The "paper" referred to below is my book "Theory of Nothing", which is
available as a free download from my website
http://www.hpcoders.com.au/nothing.html, or in dead tree format from
Amazon.
There is also a paper "Ants are not conscious" which takes that argument a
bit further, and more technic
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/14 Brent Meeker :
>
>>> Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that's the problem.
>>> The point is that evaluating CTM as a physical theory of mind
>>> necessitates making the relation between experience and process
>>> *explicitly* physical, and actually a
2009/9/14 Brent Meeker :
>> Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that's the problem.
>> The point is that evaluating CTM as a physical theory of mind
>> necessitates making the relation between experience and process
>> *explicitly* physical, and actually attempting this inevitably r
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/13 Brent Meeker :
>
>> You regard "doing the same computation" as a purely formal (=
>> non-physical) critereon, but I think this is specious. It seems right
>> because we talk about "a computation" at a very high level of
>> abstraction. But when we ask what makes t
2009/9/13 Brent Meeker :
> You regard "doing the same computation" as a purely formal (=
> non-physical) critereon, but I think this is specious. It seems right
> because we talk about "a computation" at a very high level of
> abstraction. But when we ask what makes this causal sequence or that
Thanks,
This does indeed clarify the subject and puts it in a perspective
that I feel that I can understand as much as possible without working through
the intricacies of the proof. m.a.
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroup
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/11 Flammarion :
>
>
>>> I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the
>>> realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause
>>> consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised
>>> computation could be identical to any
Find answer for any question here http://radiowiki.teknusi.org/cheap-flight-256
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroup
Marty,
>Could you please clarify to a non-mathematician why the
> principle of excluded middle is so central to your thesis (hopefully
> without using acronyms like AUDA, UD etc.).
Without the excluded middle (A or not A), or without classical logic,
it is harder to prove non c
2009/9/11 Flammarion :
>> I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the
>> realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause
>> consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised
>> computation could be identical to any mental state.
>
> That doesn't
Bruno,
Could you please clarify to a non-mathematician why the principle of
excluded middle is so central to your thesis (hopefully without using acronyms
like AUDA, UD etc.). Many modern schools of philosophy reject the idea. Thanks,
Russell,
is there a chance I could read your paper referred to below? (Those 'some'
hours passed what you suggested to require for getting it on the internet).
I wonder if you referred to individual ants or a hive - that IMO may be
socially conscious (depending on our def. of conscious).
It all go
John,
On 12 Sep 2009, at 17:01, John Mikes wrote:
> Bruno,
> the more I read here on the "Church thesis" the less I know about it.
> Is there a short description in 'non-technical' words about the
> 'essence' you hold instrumental in the applications you apply?
I will explain in detail Church
On 12 Sep 2009, at 16:42, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11 Sep, 19:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 11 Sep 2009, at 17:45, Flammarion wrote:
>>>
>>
>> Once you say "yes" to the doctor, there is a clear sense in which
>> "you" (that is your third person relative computational state, the
>> one
>>
14 matches
Mail list logo
