc) requires temporality.

Yes, it is weird. I am very confused about this.


>
>
>
>> 
>> AUDA in short.
>>
>
> Ok, you have whetted my appetite, now I will have to read the Plotinus
> paper ;-)


Plotinus, for me, is mainly a good pedagogical path. It helps also to  
recast the machine interview in the human philosophies.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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