Re: QTI and eternal torment

2012-06-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Nick,

This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence  
of) first person view?


Given that very minimal change in the brain seems to be able to send  
someone in the amnesic arithmetical heaven, as illustrated by some  
drugs, I am not sure we should worry about QM immortality, which  
arises itself from the comp immortality. It illustrates also that  
backtracking might be more probable. Technically this is difficult to  
compute, and if QM is true yet comp false, I would worry more on this.  
I do appreciate that people are aware that notions of after-life  
makes sense, and are hard to avoid with current theories. Yet, without  
handling the whole theology, and not just its physical aspects, we can  
come easily to weird conclusions. With comp there are too much open  
problems to decide on this in any quick way. Of course we can  
speculate. It is a fascinating subject.


Bruno


On 08 Jun 2012, at 01:11, Nick Prince wrote:


I’ve just read the following paper :


http://istvanaranyosi.net/resources/Should%20we%20fear%20qt 
%20final.pdf



which argues that it is possible to avoid the descent into decrepitude
that seems to follow from the quantum theory of immortality (QTI).
Aranyosi argues that this is plausible on the grounds that any death
branch would be preceded by an unconsciousness branch.  Under normal
QTI circumstances, if we were Schrödinger’s cat we would come across
the (3p) node  (L= Lives, D= Dies):


   DD
LLL
   LLL

To see the cat’s (1p), view we discard the  branch, but we will
more than likely be harmed at each branch and therefore become more
decrepit.

If I understand it correctly, and keeping things simple, Aranyosi
seems to be arguing that, by assuming that unconsciousness precedes a
death branch, then for 3p we have two types of branching: (where
C=Conscious, U = unconscious). First a triple branch:


   D DDDX
 U..UU
   C CCC

And also a double branch:



  C
  UUU

Any combinations of these can be put together by matching U’s or C’s
to make a tree.

A  1p  subjective experience comes by discarding all branches that
have death D preceded by U.  Hence the first type of diagram would
never be experienced and the cat sees only the C to C/U branching.
You can join two of the second type of diagram – a CUC route simply
being sleep or fainting or anaesthetic etc.

I would argue though that U can still occur if one suffers significant
physical damage and hence decrepitude still follows?

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: QTI and eternal torment

2012-06-08 Thread Nick Prince


On Jun 8, 8:45 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 Hi Nick,

 This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence
 of) first person view?

I've drawn the branches so that they represent a 3p viewpoint of
someone observing us over time - i.e. we are schrodingers cat!  So U
means observer sees us as unconsciouss and D means observer sees us as
dead.  The ist person view that we see would always be C according to
the branches I've drawn, provided that you discard all branches that
have death D preceded by U.  I wish I could draw it but I'm limited on
this user interface.

ist branch is C - U or C then from the U of this branch, we get U or
D or C

I'm bothered by the fact that the observer would end up seeing
zombies! If you have a C-U or C and then if the new branch from the U
is U - D or U or C then 1p (cat) would see only C as expected. His
route woud be C-C because the whole second branch is deleted.
However the observer that goes down the U branch would see the cat go
into some sort of  scenario  resulting in U or C or D.  If it turns
out that C occurs then the cat is seen as consciouss and yet it is
disjoint from the conscioussness of the original cat.  I'll have to
really think about this one in terms of the early steps of your UDA.


 Given that very minimal change in the brain seems to be able to send
 someone in the amnesic arithmetical heaven, as illustrated by some
 drugs, I am not sure we should worry about QM immortality, which
 arises itself from the comp immortality. It illustrates also that
 backtracking might be more probable. Technically this is difficult to
 compute, and if QM is true yet comp false, I would worry more on this.
 I do appreciate that people are aware that notions of after-life
 makes sense, and are hard to avoid with current theories. Yet, without
 handling the whole theology, and not just its physical aspects, we can
 come easily to weird conclusions. With comp there are too much open
 problems to decide on this in any quick way. Of course we can
 speculate. It is a fascinating subject.


What do you mean by backtracking?


