Re: I the mirror
Dear Stephen, [SPK] So p is it is not provable that not p? This is a double negative implying that your logic follows the law of the excluded middle. That is ok, but I was hoping that you would see that as being a logicwise subset of Intuitionistic logic, ala Topos and Heyting Algebras... BM: I use the classical boolean logic for the third person discourse by machine. I get the Heytingian Intuitionist logic for the first person, modelized by the thaetetic definition of knowledge apply to classical self-reference. That is the passage from []p to p []p. I get the quantum logic by refining that notion of knowledge when I translate the uda in a consistent machine language. A little more below. BM: Any machine or theory extending classical logic and capable of proving elementary arithmetical theorems. [SPK] Umm, what are the bounds of this extension of classical logic? Any possibility of getting into contectual or modal aspects, such as []p iff some x implies p, where x is some context that may vanish in some limit. An example of this is found in solutions of the grue paradox. BM: There are no bounds for the extension. What I prove remains true for any definissable or axiomatizable extension of classical logic + Peano arithmetic (let us say). snip SPK: We may note that machines are usually defined by some set of functions N - N, where N are the Natural numbers. BM: Read my to diagonalisation post for making this precise. I would say that controlable machine, constructive reals, and total computable function (where total means defined on all N, can be, in our context, identified. But such a set is not *recursively* (mechanically) enumerable All my enterprise, and actually Church thesis, are made consistent by the fact that the set of total computable function is a necessarily fuzzy set include in the set of all computable functions. [SPK] You are avoiding my question! How is this fuzzyness defined? Is it some analogy to the boundary of a recursively enumerable set or is it some membership function that can range over [0,1] or some thing else? BM: There is an analogy with the border of a Recursively Enumerable set (having a non recursively enumerable complement). That is, a RE but non recursive set. It can be arbitrary difficult to decide the belongness for the point near the frontier. But the precise meaning is given in the diagonalisation posts. SPK: I am very skeptical that this (countable) set of numbers alone is sufficient in itself to cover the range of all possible systems in Nature (the Totality of possible existential expressions, including all mathematics). Given this caveat, is this within your notion of a definition of these words? BM: Please read carefully the diagonalisation post. Church thesis is really the schroedinger equation of comp. I mean a highly non trivial statement in the fundamentals of mathematics. It is the roots of the incompleteness phenomenon. Before Church thesis you could have believed that to be a machine is a simplifying assumption. After Church thesis we know that machines, and universal machines in particular have unbounded complexity. Universal machines are mostly lucky unpredictable being. [SPK] What is the link to the diagonalization post? It is true that I have a problem with the Church thesis, but it is that it seems to be myopic and limited. BM: Mmmh... OK. I promise coming back on it. I have not the time explaining it now. Perhaps it is the real difficulty. Not only Church Thesis is not a limitation, but with comp, it is even a quasi-constructive vaccine against all form of limitation. It is Church thesis which makes general the incompleteness phenomenon and which transforms any honest machine into a modest machine. I see no analogy between the Church thesis and SWE other than a mapping function - such that Church thesis is about N - N and SWE can be considered to be about C - C, but it is obvious that N \subset C and not the otherway around. BM: Well, that analogy is shallow :( I was just saying that Church thesis introduces non trivial constraints on the machine psychological states. My comparison with SWE, here, was probably unpedagogical, sorry. snip [SPK] What I am trying to argue is that we can not abondon eiter sup-phys nor comp except in the very very special case where the distinguishability between the two vanishes, e.g. a neutal monism that obtains in the infinite limit of all possible existential (or ontological) expressions and, additionally, we must not be so cavalier in our postulations. As I have tried to argue before, the notion that the mind is UTM emulable is not a proven fact and at this point should be considered to be merely a conjecture. BM: It cannot be taken as a conjecture. It is an hypothesis which has the curious feature that if you add it as an axioms it becomes false! [SPK]
Re: I the mirror
