Re: On the computability of consciousness
On 21 March 2010 19:50, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno, I've been continuing to pummel my brain, on and off, about the
issues in this thread, and also reading and thinking about different
perspectives on the "knowledge paradox" (such as Gregg Rosenberg's).
If I may, let me put some thoughts to you in a slightly different way
than heretofore.
The apparent paradox, as we've discussed, seems to stem from the fact
that - whether we derive this insight from comp, or even from
mathematical physics - we seem as persons to be restricted to using
formal processes in respect of what we are able to represent, think or
communicate. Nevertheless we are justifiably convinced, beyond this,
that we have first-person access to further non-formal properties of
our situation, despite the fact that these seem to be utterly
inexpressible, either to ourselves or to others ("Wovon man nicht
sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen."). This seems to pose at
least the following questions:
1. How can the existence (though not the intrinsic nature) of putative
non-formal properties be recognisable - indeed representable - in some
way to otherwise purely formal reasoning mechanisms, and form the
basis of our apparent references to them? This is a critical matter
that - in terms of comp - you appear to address with respect to the
characteristics of particular logical systems, an aspect that BTW
doesn't seem to be widely appreciated in the philosophical literature
in this connection.
2. How are we to regard the status of such "privileged" non-formal
properties, given that they don't appear directly to motivate our
apparent judgements about them (which presumably are actually about
their formal analogues)? Is first-person consciousness of such
properties to be regarded as an aspect of epistemology (i.e. as
somehow adding to the knowledge, though apparently not the behavioural
repertoire, of the person); or is it more properly a fact of ontology
(i.e. reflecting in some way the "existential commitment" of the
person)? Or does it somehow partake of both aspects?
3. Finally, are we to understand the totality of our experience as in
some way the convergence of the formal and non-formal aspects of our
situation in a mutually dependent relation? That is, in the sense
that the formal aspect arises ultimately out of - or in terms of - a
non-formalisable background, which in turn only achieves
differentiation and "personalisation" when caught in the "net" of the
formal.
The above thoughts seem to me to go some way to resolving, at least in
my own mind, the knowledge "paradox", in a non-paradoxical way. I'm
least clear, however, on the details of what is implied in point 1
above: i.e. the crucial aspect of how the non-formal gets caught in
the "net" of the formal). It must be frustrating for you if you feel
you have already explained this on numerous occasions - but I suspect
there are very specific aspects of the logics you have mentioned
heretofore which must be absorbed in close detail to drive this point
home intuitively (as I say, there seems to be little appreciation of
this in the literature). I feel this is the final step I need in
order to achieve a logically compelling solution to this nagging
problem.
David
>
> On 20 Mar 2010, at 21:34, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 20 March 2010 18:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Well, if by 3-p Chalmers you mean some 'body', such a body *is* a zombie.
>>> The 1-p Chalmers is Chalmers, the person. Its body does not think, but
>>> makes
>>> higher the probability that the 1-p thoughts refers to the most probable
>>> computations you are sharing with him.
>>
>> Well, if its body does not think (which of course Chalmers assumes
>> that it does, even though he says from his epiphenomenalist-dualist
>> standpoint that this does not logically entail consciousness), just
>> how does it increase the probabilities in the way you say above?
>
>
> That is what uda is all about. It shows that your current next 1-state is
> determined by all the universal UD-computations, which are going through the
> infinitely many 3-states corresponding (by comp) to that 1-state;
> equivalently, by an infinite set of number theoretical relations, which
> happen to be true.
>
>
>
>
>> IOW,
>> what is the systematic correlation supposed to be between the
>> "physical events" in its brain and the 1-p thoughts of 1-p Chalmers?
>
> The 1-p thoughts are associated to the infinitely many computations (in UD*)
> leading to the 3-p states.
> The next 1-p thought depends on the most probable "type" of computations.
> Probably there is a special role for deep and linear computation, to make
> duplication contagious from individual to population of individuals. But
> this has to be confirmed from a reasonable definition of knowledge,
> observation, ... , like the Theaetetical variants of G and G*.
