Re: Reversal without primary matter elimination (step 7)

2011-03-05 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/5/2011 4:04 PM, Pzomby wrote: On Mar 5, 1:50 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/5/2011 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote: On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchalwrote:

Re: Reversal without primary matter elimination (step 7)

2011-03-05 Thread Pzomby
On Mar 5, 1:50 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: > On 3/5/2011 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > > On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote: > > >> On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote: > > >>> On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote: > > >>> > >     If you still don't see this, ask for clari

Re: Reversal without primary matter elimination (step 7)

2011-03-05 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/5/2011 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote: On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > If you still don't see this, ask for clarification of the sane04 > paper(*), because it seems to me that the first sev

Re: How embryogenesis fits in the mind-body problem?

2011-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 04 Mar 2011, at 01:36, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Mar 03, 2011 at 10:48:38AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: So I will be franc. The problem of interaction is not solved at all, even between third person describable objects. And the problem of how many first person "really" exist is also

Re: Reversal without primary matter elimination (step 7)

2011-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote: On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > If you still don't see this, ask for clarification of the sane04 > paper(*), because it seems to me that the first seven steps are rather > clear, there. You

Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper

2011-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote: I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on the idea that "everything" is simpler than "something". If we take Chalmers and Bitbol seriously, consciousness is a perfectly symmetrical emergent property of the Everything, and