Dear Bruno, Snipping a lot. - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, January 31, 2003 6:44 AM Subject: Re: I the mirror Hello Stephen, At 13:18 -0500 29/01/2003, Stephen Paul King wrote: Could you translate these symbols into words so that I could better wrap my mind around them and spin them around in my head? BM: Basically []p = provable p in such a precise way that 1) you can verify the proof in a finite number of mechanical steps 2) grosso modo p is made true in all recursively enumerable maximal extension of the machine/theory p is -[]-p you should read p by consistent p. That is the fact that -p is not probable, so that you get no contradiction by adding p as a new axiom to the theory or to the machine roots belief. [SPK] So p is it is not provable that not p? This is a double negative implying that your logic follows the law of the excluded middle. That is ok, but I was hoping that you would see that as being a logicwise subset of Intuitionistic logic, ala Topos and Heyting Algebras... snip SPK: I take consistent means that given some formal model, whose exact definition must be given somehow ... BM: Any machine or theory extending classical logic and capable of proving elementary arithmetical theorems. [SPK] Umm, what are the bounds of this extension of classical logic. Any possibility of getting into contectual or modal aspects, such as []p iff some x implies p, where x is some context that may vanish in some limit. An example of this is found in solutions of the grue paradox. snip SPK: We may note that machines are usually defined by some set of functions N - N, where N are the Natural numbers. BM: Read my to diagonalisation post for making this precise. I would say that controlable machine, constructive reals, and total computable function (where total means defined on all N, can be, in our context, identified. But such a set is not *recursively* (mechanically) enumerable All my enterprise, and actually Church thesis, are made consistent by the fact that the set of total computable function is a necessarily fuzzy set include in the set of all computable functions. [SPK] You are avoiding my question! How is this fuzzyness defined? Is it some analogy to the boundary of a recursively enumerable set or is it some membership function that can range over [0,1] or some thing else? SPK: I am very skeptical that this (countable) set of numbers alone is sufficient in itself to cover the range of all possible systems in Nature (the Totality of possible existential expressions, including all mathematics). Given this caveat, is this within your notion of a definition of these words? BM: Please read carefully the diagonalisation post. Church thesis is really the schroedinger equation of comp. I mean a highly non trivial statement in the fundamentals of mathematics. It is the roots of the incompleteness phenomenon. Before Church thesis you could have believed that to be a machine is a simplifying assumption. After Church thesis we know that machines, and universal machines in particular have unbounded complexity. Universal machines are mostly lucky unpredictable being. [SPK] What is the link to the diagonalization post? It is true that I have a problem with the Church thesis, but it is that it seems to be myopic and limited. I see no analogy between the Church thesis and SWE other than a mapping function - such that Church thesis is about N - N and SWE can be considered to be about C - C, but it is obvious that N \subset C and not the otherway around. snip [SPK] What I am trying to argue is that we can not abondon eiter sup-phys nor comp except in the very very special case where the distinguishability between the two vanishes, e.g. a neutal monism that obtains in the infinite limit of all possible existential (or ontological) expressions and, additionally, we must not be so cavalier in our postulations. As I have tried to argue before, the notion that the mind is UTM emulable is not a proven fact and at this point should be considered to be merely a conjecture. BM: It cannot be taken as a conjecture. It is an hypothesis which has the curious feature that if you add it as an axioms it becomes false! [SPK] This is what bothers me about it, it is like the Createan what is honest so long as he never speaks a word and yet you do not seem to allow for a resolution of the Liar paradox other that demanding silence, ala Russell's solution. I hope some day soon we can explore the notion of non well founded sets that Peter Wegner proposed as a means to generalize the notion of computation. (This is a known feature of modal logics or intensional mathematics). So the notion that the mind is [consistently] UTM emulable is not only not a proven fact
Re: I the mirror
Hello Stephen, At 13:18 -0500 29/01/2003, Stephen Paul King wrote: Could you translate these symbols into words so that I could better wrap my mind around them and spin them around in my head? BM: Basically []p = provable p in such a precise way that 1) you can verify the proof in a finite number of mechanical steps 2) grosso modo p is made true in all recursively enumerable maximal extension of the machine/theory p is -[]-p you should read p by consistent p. That is the fact that -p is not probable, so that you get no contradiction by adding p as a new axiom to the theory or to the machine roots belief. BM: Here I gave a little sketch of the translation of UDA in a consistent machine's language. [SPK] I hope that you realize that there are many ideas that you are assuming tacitly that I and others are not familiar with and/or may have other definitions for. BM: I constantly refer the interested lister to Boolos 1993 book. Or Smorynski 1985. SPK: For example: exactly what do the words consistent, machine and language mean? BM: See above. SPK: I take consistent means that given some formal model, whose exact definition must be given somehow ... BM: Any machine or theory extending classical logic and capable of proving elementary arithmetical theorems. SPK: ... or, at least, must be familiar to your readers, a consistent machine's language is one where there is no contradiction obtainable given any possible combination of the machine's language. BM: Not any possible