 Bruno

 On 08 Jun 2012, at 01:11, Nick Prince wrote:





  I’ve just read the following paper :

 http://istvanaranyosi.net/resources/Should%20we%20fear%20qt
  %20final.pdf

  which argues that it is possible to avoid the descent into decrepitude
  that seems to follow from the quantum theory of immortality (QTI).
  Aranyosi argues that this is plausible on the grounds that any death
  branch would be preceded by an unconsciousness branch.  Under normal
  QTI circumstances, if we were Schrödinger’s cat we would come across
  the (3p) node  (L= Lives, D= Dies):

             DD
  LLL
             LLL

  To see the cat’s (1p), view we discard the  branch, but we will
  more than likely be harmed at each branch and therefore become more
  decrepit.

  If I understand it correctly, and keeping things simple, Aranyosi
  seems to be arguing that, by assuming that unconsciousness precedes a
  death branch, then for 3p we have two types of branching: (where
  C=Conscious, U = unconscious). First a triple branch:

                                D DDDX
                                                   U..UU
                                C CCC

  And also a double branch:

             
           C
                                    UUU

  Any combinations of these can be put together by matching U’s or C’s
  to make a tree.

  A  1p  subjective experience comes by discarding all branches that
  have death D preceded by U.  Hence the first type of diagram would
  never be experienced and the cat sees only the C to C/U branching.
  You can join two of the second type of diagram – a CUC route simply
  being sleep or fainting or anaesthetic etc.

  I would argue though that U can still occur if one suffers significant
  physical damage and hence decrepitude still follows?

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Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-08 Thread Pzomby
Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations,
emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of
observations of the physical universe and its processes.

This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
computations.

1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter
and energy?

2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions,
replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding*
of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality?

Thanks

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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-08 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Jun 8, 3:00 pm, Pzomby htra...@gmail.com wrote:
 Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
 consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations,
 emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of
 observations of the physical universe and its processes.

We can create models for ourselves, but nothing else in the universe
reads them that way.


 This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
 exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
 computations.

 1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter
 and energy?

If so that would mean that mathematics is either:

a) encoded in something other than mathematics - if so, whatever it is
that math can be encoded into (matter) makes encoding redundant and
unexplainable. If you have something other than math, then why does
math need to be encoded as it?

b) encoded as some other mathematical formula - if so, then the
appearance of the encoded non-math is redundant and unexplainable.


 2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions,
 replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding*
 of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality?

They are a partial decoding. The modeling process allows our mind to
recover some essential sense experience of the physics, thereby
superimposing a supersignifying abstraction layer on our experience of
it's reality.

My view in a nutshell:

Sense is not an emergent property of information.

Significance is a recovered property* of sense.

Matter is a form of significance. A sensible persistence through time
which we perceive as volume-densities divided from us and each other
by space.

To be informed is to recover significance through sense.

Sense is primordial, concrete, essential, and viscerally real.

Information is a derivative, redundant term which models sense from a
hypothetical third person view (a view which, taken literally, could
only be that of a formless, non-sense, omniscient voyeur), rendering
consciousness a generic, sterile, and meaningless wireframe of
experience.

Extrapolating a worldview based on this inversion of sense-making and
inert data is useful for modeling computation but is catastrophic if
applied literally to consciousness, as it makes life, order, emotion,
and intelligence itself into a meaningless function for the sake of
function. It makes sense into a kind of non-sense.

Craig

*By recovered property I mean that significance cannot emerge from
nothing, it can only be recovered or discovered from everything.

Consciousness is a splinter or temporal diffraction of the cosmos as a
whole, which, when experienced outside of ‘our world’ (umwelt,
perceptual inertial frame, or cumulative history of perception), would
be an undiffracted totality or eternal instant…devoid of everything
except absence of any absence and filled with nothing except the
presence of presence

…and I mean that in the most non-mystical and unambiguous sense (/
Cheshire grin)

