Re: Is math real?

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/24/2017 1:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Aug 2017, at 20:43, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 8/23/2017 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am not someone proposing any new theory. I am someone showing that 
the current materialist metaphysics just can't work with the 
Mechanist hypothesis.


Refresh my understanding.  What it the mechanist hyposthesis? Is it 
the same as computationalism?


Yes.

Computationalism = Digital Mechanism = Mechanism = (Yes-Doctor + 
Church's Thesis)






Or is it the same as yes-doctor plus reifying arithmetic?


No, it is (yes-doctor + Church's Thesis).

I do not add since long "Arithmetical Realism" because many people 
tend to put to much into it, and is actually redundant with Church's 
thesis. To just understand Church's thesis automatically assume we 
believe in some "essentially undecidable theory", and this is 
equiavalent with believing in the right amount of arithmetic.
I will write a post on the detailed starting point of the mathematics 
needed to derive physics from "machine's theology".






From your use, these all seem slightly different to me.  It would be 
helpful to some firm definitions - not just usage.


I use them as completely equivalent, although in the literature they 
are usually stronger. Putnam's functionalism is a version of Digital 
Mechanism which assumes a substitition level rather high, where my 
version just ask for the existence of a substitution level. My version 
is the weaker form possible, and Maudlin, in his Olympia paper, 
suggests that if we define mechanism in this way, it becomes trivial, 
a bit like Diderot defined "rationalism" by Descartes' Mechanism.


So a firm definition of Mechanism (in my weak sense) is

1) Church's Thesis (a function from N to N is computable iff it exists 
a combinator which computes it)


    (There are many variants of this. You can replace also 
"combinator" by "game of life pattern", or "fortran program" or "c++ 
program", or "quantum computer" etc.). Note that this asks for 
"Arithmetical realism" which is only the believe that the RA axioms 
makes "absolute sense", which means basically that not only 17 is 
prime, but that this is true independently of me, you, or anyone, or 
anything physical. All mathematicians are arithmetical realist. The 
fight on realism is in Analysis or set theory, not arithmetic, 
especially without induction axiom like with RA. Even a quasi 
ultra-finitist like Nelson agrees with RA.



2) Yes-Doctor (= my consciousness is invariant for a digital physical 
brain transplant made at some level of description of my (generalized) 
brain.


It asserts the existence of that substitution level, and is equivalent 
with accepting that we can use classical teleportation as a mean of 
travel (UDA step 1).


Important Remark: that definition does not ask for surviving without a 
physical brain/machine. That is indeed the object of the UDA 
reasoning: showing that we cannot invoke God, or Primary-Matter to 
block the immaterialist consequence of Digital Mechanism.


That's where I think some imprecision sneaks in.  Yes-doctor was 
originally presented as substituting some digitally simulated nuerons in 
the brain.  But then it was generalized to the whole brain.  But we 
think with more than our brain.  Our body contributes hormones and 
afferent and efferent nerve impluses.  And the environment provides 
stimulation to those nerves and an arena within which we act.  All that 
is taken for granted in answering "yes doctor" or teletransporting.  So 
it appears to me that you implicitly suppose all of this is also 
digitally replaced.


Brent



Primary or primitive means "in need to be necessarily assumed" or "non 
derivable from anything else (up to some provable equivalence)".


Ask any precision if needed.

Bruno








Brent

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Aug 2017, at 23:58, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Aug 23, 2017 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​>>​the copies could not ask anything because they didn't exist  
yesterday.



​> ​No. It is always the "third person" who will ask all  
question, to the Helsinki man, and to the copies.


​Then who will be the judge to determine  ​what the name of the  
one and only one city ​the Helsinki man ended up seeing?


The Helsinki man.




And why are you so afraid of the Helsinki man asking his own question?


I have no problem with this as long as the question is asked *to* the  
Helsinki man, and not to the third person, who of course cannot answer  
any 1p question to the H-man. Only the H-man knows the H-man 1p  
experience. All this is to avoid some 1p/3p confusion.






​>> ​And the Helsinki man already knew the Washington man will  
see Washington


​> ​You already said this, but that is tautological,

​And I also already said at least tautological statements are not  
gibberish, and in fact they have the additional virtue of being  
true. ​


​> ​and the point is that in Helsinki he does not know if he​ 
...​


 Yep, personal pronouns do an amazingly good job at hiding fuzzy  
thinking. Why else would Bruno Marchal​  keep using them?


I have at least three times given you version without pronouns, so  
this is just unfair, and as we try to explain to you, the problem is  
the same with proper name, and all problem/ambiguity are solved by  
just being precise on the 1p/3p distinction, be it with proper name or  
pronoun. That HAS been shown more than once.





​> ​Please use the diaries

​For what? They were written yesterday and today nobody can agree  
on who wrote them.  ​


I do not see this at all. Yesterday, it is the H-man who wrote the  
prediction. And today, the version of the H-man in M can verify if  
yesterday he (no ambiguity at all here) has been correct or not, like  
the H-man in W can do the same. Everyone agree on who wrote it: it is  
the H-man who wrote the prediction, and, if for example, the  
prediction was "W", the H-man in W can say that he was correct, and  
the H-man in M can say it was false, and so, as both remains  
computationalist, they can conclude the prediction was not the best one.