combination, only those who respect classical logical inference rule. I interview (in AUDA) the platonist computationalist machine! SPK: We may note that machines are usually defined by some set of functions N - N, where N are the Natural numbers. BM: Read my to diagonalisation post for making this precise. I would say that controlable machine, constructive reals, and total computable function (where total means defined on all N, can be, in our context, identified. But such a set is not *recursively* (mechanically) enumerable All my enterprise, and actually Church thesis, are made consistent by the fact that the set of total computable function is a necessarily fuzzy set include in the set of all computable functions. SPK: I am very skeptical that this (countable) set of numbers alone is sufficient in itself to cover the range of all possible systems in Nature (the Totality of possible existential expressions, including all mathematics). Given this caveat, is this within your notion of a definition of these words? BM: Please read carefully the diagonalisation post. Church thesis is really the schroedinger equation of comp. I mean a highly non trivial statement in the fundamentals of mathematics. It is the roots of the incompleteness phenomenon. Before Church thesis you could have believed that to be a machine is a simplifying assumption. After Church thesis we know that machines, and universal machines in particular have unbounded complexity. Universal machines are mostly lucky unpredictable being. SPK: Ok, I am not questioning whether or not there exists self-referential programs (plural???) or a Univiversal program (singular???), I am wondering about how do we go from formal existence postulation to the possibility of maniferstation itself. This is where I think that there is a problem if only in that the domain of explanatory power of such models only applies to a very narrow range. BM: I am really afraid you don't take Church thesis into account. The explanatory power applies to range which you can not even bound by formal tools. Even the whole Cantor Paradise is too poor to explain *in general* universal machine behavior. Some people still believe that the computer industry will make our life more simple. They will be disillusioned. A good thing perhaps. Now, for an explanation of the qualitative aspect of the manifestation, well this is all the purpose of my thesis. Note that I acknowledge an explanatory gap, but I show that comp justifies the existence of a talk on explanatory gap by the machine's first person. BM Not with comp by hypothesis. Manifestation are indexicals. Strictly speaking this follows from the UDA + OCCAM RAZOR, or better UDA + MOVIE GRAPH. (we can come back on this latter). See Maudlin 89 for something equivalent to the movie graph. Maudlin realises the incompatibility between the physical supervenience thesis (sup-phys) and comp. Because he want sup-phys, he abandons comp. Because I postulate comp, I abandon sup-phys. [SPK] What I am trying to argue is that we can not abondon eiter sup-phys nor comp except in the very very special case where the distinguishability between the two vanishes, e.g. a neutal monism that obtains in the infinite limit of all possible existential (or ontological) expressions and, additionally, we must not be so cavalier in our postulations. As I have tried to argue
Re: I the mirror
Dear Bruno, Interleaving many comments. - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, January 25, 2003 10:24 AM Subject: Re: I the mirror Hi Stephen, SPK: I have no difficulties with such notions, but would like to see a more general situation discussed such as how we can have a formal model of multiple 1-person intentionalities. I see this more general stuation as being the exact analogy of the problem of time in physics and given my interest in that problem I am engaging in this discussion. ;-) BM: Third person self-reference (corresponding to Kleene, Case, ...): []p ([] = Godel's beweisbar), p arithmetical proposition. First person self-reference without self-name): p []pThat gives through Kripke semantics an antisymmetrical logic of subjective time. Note G* proves []p - (p []p), but G does not prove it!!! Also p []p is not definissable in arithmetic: the machine will hardly confuses herself with a description, or any 3-view of herself like a doppelganger. First person plural (rational plausible communicable belief) p []p p arithmetical proposition First person plural knowledge restricted to the DU accessible propositions/states: p []p p \Sigma_1 arithmetical proposition. This gives the quantum modal logics Z1 and Z1*. Where the atomical propositions (here just the leaves of DU*) are persistent in the sense that once a lobian machine got it in her actual world, it remains true in her neighborhood (which is sparse in UD*). [SPK] Could you translate these symbols into words so that I could better wrap my mind around them and spin them around in my head? Here I gave a little sketch of the translation of UDA in a consistent machine's language. [SPK] I hope that you realize that there are many ideas that you are assuming tacitly that I and others are not familiar with and/or may have other definitions for. For example: exactly what do the words consistent, machine and language mean? I take consistent means that given some formal model, whose exact definition must be given somehow or, at least, must be familiar to your readers, a consistent machine's language is one where there is no contradiction obtainable