date:20171005

Re: Will computationalism be refuted?

2017-10-05 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 3, 2017 at 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> 
>> I can see why it would be bad news for Everett, but I don't see what it
>> has to do with Computationalism.
>
>
> > 
> Well, it is rather obvious why you don't see this. It is because you stop
> at step 3.
>

It's been a long time, to tell the truth I don't remember if it was step 3
or not, all I remember is I stopped reading when the gibberish began. 

>
>>> >>
>>> 
>>> which gives hope to refute Mechanism
>>
>>
>> 
>> >> 
>> That is a odd thing to say, 
>> Mechanism
>>  was refuted 90 years ago.
>>
>
> > 
> Computationalism = Digital Mechanism = (for being short in our context
> where everything has been made clear) Mechanism.
>  
> But you are right, I meant Digital Mechanism.
>

Digital mechanism was refuted 90 years ago just like every other type of
mechanism.

>> >> 
>> Not every event has a cause.
>
>
> > 
> That is irrationalism.
>

I am not aware of any law of logic that demands that every event have a
cause nor am I aware of any self contradictions or paradoxes that would
result if some events have no cause. In fact I'm not aware of any law of
logic that demands *ANY* event have a cause, we have learned that some
events do in fact have a cause not from logic but by empirical experience.

> > 
> The belief in magic.
>

Magic will not help. If event X happened because of magic then X had a
cause. God will not help. if God made X happen then it would also have a
cause. Both are mechanistic explanations. I'm saying some things have no
explanation, they are brute facts, they just are. We're lucky that at lest
some events have a cause.

> > 
> You might think finding an example of a physical event without a physical
> cause.
>

The cause of the electron ending up hitting the exact spot  on the wall
that I'm pointing at after it went threw 2 slits.

Or the reason the atom of U235 I'm pointing at will decay now and not 5
minutes from now, or 5 days from now, or 500 million years from now.

John K Clark

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-10-05 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Oct 1, 2017 at 9:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> 
>> I have a thought experiment of my own and this is the
>>  
>> protocol:
>>
>>> 1) I have *TWO* coins, a regular coin and a two headed coin.
>>
>>> 2) I flip both coins.
>> 3) Predict if *the one and only coin* will land heads or tails.
>> 
>> You can't predict it because of coin indeterminacy. Is it too early to
>> start writing my Nobel Prize acceptance speech?
>>
>
> > 
> That question can’t be answered because if there are two coins there can’t
> also be one and only one coin.
>

Yes, and for that very reason it's not even a question, it's just a
sequence of words that happens to conform with the rules of English grammar
and a question mark at the end.

> Similarly, if John Clarke is duplicated to two cities then it doesn’t make
> sense to ask which one and only one city will end up with a John Clark in
> it.
>

Precisely correct, it's ridiculous. And sticking into that  a personal
pronoun into the middle of that nonsense will not help one bit.

> > 
> But this is NOT the same as asking which one and only one city will John
> Clark see, from his own point of view.
>

It's exactly precisely the same. It's the same

gibberish as asking what one and only one one way THE coin will fall from
"IT'S" own point of view.
There is one and only one way to avoid the gibberish, 
Stathis Papaioannou
 needs to explain what one and only one person the personal pronoun "his"
in the above reefers to.  John Clark is all ears. 

> >
> You have been through this before countless times, if some version of the
> multiverse is true, and you know that you only end up in one city from your
> own point of view,
>

As far as this is concerned 
it makes no difference if the 
multiverse
 exists or not; when looking from the present into the past there is
*always* one and only one stream of consciousness that a being can
remember. But that is NOT what you're talking about, you're talking about
looking from the present into the future. The future operates according to
different rules than the past, that's why they have different names.

