Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
To have strict continuity you would certainly need the state, but not at the quantum level, see Tegmark's paper. But you could probably do without most of the state information if you were willing to accept a gap - as in anesthesia. Brent ronaldheld wrote: > Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain, > wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at > one time to "quantum resolution" (TNG transporter term). > Ronald > > On Feb 23, 9:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker : >> >>> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of >>> personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like >>> "observer moments" and "continuity". Almost all my memories are not >>> being remembered at an given time. Some I may not recall for years at a >>> time. I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously >>> recalling any memories. So then how can memories and continuity be >>> essential? I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, >>> "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?" >> The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories >> as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the >> music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent >> parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if >> you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then >> during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar >> experience. >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Amoeba's Secret - English Version started
On 02 Mar 2009, at 02:21, russell standish wrote: > > On Sun, Mar 01, 2009 at 05:55:12PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Hi Kim, >> >> I didn't expect you to send the translation of the Amoeba's Secret >> (AS) on the list. But it is OK, and you did a rather very good job. >> >> For the other: "The Amoeba's Secret" is the book which has been >> ordered to me when I won the LE MONDE prize of the best thesis in >> 1998. For obscure reasons (which I don't want to talk about) it has >> not been published, it is the only prize LE MONDE which has not been >> published. > > Thanks for sharing these old wounds with us. FWIW, I have read so > far the > story up to the end of your undergrad days, and I think it is very > well written, and as I commented to Kim J - the chapter "Amoeba's > secret" would make an excellent basis for a short film. So far, Le > Monde's decision not to publish is completely inexplicable (I can > understand that the thesis itself being too technical might be a > reason for not publishing that). > > Was there any discussion of removing some of the personal elements > from the sorry affair that happened when your thesis was submitted to > ULB? I send the manuscript electronically after each chapter, and said it was very nice, up to the end. Until Grasset interrupts the contract with LE MONDE. I have been told the book, nor the thesis can enter in their collection. I did not get any explanation. I have been interviewed by journalists on my work, only the journalist of switzerland succeed in publishing his paper. > Even with politics operating behind the scene (which you have > hinted), I can't imagine that nothing of the work is publishable. I already discussed proposition of publishing "Conscience et Mécanisme" with three publishers, before my thesis was judged not receivable (meaning no private defense, nor public defense, I have *never* met those who criticize, not even my work, but a product of their imagination). Then silence, even after the defense in Lille, and even more after the paradoxical price in Paris. I cannot explain. Or I can explain except that here reality is far beyond fiction as usual, but also more sad, and rather delicate if only because that story is not finished. My life is more unbelievable than any thing I assert in my works. It took me 22 years to understand what happened in 1977, and since then. I feel responsible to let them build they own trap, and then get myself a bit worried seeing them to protect themselves from Brussels to Paris! It is not because I have done an "original work" (say) in Brussels, that I got problems there. It is because I got problems in Brussels that I have done an original work. In 1977, they give me no chance, not even getting out of Belgium. In 1994, my work was criticize vaguely as "not original", "too much simple", and then "delirious". And now already "not from him" in some place. Which again shows the problems is not related with my findings, except it belongs to the kind of things you can easily use to treat you as a fool (Gödel's theorem, Quantum mechanics, consciousness: few understand so it is easy to say "not serious"). The little scandal has grown up all the time and is too big, now. It is the kind of manipulation which makes everyone feel responsible, from corporatist reflex to corporatist reflex, when actually there is only one, very clever, but very bad, guy. Now that "little scandal" has become big enough to throw light on other really bigger scandals. There are "cadavres dans les placards", as we say in French (corpses hidden in boxes). Mean of pressures. I still believe in academies, but like in School "serial killer" can exist. When you see the time made by religious institution to protect their member of their hierarchy from their much grave behavior, I estimate it could take a long time if ever to understand and recognize what happened. And I have no problem with serious academicians and scientists which understand enough to understand it is "serious", even if probably wrong, which I have myself never ceased to believe plausible (which explains why I am eager to discuss the validity of the UDA steps, with people interested). I did defend the work as PhD thesis. I was asked many questions, I answered them and everyone got the idea. Some people takes time, but most get enough to trust the interest of the work. Still today, few get both UDA and AUDA. UDA is almost easy, but not so easy. AUDA is very *simple*, once you understand enough standard logic (which I have discovered is excessively rare). The whole thing is strongly interdisciplinary, and between disciplines, rumors circulate more quickly than "scientific bridge", which often makes people feeling being aggressed on their territories. Even more so when the work approaches question traditionally qualified as "philosophical". My initial power comes from the