given any possible combination of the machine's language. We may note that machines are usually defined by some set of functions N - N, where N are the Natural numbers. I am very skeptical that this (countable) set of numbers alone is sufficient in itself to cover the range of all possible systems in Nature (the Totality of possible existential expressions, including all mathematics). Given this caveat, is this within your notion of a definition of these words? SPK: Ok, I am not questioning whether or not there exists self-referential programs (plural???) or a Univiversal program (singular???), I am wondering about how do we go from formal existence postulation to the possibility of maniferstation itself. This is where I think that there is a problem if only in that the domain of explanatory power of such models only applies to a very narrow range. BM Not with comp by hypothesis. Manifestation are indexicals. Strictly speaking this follows from the UDA + OCCAM RAZOR, or better UDA + MOVIE GRAPH. (we can come back on this latter). See Maudlin 89 for something equivalent to the movie graph. Maudlin realises the incompatibility between the physical supervenience thesis (sup-phys) and comp. Because he want sup-phys, he abandons comp. Because I postulate comp, I abandon sup-phys. [SPK] What I am trying to argue is that we can not abondon eiter sup-phys nor comp except in the very very special case where the distinguishability between the two vanishes, e.g. a neutal monism that obtains in the infinite limit of all possible existential (or ontological) expressions and, additionally, we must not be so cavalier in our postulations. As I have tried to argue before, the notion that the mind is UTM emulable is not a proven fact and at this point should be considered to be merely a conjecture. The thought experiement using classical cloning and or teleporting of minds has several assumptions that are contrary to known physical facts, such as the imposibility of simulataneously measuring the position and momenta of all the required atoms of a brain such that a UTM could be defined that would emulate its behaviour. This, in itself, leads me to reject the entire notion of brain cloning and any idea that depends on it as simple idealistic. It is as fantastic as a pink unicorn. I see not way in which the classical teleportation is possible in the real world. SPK Here we find the following: http://www.cis.udel.edu/~case/slides/krt-consc-cs-slides.ps BM: Nice. I didn't see it! SPK: Exactly what is the formal statement of if she looks closely
Re: I the mirror
Dear Bruno, First let me state that the reason that I am discussing this idea with you is so that I can kill two birds with one stone. I would like to better understand your thesis and would like to see how it accounts for or solves the epiphenomenona problem so that I can evaluate a model that I am working on. - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2003 2:18 AM Subject: Re: I the mirror Hi Stephen, At 10:52 -0500 22/01/2003, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, Thank you for the reference to the Case papers. It is ironic that his argument makes the case for the subtle issue that I am trying to point out to you, that there is a grave problem with your model. In http://www.cis.udel.edu/~case/self-ref.html we find a very informative discussion of self-reference and the way that infinite regression is avoided by using an external aspect to act as a mirror/sketch pad for the machine to use as a self-referential imaging system. While I do have some reservation regarding the assumption that N - N functions can completely capture physics and the exclusive usage of Well founded statements in mathematics, I propose to set them aside for the sake of a discussion. [SPK] I have cut and pasted the exact words used: Machine Self-Reference The robot pictured below has a transparent front and is facing an (expandable) board, a little to its right, and a mirror, a little to its left. It's transparent front enables it to see in the mirror its complete underlying mechanism, flowchart, or program. The board serves for input, output, and intermediate computations. Such a self-referential or self-reflecting robot has data access, then, to a complete (low level) self model. It is depicted already having copied onto the board a portion of its ``program'' (corrected for mirror reversal). Note that the robot's self copy is projected externally to the robot itself. In this way infinite regress is not required for the robot to have complete (low level) self knowledge. The use this robot makes of its complete (low level) self knowledge is whatever was built into it, but it could have been anything algorithmic. For general computer programs, in contexts where mirrors may not be available, a quiescent (low level) self-model can be obtained by a mechanism logically similar to the self-replication mechanism employed by single-celled organisms. [BM] I am not sure which external aspect you allude to. Case'w work relies on the second recursion of Kleene, which gives easy way to construct self-referential programs. The mirror is really in machine's head. [SPK] Ok, but if, as you state, the 'mirror' is really in the machine's head we are only shifting the 3-person view; instead of seeing the robot standing in front of a mirror, we zoom inside the robot's innards and find the 'mirror'. This does not chance anything. On the other hand, you are making a different point since the 'mirror' that Case and you (I think) are