John K Clark

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Re: Maudlin's Computation and Consciousness

2017-10-05 Thread David Nyman

On 5 Oct 2017 16:06, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 05 Oct 2017, at 16:02, David Nyman wrote:

On 5 October 2017 at 13:50, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 02 Oct 2017, at 15:07, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2 Oct 2017 1:58 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>
> Dear Evgenii,
>
>
> On 28 Sep 2017, at 21:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Long time ago you have discussed Maudlin's paper. At that time I somehow
> did not get interested. Yet, other day I have got strong feeling that I
> must read Maudlin's paper right now. I guess this could be explained by
> peculiarities of the universal dovetailer.
>
> Anyway, I have read Maudlin's paper, then I have read Hoffmanm's Sandman,
> and once more Maudlin's paper. I have enjoyed reading, the paper is nicely
> written. I guess I have understood the argument. Thank you.
>
>
>
> You are welcome. Don't hesitate to ask any further questions. There are
> slight differing nuances between the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) and
> Maudlin's argument. Also, I have found a way to cut the UDA at step 7
>
>
> More details please.
>
>
> Maudlin focuses on the counterfactual issue, which the MGA somehow avoids.
> Both argument shows the inadequacy of materialism and mechanism, but the
> MGA assumes that we have already a good idea of what a (mathematical)
> computation is, and that it is a special logical relation, not something in
> need of any physical assumption. Then Maudlin's analysis can be used to
> answer the "counterfactual objection", instead of reminding implicitly the
> logical nature of what is a computation. In the context of the UDA, the
> rôle of the MGA is only to show that the move in step 7 consisting in
> assuming a small primary universe, is isomorphic to creationist last
> rebuttal when saying eventually that they agree with the evidences for
> evolution, but that God was needed to make that evolution possible. That
> was already clear with Peter Jones old objection to UDA that only a
> computation supported by primary matter  can be conscious. That is a sort
> of magic way of thinking, by rebutting a theory (experimentally testable)
> by invoking a god or a magic substance which a priori is not testable ...
> to avoid the search of an a posteriori test, given here by the theory.
>

> , or I could add a simpler step 8.
>
>
> And here.
>
>
> So, it is enough just to NEVER assumes a *primary* physical universe to
> start with, like I do. Then, we can avoid the MGA by explaining directly
> (in step 7) that the arithmetical reality implements all computations,
> which follows from what we can find in all textbook on theoretical computer
> science, like Davis chapter 4 (Turing machine self-applied). I am currently
> using that material to explain that very points to my students, so I might
> make a try to explain a bit here, to give the taste of it. The advantage of
> the Turing machine formalism, is that it is close to "physical computer",
> and yet simple enough to make the theory not too much hidden in technical
> details. I will think how to do that.
>

In effect then one argues as follows. Beginning with the assumption of CTM,
we can agree in principle that the existence of a computational device,
instantiated in a primary physical reality capable of computing sufficient
of the trace of the UD, would permit the UDA to go through. This is the
initial assumption of Step 7 of the UDA. Then any objection that went to a
presumed insufficiency of such a primary reality to implement such a
computer would be a merely contingent supposition of its 'actual'
non-existence. But the question of what is 'actual' with respect to the
theory is precisely what is being asked. So any such "Show me the computer"
type of objection begs that very question.

Absolutely.

This is really forced by the initial assumption of CTM, which puts any
theory relying on it in the position of justifying the appearance of any
possible physics, including physical computational devices, on the basis of
the existence of an arithmetical, not physical, basis of computation.
'Arithmetic' here just stands for any theoretically irreducible and
sufficient basis for computation. The relevant sense of 'existence', as in
any fundamental theory, essentially equates to explanatory power. It would
of course be open to anyone to additionally assume the existence of a
putatively more 'explanatorily primitive' physical reality. But this could
only weaken the theory by arbitrarily invoking the 'preselection' of
undetectable mechanisms that then had no further explanatory role in what
followed. Hence this move should be abandoned in favour of greater
explanatory parsimony.

I think you see the point very well. It makes "primary or primitive matter"
exactly like "invisible horse". It adds something "invisible" and gives to
it magical abilities having virtually no sense in the frame of the
hypothesis.