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 01 Mar 2009, at 23:48, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/3/2 Bruno Marchal : > >> All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in >> "your" interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can >> you be coherent, take the full piece of botter "dead is not big deal" >> of the midazolam argument, and keep that sort of selfishness. >> >> Do you prefer to live in a country 1 where "self-torture" is allowed >> but only when the decision is made before the duplication (and yes >> you >> could be the victim indeed), or in a country 2 where "self-torture" >> is >> allowed after the duplication. It seems to me that your midazolam- >> argument (I re-quote below(*)) should in fine relativize the very >> notion of selfishness. >> >> I think it is preferable to live in the first country: yes I could be >> the victim, but I can remember my consent. In the second type of >> country, I could even more so be the tortured one ... eventually; and >> without my consent. OK? > > Living in the first country is equivalent to allowing a contract where > you agree to a gain today at the cost of suffering tomorrow, like > selling your soul to the devil. I would say that it is more like selling your soul to yourself, but I admit this could be the same, in some case. You better have to know yourself. I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run, along three classes: A: majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of "individuals": annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to self-infliction. In case of accidental or exceptional self- multiplication, consent is asked at any time. B: a stable minority (in the long run). Accept teleportation but do allow overlap of individuals. Some will fight for the right of self- infliction including the consent made before the duplication, but with precise protocol. You know the problem of the masochist: I say no, continue, I say "no no", stop! C: the bandits. They violates protocols and don't ask for consents. They should normally be wanted, I mean researched by all the polices of the universe, or already be in jail or in asylum. Legend for the future: the A and B people will fight with each other until the A people realize that only the B people can help them to lessen the pain inflicted by the C people. A little bit like Orpheus going to hell for saving the soul of his love Eurydice. The case of the B people is an interesting case, if only because it shows the richness of the hardly definable notion of self-consent. With comp you can't build a paradise without building an hell. The existence of B people can make hell partially controllable. I think. This points to harm reduction strategies in the politics of health. The very existence of the B people makes the C people transparently cowards. A masochist has much in common with a Godelian sentence, which asserts their (true) unprovability or their (false but consistent) refutability. They are quite different from the Löbian sentences which asserts positively their (true) provability. The genuine pain is not in the intensity of the flame, but in the unfairness of the violation of the consents and protocols. Amnesia of consent is equivalent to no consent at all. Except for ... Masochism could be a self-referential type of Trojan Horse concept for developing, as far as it is comp-possible, a mechanist theory of pain. And the first easy thing you can deduce are of the negative type: pain is not definable, pain is unavoidable (for consistent entities), but also pain can be limited, and this even in the transfinite. Indulge my thinking aloud. This is not published material. Yet I did wrote, for myself, a long time ago a "A Refutation of Sade". Sade, in his own way, showed already the danger of confusing Mechanism and Materialism. He took Mechanism and Materialism from La Mettrie, who already builded the seeds of person elimination philosophies. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: AUDA Page
Thanks, Günther. Bruno On 01 Mar 2009, at 23:34, Günther Greindl wrote: > > Hello, > > have incorporated most of Bruno's change wishes: > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/auda > > Best Wishes, > Günther > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/3/2 ronaldheld : > > Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain, > wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at > one time to "quantum resolution" (TNG transporter term). The question is what level of resolution is needed in order to copy the memories, personality etc. You may not need quantum resolution, since in that case it is hard to see how you could avoid drastic mental state changes while just sitting still. Also, in which TNG episode does it mention quantum resolution for the transporter? -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain, wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at one time to "quantum resolution" (TNG transporter term). Ronald On Feb 23, 9:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker : > > > I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of > > personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like > > "observer moments" and "continuity". Almost all my memories are not > > being remembered at an given time. Some I may not recall for years at a > > time. I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously > > recalling any memories. So then how can memories and continuity be > > essential? I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, > > "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?" > > The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories > as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the > music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent > parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if > you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then > during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar > experience. > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: random thoughts
Bruno: Dur to financial considerations I will wait for the fifth edition to come out. On Feb 28, 6:11 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 27 Feb 2009, at 13:34, ronaldheld wrote: > > > > > The fifth edition of Mendelson's book is due out in August;is it > > worth waiting for? > > I really don't know. My favorite edition is the first one, because > there is a nice appendix with a proof of the consistency of arithmetic > by transfinite induction, which is less informative than the original > proof by Gentzen, but more easy to follow. > > > > > I will take a look at some of the links on Podnieks page. > > This can surely help, Only had time for a few links, but they were interesting. > > Regards, > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > Ronald > > > On Feb 26, 11:17 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 23 Feb 2009, at 16:40, ronaldheld wrote: > > >>> Perhaps this paper would be of interest: > >>> Deterministic multivalued logic scheme for information processing > >>> and > >>> routing in the brain(arxiv.org/abs/0902.2033)? > >>> Speaking of logic, even though I am not starting from zero,and given > >>> that it is not my full time profession, which papers/book should be > >>> read, and are they available online? > > >> A very good book is the one by Eliot Mendelson: > > >> MENDELSON E., 1987, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, 3ème édition, > >> Wadsworth & > >> brooks/Cole. > > >> A good webpage is Podnieks page: > > >>http://www.ltn.lv/~podnieks/ > > >>> finally what is the difference between being awake and asleep from > >>> the > >>> programmatic POV? > > >> It is a like the difference between a solitaire video game, and a > >> collective video game, where many computational histories cohere and > >> glue together. It is still an open problem if that can exist with > >> comp, note! > >> It is related to the difference between first person, and first > >> person > >> plural, which, in both QM and pure comp, are defined by "population" > >> multiplication. If we are both annihilated and both reconstituted in > >> washington and Moscow, we can share indeterminacies and even use a > >> notion of Dutch Book probabilities. > > >> Best, > > >> Bruno > > >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