​> ​Yesterday I tell him, you will see Washington, or Moscow, but  
not both. It will be like a coin throwing.


And today after you've learned all there is to know about it that's  
STILL the best you can say, and that​ is​  NOTHING like coin  
throwing!​ If you ask me today how a coin landed yesterday I just  
tell you, I don't say "it turned out the coin landed heads or tails  
but not both with 50% probability", I don't mention probability at  
all,​ I just​ mention the face​ it​ turned out that the coin  
landed on, and that can be done with​ ONE WORD, not a paragraph of  
bafflegab​,​ just​ ONE WORD​ because that's all that's  
needed​ .​


That is exactly the same in the FIRST-PERSON POV OF EACH COPY.

The guys open the door, and both answer it with one word: indeed the  
unique city they are discovering in front of them when opeing the  
door. Just put yourself at the place of one of the copy, and then at  
the place of the other copy. They both refute "W & M", and they both  
confirms "W v M".




But​ Nobody can do the same thing with the Helsinki man's  
"question" not yesterday and not today either.


​> ​move to step 4.

​To read more gibberish built on top of a foundation of gibberish?  
I don't think so. ​



“The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow-witted  
man if he has not formed any idea of them already; but the simplest  
thing cannot be made clear to the most intelligent man if he is firmly  
persuaded that he knows already, without a shadow of doubt, what is  
laid before him.” Leo Tolstoy






​> ​ you continue to talk with the tone "it is so obvious that  
you are wrong",


​But you're not wrong, you'd have to improve your idea a great deal  
before it could reach the exalted status of being wrong. ​There is  
no disgrace​ in saying something that later turned out to be wrong,  
but there is in talking gibberish.​


​> ​​There is one and only one difference between M and W: M  
will see M and not W and W will see W and not M.


​> ​So bot confirms "W v M",

​No, it turned out neither saw W or M.


That *is* gibberish. It turns out that the proposition "W or M" was a  
correct prediction.




And when you observe a coin flip you don't see it land heads or  
tails either.​


Indeed, but this makes my point. Unless you claim there is no  
indeterminacy when throwing a coin ...


You are playing with word. What is your agenda?




​> ​And both understand immediately that the Helsinki man would  
have been correct by predicting "W v M"


​Then they would be equally correct in predicting "you" will see  
neither W nor M.​ ​But the best prediction of all would be  
"nobody will ever learn anything from any of this".​

Re: Is math real?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Aug 2017, at 20:43, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 8/23/2017 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am not someone proposing any new theory. I am someone showing  
that the current materialist metaphysics just can't work with the  
Mechanist hypothesis.


Refresh my understanding.  What it the mechanist hyposthesis?  Is it  
the same as computationalism?


Yes.

Computationalism = Digital Mechanism = Mechanism = (Yes-Doctor +  
Church's Thesis)






Or is it the same as yes-doctor plus reifying arithmetic?


No, it is (yes-doctor + Church's Thesis).

I do not add since long "Arithmetical Realism" because many people  
tend to put to much into it, and is actually redundant with Church's  
thesis. To just understand Church's thesis automatically assume we  
believe in some "essentially undecidable theory", and this is  
equiavalent with believing in the right amount of arithmetic.
I will write a post on the detailed starting point of the mathematics  
needed to derive physics from "machine's theology".






From your use, these all seem slightly different to me.  It would be  
helpful to some firm definitions - not just usage.


I use them as completely equivalent, although in the literature they  
are usually stronger. Putnam's functionalism is a version of Digital  
Mechanism which assumes a substitition level rather high, where my  
version just ask for the existence of a substitution level. My version  
is the weaker form possible, and Maudlin, in his Olympia paper,  
suggests that if we define mechanism in this way, it becomes trivial,  
a bit like Diderot defined "rationalism" by Descartes' Mechanism.


So a firm definition of Mechanism (in my weak sense) is

1) Church's Thesis (a function from N to N is computable iff it exists  
a combinator which computes it)


(There are many variants of this. You can replace also  
"combinator" by "game of life pattern", or "fortran program" or "c++  
program", or "quantum computer" etc.). Note that this asks for  
"Arithmetical realism" which is only the believe that the RA axioms  
makes "absolute sense", which means basically that not only 17 is  
prime, but that this is true independently of me, you, or anyone, or  
anything physical. All mathematicians are arithmetical realist. The  
fight on realism is in Analysis or set theory, not arithmetic,  
especially without induction axiom like with RA. Even a quasi ultra- 
finitist like Nelson agrees with RA.



2) Yes-Doctor (= my consciousness is invariant for a digital physical  
brain transplant made at some level of description of my (generalized)  
brain.


It asserts the existence of that substitution level, and is equivalent  
with accepting that we can use classical teleportation as a mean of  
travel (UDA step 1).


Important Remark: that definition does not ask for surviving without a  
physical brain/machine. That is indeed the object of the UDA  
reasoning: showing that we cannot invoke God, or Primary-Matter to  
block the immaterialist consequence of Digital Mechanism.


Primary or primitive means "in need to be necessarily assumed" or "non  
derivable from anything else (up to some provable equivalence)".


Ask any precision if needed.

Bruno








Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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