To be sure, this assumes Mechanism, in some strong sense. When

Re: Maudlin's Computation and Consciousness

2017-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 05 Oct 2017, at 16:02, David Nyman wrote:


On 5 October 2017 at 13:50, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 02 Oct 2017, at 15:07, David Nyman wrote:




On 2 Oct 2017 1:58 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
Dear Evgenii,


On 28 Sep 2017, at 21:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:





Long time ago you have discussed Maudlin's paper. At that time I  
somehow did not get interested. Yet, other day I have got strong  
feeling that I must read Maudlin's paper right now. I guess this  
could be explained by peculiarities of the universal dovetailer.


Anyway, I have read Maudlin's paper, then I have read Hoffmanm's  
Sandman, and once more Maudlin's paper. I have enjoyed reading,  
the paper is nicely written. I guess I have understood the  
argument. Thank you.



You are welcome. Don't hesitate to ask any further questions. There  
are slight differing nuances between the Movie Graph Argument (MGA)  
and Maudlin's argument. Also, I have found a way to cut the UDA at  
step 7


More details please.


Maudlin focuses on the counterfactual issue, which the MGA somehow  
avoids. Both argument shows the inadequacy of materialism and  
mechanism, but the MGA assumes that we have already a good idea of  
what a (mathematical) computation is, and that it is a special  
logical relation, not something in need of any physical assumption.  
Then Maudlin's analysis can be used to answer the "counterfactual  
objection", instead of reminding implicitly the logical nature of  
what is a computation. In the context of the UDA, the rôle of the  
MGA is only to show that the move in step 7 consisting in assuming a  
small primary universe, is isomorphic to creationist last rebuttal  
when saying eventually that they agree with the evidences for  
evolution, but that God was needed to make that evolution possible.  
That was already clear with Peter Jones old objection to UDA that  
only a computation supported by primary matter  can be conscious.  
That is a sort of magic way of thinking, by rebutting a theory  
(experimentally testable) by invoking a god or a magic substance  
which a priori is not testable ... to avoid the search of an a  
posteriori test, given here by the theory.




, or I could add a simpler step 8.

And here.


So, it is enough just to NEVER assumes a *primary* physical universe  
to start with, like I do. Then, we can avoid the MGA by explaining  
directly (in step 7) that the arithmetical reality implements all  
computations, which follows from what we can find in all textbook on  
theoretical computer science, like Davis chapter 4 (Turing machine  
self-applied). I am currently using that material to explain that  
very points to my students, so I might make a try to explain a bit  
here, to give the taste of it. The advantage of the Turing machine  
formalism, is that it is close to "physical computer", and yet  
simple enough to make the theory not too much hidden in technical  
details. I will think how to do that.



In effect then one argues as follows. Beginning with the assumption  
of CTM, we can agree in principle that the existence of a  
computational device, instantiated in a primary physical reality  
capable of computing sufficient of the trace of the UD, would permit  
the UDA to go through. This is the initial assumption of Step 7 of  
the UDA. Then any objection that went to a presumed insufficiency of  
such a primary reality to implement such a computer would be a  
merely contingent supposition of its 'actual' non-existence. But the  
question of what is 'actual' with respect to the theory is precisely  
what is being asked. So any such "Show me the computer" type of  
objection begs that very question.


Absolutely.




This is really forced by the initial assumption of CTM, which puts  
any theory relying on it in the position of justifying the  
appearance of any possible physics, including physical computational  
devices, on the basis of the existence of an arithmetical, not  
physical, basis of computation. 'Arithmetic' here just stands for  
any theoretically irreducible and sufficient basis for computation.  
The relevant sense of 'existence', as in any fundamental theory,  
essentially equates to explanatory power. It would of course be open  
to anyone to additionally assume the existence of a putatively more  
'explanatorily primitive' physical reality. But this could only  
weaken the theory by arbitrarily invoking the 'preselection' of  
undetectable mechanisms that then had no further explanatory role in  
what followed. Hence this move should be abandoned in favour of  
greater explanatory parsimony.