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Re: QTI and eternal torment

2012-06-08 Thread Pierz
I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take 
seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other 
what ifs. But I think I see a couple of flaws in this argument. Firstly, I am 
not sure about the equation of unconsciousness with death. Why should coma be 
any different from deep sleep - i.e. a state of minimal consciousness which one 
cannot remember in retrospect but which nevertheless is a legitimate 1p view? 
One does not miraculously avoid sleep each night (well, come to think of it, I 
do, but that's another story!). I think this is the point Bruno is making. But 
there's a deeper problem I think with the idea of avoiding the 'vicinity' of 
death. QI says you can never end up on a branch in which you are dead. That's 
clear enough - so long as you grant that death is 'no-point-of-view', i.e., 
there is no no afterlife. But *someone* ends up on all the branches, so long as 
there is a point of view associated with them. Even if there is a cul-de-sac 
branch in which the probability of death is 100%, some version of you goes down 
that track. So right up until the very brink of death, you should expect your 
experience to follow the probabilities given by normal physics and statistical 
expectations. You can't, by QI, 'foresee' that a branch is a cul-de-sac in 
advance and so trim it out of your possible futures. But because there is 
always a finite, if vanishingly small, probability of not dying, one might 
expect that one will always find oneself 'sliding along the edge of death' so 
to speak, always just barely avoiding oblivion. But this is reminiscent of 
Zeno's paradox. How can one's experience follow normal statistical rules right 
up until a certain limit, then diverge from them to an ever greater, more 
improbable extent? QI is another of the absurd paradoxes that arises when 
trying to reconcile objectivity and subjectivity. I think we'd be better 
adopting something analogous to Einstein's assumption with regard to speed - 
namely that the laws of physics appear the same to us regardless of our 
velocity. By the same type of reasoning, we should assume that the laws of 
statistical probability (physics) will continue to apply at every point of our 
experience, even at liminal points like death. I personally favour the idea of 
primary consciousness, so I'm quite happy with the idea that 1p experience 
bridges death. If you don't swallow that, I suppose the onus is on you to 
explain away the paradox by some other means.

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Re: QTI and eternal torment

2012-06-08 Thread meekerdb

On 6/8/2012 7:02 PM, Pierz wrote:

I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take 
seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other 
what ifs. But I think I see a couple of flaws in this argument. Firstly, I am 
not sure about the equation of unconsciousness with death. Why should coma be 
any different from deep sleep - i.e. a state of minimal consciousness which one 
cannot remember in retrospect but which nevertheless is a legitimate 1p view? 
One does not miraculously avoid sleep each night (well, come to think of it, I 
do, but that's another story!). I think this is the point Bruno is making. But 
there's a deeper problem I think with the idea of avoiding the 'vicinity' of 
death. QI says you can never end up on a branch in which you are dead. That's 
clear enough - so long as you grant that death is 'no-point-of-view', i.e., 
there is no no afterlife. But *someone* ends up on all the branches, so long as 
there is a point of view associated with them. Even if there is a cul-de-sac 
branch in which the probability of death is 100%, some version of you goes down 
that track. So right up until the very brink of death, you should expect your 
experience to follow the probabilities given by normal physics and statistical 
expectations. You can't, by QI, 'foresee' that a branch is a cul-de-sac in 
advance and so trim it out of your possible futures. But because there is 
always a finite, if vanishingly small, probability of not dying, one might 
expect that one will always find oneself 'sliding along the edge of death' so 
to speak, always just barely avoiding oblivion. But this is reminiscent of 
Zeno's paradox. How can one's experience follow normal statistical rules right 
up until a certain limit, then diverge from them to an ever greater, more 
improbable extent? QI is another of the absurd paradoxes that arises when 
trying to reconcile objectivity and subjectivity. I think we'd be better 
adopting something analogous to Einstein's assumption with regard to speed - 
namely that the laws of physics appear the same to us regardless of our 
velocity. By the same type of reasoning, we should assume that the laws of 
statistical probability (physics) will continue to apply at every point of our 
experience, even at liminal points like death. I personally favour the idea of 
primary consciousness, so I'm quite happy with the idea that 1p experience 
bridges death. If you don't swallow that, I suppose the onus is on you to 
explain away the paradox by some other means.



Even if computation is fundamental and physics is derivative, that still leaves 
consciousness as derivative too and possibly derivative from physics.  If 'you' is 
identified with certain computations, some of which constitute your consciousness it is 
still the case that there are a great many threads of computation that are *not* you, so 
it is possible that all those threads that are 'you' stop being you, e.g. you're dead.  Of 
course it may be that the threads constituting 'you' approach some simple state so that 
the closest continuation is the simple computational thread of a lizard, bacterium, or 
fetus.  So you now can think of 'you' as continuing in this way - although it becomes 
rather arbitrary which lizard you will be.


Brent

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