Re: QTI and eternal torment
On 09 Jun 2012, at 15:42, David Nyman wrote: On 9 June 2012 11:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Such a backtracking (proposed once by Saibal Mitra on this list) can also be used to defend the idea that there is only one person, and that personal identity is a relative illusory notion. We might be a God playing a trick to himself, notably by becoming amnesic on who and what he is. We seem to agree on this, at least some of the time! If we entertain such notions, the question then presents itself - assuming one doesn't accept, with Hoyle, that this similarly entails only one multiplexed stream of consciousness - how only one person can be conceived as being the subject of every experience simultaneously? Probably because the experience of consciousness itself is not temporal. But from each fist person picture, as everything physical become an indexical (technically defined with the logic of self- reference) we get deluded in both personal identity (I),present moment (now), and present place (here). The same person get the illusion of being different person at different times and in different places, but those are the things which depends only on the atemporal relations between relative universal numbers states (assuming comp). Just that as seen from the (arithmetically, atemporally) implemented *knower* (first person) it looks physically and temporally structured, as the machine might already tell us, in the case of the ideally self- refetentially correct machine. I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to say that they are simultaneously true, because this refer to some time, and can only be used as a metaphor. Think perhaps to the WM duplication with delay: it shows notably that the subjective time is not connected causally to the physical time (assuming one), the belief in a past of a subject is an arithmetical construction, and it makes sense, quasi-tautologically, along the computations which satisfies or not the beliefs. The universal person might be the knower associated to any universal machine, or any sigma_1 complete believer (provably equivalent with respect of computability). If you recognize yourself in that person, your are obviously immortal. Here, it would be like accepting a 8K computer for the brain, leading to a version of yourself *quite* amnesic. But again that 8K and bigger system but equivalent, or extending them, pullulate in arithmetic. Consciousness' differentiation seems unavoidable there too. Does this put some light on the question? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09 Jun 2012, at 20:57, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 09.06.2012 20:27 Quentin Anciaux said the following: Le 9 juin 2012 20:22, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru a écrit : ... No, I have meant a) simulated computer b) simulated myself (but not in a) Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed by some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would you define the difference then in this case? If you are running at the same level (inside the same simulation, meaning what is simulating the computer is also simulating you and the world you share) then you're able to affect the computer. And computer in a way cannot affect me. This what I actually wanted to say in the beginning. Even if we assume simulation hypothesis, nothing changes and the business continues as usual. On Monday for example it is necessary to go to work. On the other hand, if I understand Bruno's theorem correctly a) and b) imply quite different things. While a) brings no problem, b) leads to arithmetic - mind - physics That is, I am not sure if according to Bruno, mind simulation in simulation is possible. Yes it is possible. And worth, it is necessary the case. Let me explain why. Let us fix a universal system, FORTRAN for example, or c++, game of life, arithmetic, S K, etc. Let us enumerate the one argument programs: p_i, and let us called phi_i the partial (that include the total) corresponding computable functions. This is equivalent of choosing a base in linear algebra. We can associate a number to each partial computable functions. A universal number (a computer) is a number u such that phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y). x is the program, y is the data and u is the computer. In that case we can say that u emulates the program x (first approximation of a definition to be sure). Now, phi_u, to be in the phi_i, needs to be a one variable function, so we better have a good computable bijection between NxN and N. With this you can see that a universal emulation can itself be emulated by yet another universal number, and you can easily understand that the universal dovetailer generates the infinitely many layers of simulations, showing that they correspond to true arithmetical relations. They are solution of a universal diophantine equation. We cannot avoid them in the measure problem. The key is that below our substitution level we belong to infinities computations/emulation, defining our physical realities, and above the substitution level, it can (re)define our identities. We never know our level of substitution, but we can know that below, it is a matter of experience, and above it is a matter of private opinion, something like that. In UD*, or in a tiny part of arithmetic, there are a lot of even infinite trails of simulation in simulation in simulation, etc. with variants etc. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: inside vs outside