I think you see the point very well. It makes "primary or primitive  
matter" exactly like "invisible horse". It adds something "invisible"  
and gives to it magical abilities having virtually no sense in the  
frame of the hypothesis.


To be sure, this assumes Mechanism, in some strong sense. When the  
argument is translated in mathematics,

Re: Maudlin's Computation and Consciousness

2017-10-05 Thread David Nyman

On 5 October 2017 at 13:50, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 02 Oct 2017, at 15:07, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2 Oct 2017 1:58 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>
> Dear Evgenii,
>
>
> On 28 Sep 2017, at 21:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Long time ago you have discussed Maudlin's paper. At that time I somehow
> did not get interested. Yet, other day I have got strong feeling that I
> must read Maudlin's paper right now. I guess this could be explained by
> peculiarities of the universal dovetailer.
>
> Anyway, I have read Maudlin's paper, then I have read Hoffmanm's Sandman,
> and once more Maudlin's paper. I have enjoyed reading, the paper is nicely
> written. I guess I have understood the argument. Thank you.
>
>
>
> You are welcome. Don't hesitate to ask any further questions. There are
> slight differing nuances between the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) and
> Maudlin's argument. Also, I have found a way to cut the UDA at step 7
>
>
> More details please.
>
>
> Maudlin focuses on the counterfactual issue, which the MGA somehow avoids.
> Both argument shows the inadequacy of materialism and mechanism, but the
> MGA assumes that we have already a good idea of what a (mathematical)
> computation is, and that it is a special logical relation, not something in
> need of any physical assumption. Then Maudlin's analysis can be used to
> answer the "counterfactual objection", instead of reminding implicitly the
> logical nature of what is a computation. In the context of the UDA, the
> rôle of the MGA is only to show that the move in step 7 consisting in
> assuming a small primary universe, is isomorphic to creationist last
> rebuttal when saying eventually that they agree with the evidences for
> evolution, but that God was needed to make that evolution possible. That
> was already clear with Peter Jones old objection to UDA that only a
> computation supported by primary matter  can be conscious. That is a sort
> of magic way of thinking, by rebutting a theory (experimentally testable)
> by invoking a god or a magic substance which a priori is not testable ...
> to avoid the search of an a posteriori test, given here by the theory.
>

> , or I could add a simpler step 8.
>
>
> And here.
>
>
> So, it is enough just to NEVER assumes a *primary* physical universe to
> start with, like I do. Then, we can avoid the MGA by explaining directly
> (in step 7) that the arithmetical reality implements all computations,
> which follows from what we can find in all textbook on theoretical computer
> science, like Davis chapter 4 (Turing machine self-applied). I am currently
> using that material to explain that very points to my students, so I might
> make a try to explain a bit here, to give the taste of it. The advantage of
> the Turing machine formalism, is that it is close to "physical computer",
> and yet simple enough to make the theory not too much hidden in technical
> details. I will think how to do that.
>

In effect then one argues as follows. Beginning with the assumption of CTM,
we can agree in principle that the existence of a computational device,
instantiated in a primary physical reality capable of computing sufficient
of the trace of the UD, would permit the UDA to go through. This is the
initial assumption of Step 7 of the UDA. Then any objection that went to a
presumed insufficiency of such a primary reality to implement such a
computer would be a merely contingent supposition of its 'actual'
non-existence. But the question of what is 'actual' with respect to the
theory is precisely what is being asked. So any such "Show me the computer"
type of objection begs that very question.

This is really forced by the initial assumption of CTM, which puts any
theory relying on it in the position of justifying the appearance of any
possible physics, including physical computational devices, on the basis of
the existence of an arithmetical, not physical, basis of computation.
'Arithmetic' here just stands for any theoretically irreducible and
sufficient basis for computation. The relevant sense of 'existence', as in
any fundamental theory, essentially equates to explanatory power. It would
of course be open to anyone to additionally assume the existence of a
putatively more 'explanatorily primitive' physical reality. But this could
only weaken the theory by arbitrarily invoking the 'preselection' of
undetectable mechanisms that then had no further explanatory role in what
followed. Hence this move should be abandoned in favour of greater
explanatory parsimony.

