On 23 Aug 2017, at 23:58, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Aug 23, 2017 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

​>>​the copies could not ask anything because they didn't exist yesterday.


​> ​No. It is always the "third person" who will ask all question, to the Helsinki man, and to the copies.

​Then who will be the judge to determine ​what the name of the one and only one city ​the Helsinki man ended up seeing?

The Helsinki man.



And why are you so afraid of the Helsinki man asking his own question?

I have no problem with this as long as the question is asked *to* the Helsinki man, and not to the third person, who of course cannot answer any 1p question to the H-man. Only the H-man knows the H-man 1p experience. All this is to avoid some 1p/3p confusion.




​>> ​And the Helsinki man already knew the Washington man will see Washington

​> ​You already said this, but that is tautological,

​And I also already said at least tautological statements are not gibberish, and in fact they have the additional virtue of being true. ​

​> ​and the point is that in Helsinki he does not know if he​ ...​

Yep, personal pronouns do an amazingly good job at hiding fuzzy thinking. Why else would Bruno Marchal​ keep using them?

I have at least three times given you version without pronouns, so this is just unfair, and as we try to explain to you, the problem is the same with proper name, and all problem/ambiguity are solved by just being precise on the 1p/3p distinction, be it with proper name or pronoun. That HAS been shown more than once.



​> ​Please use the diaries

​For what? They were written yesterday and today nobody can agree on who wrote them. ​

I do not see this at all. Yesterday, it is the H-man who wrote the prediction. And today, the version of the H-man in M can verify if yesterday he (no ambiguity at all here) has been correct or not, like the H-man in W can do the same. Everyone agree on who wrote it: it is the H-man who wrote the prediction, and, if for example, the prediction was "W", the H-man in W can say that he was correct, and the H-man in M can say it was false, and so, as both remains computationalist, they can conclude the prediction was not the best one.




​> ​Yesterday I tell him, you will see Washington, or Moscow, but not both. It will be like a coin throwing.

And today after you've learned all there is to know about it that's STILL the best you can say, and that​ is​ NOTHING like coin throwing!​ If you ask me today how a coin landed yesterday I just tell you, I don't say "it turned out the coin landed heads or tails but not both with 50% probability", I don't mention probability at all,​ I just​ mention the face​ it​ turned out that the coin landed on, and that can be done with​ ONE WORD, not a paragraph of bafflegab​,​ just​ ONE WORD​ because that's all that's needed​ .​

That is exactly the same in the FIRST-PERSON POV OF EACH COPY.

The guys open the door, and both answer it with one word: indeed the unique city they are discovering in front of them when opeing the door. Just put yourself at the place of one of the copy, and then at the place of the other copy. They both refute "W & M", and they both confirms "W v M".



But​ Nobody can do the same thing with the Helsinki man's "question" not yesterday and not today either.

​> ​move to step 4.

​To read more gibberish built on top of a foundation of gibberish? I don't think so. ​


“The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow-witted man if he has not formed any idea of them already; but the simplest thing cannot be made clear to the most intelligent man if he is firmly persuaded that he knows already, without a shadow of doubt, what is laid before him.” Leo Tolstoy




​> ​ you continue to talk with the tone "it is so obvious that you are wrong",

​But you're not wrong, you'd have to improve your idea a great deal before it could reach the exalted status of being wrong. ​There is no disgrace​ in saying something that later turned out to be wrong, but there is in talking gibberish.​

​> ​​There is one and only one difference between M and W: M will see M and not W and W will see W and not M.

​> ​So bot confirms "W v M",

​No, it turned out neither saw W or M.

That *is* gibberish. It turns out that the proposition "W or M" was a correct prediction.



And when you observe a coin flip you don't see it land heads or tails either.​

Indeed, but this makes my point. Unless you claim there is no indeterminacy when throwing a coin ...

You are playing with word. What is your agenda?



​> ​And both understand immediately that the Helsinki man would have been correct by predicting "W v M"

​Then they would be equally correct in predicting "you" will see neither W nor M.​ ​But the best prediction of all would be "nobody will ever learn anything from any of this".​

You insult the people in the list, my jury in Brussels and Lille.

Insult are not a valid way of reasoning. Step 3 is easy. If you can name someone having a problem with it, just tell me its name, as you are, to my knowledge, the only one.





​> ​You are in Helsinki. You are asked to write what you expect to live in the diary that you will take with you in the duplication machine. What do you write?

1) W & M
2) W v M
3) W
4) M
5) something else (and then what).

​I pick #5 because when somebody asks ​question ​that makes absolutely no sense there is nothing to write about it

Then computationalism makes no sense.




but:

"​Some people​ like to write strings of words with a question mark at the end.​" ​

And I've asked ​this 99 times but have never received an answer, what does a prediction, good or bad, have to do with the continuous feeling of self?

Nothing (as far as I can make sense of this question).






​> ​in Helsinki, you cannot be sure that you will become the M- man, or the W-man.

​Not just in Helsinki, ​nobody will ever know if ​"​you​ "​ will become the M-man, or the W-man​ because in this context nobody knows what "you" means, ​not even Mr. You.


You mean the H-man and all its continuations.




​> ​Look, you have already accept to give your brain to a cryogenic socitey.

​Yes.​

​> ​Imagine that in ten years, the mainstream in that domain give good argument that, by not having encrypted your brain data, you will be "reconstituted" infinitely often, and with a proportion of 98% hellish environment, and 2 % of heavenly environment. What is the probability that you​...​

​> ​would end up, from a first person perspective in a hellish environment?

​Mr.You's fate is unknown but there is a 100% probability John Clark will end up in​ heaven​ and a 100% chance John Clark will end up in Hell.


In the 3p view. That eludes the 1p prediction, or you believe you die anyway, and you are not a mechanist, but have an unknown religion urelated to anything we discuss.





But I have to ask again, what does quality of predictions have to do with the continuous feeling of self?

Nothing. It is the opposite. We need only to agree that the W and M men are genuine continuation of the H man. That follows of course from mechanism.


With or without duplication machines life will always look continuous looking from the present into the past,

Not necessarily. When the corpus callosum is sleepy, we can remember two simulatenous dream/experience done in the past, so locally we can conceive having two past. Anyway, this is a distracting issue.


but with or without duplication machines it will never look continuous looking from the present into the future.


Ok, but with duplication machines, this illustrates and explains the 1p indeterminacy.

Bruno




​ ​John K Clark




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