On 09 Jun 2012, at 21:53, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, Wei, I've been reading the book saving truth from paradox on and off, and it has convinced me of the importance of the inside view way of doing foundations research as opposed to the outside view. At first, I simply understood Field to be referring to the language vs meta-language distinction. He criticises other researchers for taking the outside view of the system they are describing, meaning that they are describing the theory from a meta-language which must necessarily exist outside the theory. Since Gödel we know that for rich theory we can embed the metatheory in the theory. That is what Gödel's provability predicate does, and what Kleene predicate does for embedding the reasoning on the Turing machines, and the phi_i, in terms of number relations. Arithmetic contains its own interpreter(s). I thought that his complaint was frivolous; of course you need to describe a theory of truth via a meta-language. That is part of the structure of the problem. Yes, it makes the entire theory dubious; but without a concrete alternative, the only reply to this is such is life!. So I was confused when he refused to take other logicians literally (accepting the logic which they put forward as the logic which they put forward), and instead claimed that their logic corresponded to the 1-higher theory (the metalanguage in which they describe their theory). At some point, though, the technique clicked for me, and I understood that he was saying something very different. For example, the outside view of Kripke's theory of truth says that truth is a 'partial' notion, with an extension and an anti-extension, but also a 'gap' between the two where it is undefined. (It is a gap theory.) I am not sure I understand well. On the inside view, however, it does not make this kind of commitment; it does not claim there is a gap. What the theory says about itself makes no commitment about the status of the (would-be) gap sentences; they could well be both true and false. The outside view will insist on giving a semantic status to these, but this is pathological; we cannot develop a theory of truth in this way (we know that it leads to paradox). Instead, we need to take the inside view seriously, and develop theories from that perspective. This generally means taking the truth predicate as basic, and looking for deduction rules about it which capture what we want, rather than trying to define its semantics in a set-theoretic or otherwise external way. I don't feel that I have an excellent grasp of this technique, though. So, I'm looking for feedback. Do you have any thoughts or advice here? Better! A theory. Not mine, but the one by the rich universal machine itself (that I call Löbian). Basically a machine is Löbian if it is universal (in Church Turing sense) and can prove (in a technical weak sense) that she is universal. Basically it is a universal system + an induction axiom (or axiom scheme). Examples are Peano Arithmetic, ZF, etc. The machine's inside view is already unameable by the machine, it is a time creator, (in some semantics), a kind of intuitionist knower. Yes, it is important to take its view too. All löbian machines are able to distinguish two forms of self- reference: a third person one, and a first person one. And other modalities, notably those needed to extract physics from arithmetic (as UDA enforced). The computationalist hypothesis suggest using computer science and mathematical logic for dealing with the complex aspects of relative self-reference, in apparent simple ideal case. I think. Bruno Wei, Concerning your undefinability of induction paradox... In this view, the answer is more or less there can be no truth predicate which acts like that... truth is an open notion, much like ordinals are an open notion. To some extent, this is an acceptance of the fact that if an alien showed up claiming to have a box which determined the truth or falsehood of any statement, we should ascribe this 0 probability; or rather, we won't fully understand the statement (there is no way to say such a thing; the idea is incoherent). We can ascribe some probability to much weaker statements concerning the connection between the output of the box and the truth of statements, however. In particular, probability can be ascribed to any partial notion of truth which can be discussed. This feels like accepting the problem statement as a statement of the solution. The problem is that there is no notion of semantics for which allows a system to refer to all its own semantic values. The 'solution' is to say that semantics simply isn't like that (there is no 'completion' of the semantics). If we state these formally, the problem and the solution are the same statement; it seems like we've made no progress! Again, any
Re: QTI and eternal torment
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to say that they are simultaneously true, because this refer to some time, and can only be used as a metaphor. I agree with almost everything you say. I would say also that the moments of experience, considered as a class, are themselves out of time. What it takes to create (experiential) time - the notorious illusion - is whatever is held to be responsible for the irreducible mutual-exclusivity of such moments, from the perspective of the (universal) knower. Hoyle does us the service of making this mutual-exclusivity explicit by invoking his light beam to illuminate the pigeon holes at hazard; those who conclude that this function is redundant, and that the structure of pigeon holes itself somehow does the work of creating personal history, owe us an alternative explanation of the role of Hoyle's beam. I understand, of course, that these are just ways of thinking about a state of affairs that is ultimately not finitely conceivable, but all the same, I think there is something that cries out for explanation here and Hoyle is one of the few to have explicitly attempted to address it. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
One subject
I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the question, If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have? Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre-dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the division between subjects is not absolute. What separates subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner of a specific physical brain). I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can only steal from yourself. Of course, if comp is true, moral action becomes meaningless in one sense since everything happens anyway, so you will be on the receiving end of all actions, both good and bad. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/ymVml8zv_kMJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