>
>
>
>> This, after all, is a major aspect of the mind<-->body problem, and
>> it's one thing for the explanation to be counter-i
Re: The 'no miracles' argument against scientific realism
On 20 Apr 2010, at 05:22, Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Apr 18, 2010 at 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Apr 2010, at 03:15, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: I agree in theory, though I still hold to my "consciousness is fundamental and uncaused" mantra! Would you agree that the distribution of prime numbers is "uncaused". I would say that anyone starting with the same assumptions and using the same rules of inference would reach the same conclusions. OK, but only if they are searching all conclusions. If not they could as well get very different theorems. I would not go so far as to say that the assumptions, rules of inference, OR conclusions exist, except as objects of thought. I guess you mean "don't exist". I am OK with that. Those things exists at higher epistemological level, than the basic "Ex" in the base theory. I can understand that consciousness is fundamental, and "uncaused". Yet it is explainable in term of simpler things, like numbers and elementary operations, in term of high level self-consistency. I agree that I can use numbers to represent and model aspects of what I perceive, but this falls far short of "explaining" consciousness. Actually I was slightly wrong, and consciousness is more better explained in term of true self-consistency. This is enough to make consciousness not descfribable by anything in a thurd person way. The theory explains consciousness including why we cannot explain consciousness in any third person way. consciousness is only livable, never describable. Like the first person, well, like all hypostases in which the letter "p" appears without the scope of an arithmetical modality. In the DM theory, consciousness is fundamental, yet not primary. You can 'almost' define consciousness by the unconscious, or instinctive, or automated inference of self-consistency, or of a reality (it is more or less equivalent in DM). Fundamental but not primary. Hmmm. That sounds interesting, but I'm not sure what you mean by it. Fundamental means that it plays a big role. Primary means that we use the notion undefined in the starting postulate. If you only know numbers as they appear in your conscious thoughts, how is it possible to conclude that they are more "primal" than the only medium in which you know them to exist? I don't know if anything exist. We cannot know if a theory is true. But I have been convinced of the truth of elementary arithmetic in high school, and it is a subtheory of all fundamental theories. If only two things exist, numbers and consciousness, in some relationship to each other, how do you decide which is first and which is second? Numbers cause thought. Thought causes numbers. Why prefer one over the other? Because no theory can explain the numbers without postulating them. This is the failure of logicism. Then comp explains consciousness from number, including why a gap has to remain. It explains why all universal numbers arrive at that conclusion from logic + self- introspection. If they're co-equal, then it's two sides of the same coin... For numbers, you need just "0", successors, addition and multiplication. Then consciousness is explained by the self- referential abilities of universal numbers (Löbian numbers). This explain consciousness (cf the 8 hypostases) and this include matter and the relation matter/consciousness, and this in a testable way. It is the whole coupling consciousness/realities which can be explained by addition and multiplication (or abstraction and application, etc.) once we bet on DM. Again you use the word "explained". But I think you mean "described". Hmm... You may say "meta-describe", given that the theory prevent consciousness to be described, or even associate to any finite things in a 1-1 way. It is like "truth"; no machine can describe its truth predicate. There are none. Consciousness is fractal and beyond description. This explain the usual difficulties people have with that concept. Privately, by contrast, we can know some truth (like I'm conscious), but we can never communicate them as such. Can anything fundamental ever be communicated to someone not already possessing knowledge of it? You are right. In that sense, numbers are like consciousness. But numbers are far simpler, and we can, and usually do, agree on the axioms they have to obey. That is hardly the case for consciousness. I already said this, and you answered me that you are not searching a theory, just asserting consciousness is primary. No problem with that. It means we are not doing the same kind of research. I don't *propose* a theory of mind or of matter, I derive them from the digital mechanist assumption. More exactly I provide an argumentation showing why we HAVE TO derive them from that assumption, and in AUDA, I show precisely how to derive them, and give the first results wh