David

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> David
>
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Evgenii
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
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Re: Maudlin's Computation and Consciousness

2017-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 02 Oct 2017, at 15:07, David Nyman wrote:




On 2 Oct 2017 1:58 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
Dear Evgenii,


On 28 Sep 2017, at 21:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:





Long time ago you have discussed Maudlin's paper. At that time I  
somehow did not get interested. Yet, other day I have got strong  
feeling that I must read Maudlin's paper right now. I guess this  
could be explained by peculiarities of the universal dovetailer.


Anyway, I have read Maudlin's paper, then I have read Hoffmanm's  
Sandman, and once more Maudlin's paper. I have enjoyed reading, the  
paper is nicely written. I guess I have understood the argument.  
Thank you.



You are welcome. Don't hesitate to ask any further questions. There  
are slight differing nuances between the Movie Graph Argument (MGA)  
and Maudlin's argument. Also, I have found a way to cut the UDA at  
step 7


More details please.


Maudlin focuses on the counterfactual issue, which the MGA somehow  
avoids. Both argument shows the inadequacy of materialism and  
mechanism, but the MGA assumes that we have already a good idea of  
what a (mathematical) computation is, and that it is a special logical  
relation, not something in need of any physical assumption. Then  
Maudlin's analysis can be used to answer the "counterfactual  
objection", instead of reminding implicitly the logical nature of what  
is a computation. In the context of the UDA, the rôle of the MGA is  
only to show that the move in step 7 consisting in assuming a small  
primary universe, is isomorphic to creationist last rebuttal when  
saying eventually that they agree with the evidences for evolution,  
but that God was needed to make that evolution possible. That was  
already clear with Peter Jones old objection to UDA that only a  
computation supported by primary matter  can be conscious. That is a  
sort of magic way of thinking, by rebutting a theory (experimentally  
testable) by invoking a god or a magic substance which a priori is not  
testable ... to avoid the search of an a posteriori test, given here  
by the theory.









, or I could add a simpler step 8.

And here.


So, it is enough just to NEVER assumes a *primary* physical universe  
to start with, like I do. Then, we can avoid the MGA by explaining  
directly (in step 7) that the arithmetical reality implements all  
computations, which follows from what we can find in all textbook on  
theoretical computer science, like Davis chapter 4 (Turing machine  
self-applied). I am currently using that material to explain that very  
points to my students, so I might make a try to explain a bit here, to  
give the taste of it. The advantage of the Turing machine formalism,  
is that it is close to "physical computer", and yet simple enough to  
make the theory not too much hidden in technical details. I will think  
how to do that.


Bruno










David


Kind regards,

Bruno






Best wishes,

Evgenii

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: When you split the brain, do you split the person?

2017-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 04 Oct 2017, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/4/2017 7:01 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
In this case the pronoun problems can be resolved by dint of the  
fact that the language processing areas of the brain are largely  
localized to one half. It's an interesting question to me whether  
the non-linguistic half, when separated, is self-aware. My  
intuition is that it's not.


I agree.  It's difficult to say how self-awareness can be  
implemented except via some kind of symbolism.  I could be based on  
self-images, but language seems like a more compressed way of  
storing useful memories and conceptuallization of the self.


I tend to disagree. I would say that only the non linguistic side of  
the brain is conscious, and the other part is the one doing the  
confabulation. Or perhaps I would say that the non linguistic part is  
1p-conscious, where the linguistic part if 3p-conscious, or  
representationally conscious, or aware of the representation. In our  
culture it tends to dominate. This would also mean that despite being  
mute, the separated non linguistic half is conscious, but cannot  
acknowledge the fact through words.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Will computationalism be refuted?

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

Re: Maudlin's Computation and Consciousness

Re: Maudlin's Computation and Consciousness

Re: Maudlin's Computation and Consciousness

Re: Maudlin's Computation and Consciousness

Re: When you split the brain, do you split the person?

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