thinkng about is not a physical 'mirror' or any other physical object. That is to be expected given that we seem to be discussing the subtleties of an immaterail monist theory, but does nothing to blunt the point of my question: Hw does an immaterial monist theory give a consistent meaning to notions such as transitivity, concurrency, persistence and other properties that are associated with physicality? The basic idea is very easy. Let D be a duplicator in the sense that the program D applied to X, written DX, gives a description of X apply to itself, that is XX. So DA gives AA. DB gives BB. DC gives CC, ... What gives DD? Yes. DD gives DD. It's an example of a duplicating program. [SPK] I have no difficulties with such notions, but would like to see a more general situation discussed such as how we can have a formal model of multiple 1-person intentionalities. I see this more general stuation as being the exact analogy of the problem of time in physics and given my interest in that problem I am engaging in this discussion. ;-) For all transformation T you can generalize and find a program which computes T applied to itself. Simple reproduction is the particular case when T = the identity transformation: take a new duplicator which apply to any X, written DX, gives T applied to a description of XX, that is T(XX). Now DD gives T(DD). DD gives T applied to itself. So you get self-referential machines by the substitution of some [variable of some transformation] by duplicator applied to themselves. [SPK] Ok, but where is the notion of persistence that is implicit in the chain: take a new duplicator which apply to any X, written DX, gives T applied to a description of XX, that is T(XX). Now DD gives T(DD). DD gives T applied to itself. There is obviously a transitive property here since we have to both consider
Re: I the mirror
Dear Bruno, Thank you for the reference to the Case papers. It is ironic that his argument makes the case for the subtle issue that I am trying to point out to you, that there is a grave problem with your model. In http://www.cis.udel.edu/~case/self-ref.html we find a very informative discussion of self-reference and the way that infinite regression is avoided by using an external aspect to act as a mirror/sketch pad for the machine to use as a self-referential imaging system. While I do have some reservation regarding the assumption that N - N functions can completely capture physics and the exclusive usage of Well founded statements in mathematics, I propose to set them aside for the sake of a discussion. Your model, as I understand it, would seem to make the mirror/ sketch pad to be a derivative or epiphenomenona of the UD, e.g. that physicality itself is merely derived from the intetionality of arithmetic statements, what x implies about y. My argument is that if physicality is mere epiphenomenona, is it sufficient to merely have a belief by S that x implies y to have a causal consequence on the possible behavior of S, such that if x did not imply y behavior would be 3-person distinguishable? What I seem to be getting at is how do you relate 1-uncertainty to 3-person belief? I see the paper by Pratt that I have mentioned before makes some headway on this question, but have not seen any of your comments about this. Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, January 21, 2003 3:21 AM Subject: Re: I the mirror At 11:59 +1100 21/01/2003, Colin Hales wrote: This is a query placed as a result of failing to succeed to find answers when googling my way around the place for a very long time (2 years). I am about to conclude that a) no such discourse exists or b) that it is disguised in a form of physics/math that my searching has not uncovered. I know it is off-topic but I thought I'd run it by you folk as the most eclectic agglomerators of knowledge in the multiverse. Off-list replies welcome - keep the noise down and all that. Q. What branch of science has ascertained the role and status of the image in a first person perspective of a mirror? .ie. 'be' the mirror. The answer 'there ain't one as far as I know' is as acceptable as anything. I just need to know what's out there. If there's nothing there then I take it I'm in that breezy lonely spot past the front lines of epistemology and trundle on assuming (a) above. As far as I understand the question it seems to me that the answer is intensional recursion theory. My own approach to epistemology has been based on it, especially through the work of John Case. Fortunately or unfortunately, the modal logics of self-reference (G, G*) can be used as a sort of shortcut so that I am no more relying directly on the, although very beautiful, work by John Case. A good starting point is http://www.cis.udel.edu/~case/self-ref.html Note that it is not really first person perspective of a mirror, at least as I define first person because my first person is just invisible for all third persons and so cannot be seen in a mirror. First persons share this property with vampires! One day I will put my paper amoeba, planaria, and dreaming machine on my web page, because it shows the relationship between Case's use of the mirror in abstract biology and the loebian machine psychology. Hoping that helps. Bruno
Re: I the mirror
Hi Stephen, At 10:52 -0500 22/01/2003, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, Thank you for the reference to the Case papers. It is ironic that his argument makes the case for the subtle issue that I am trying to point out to you, that there is a grave problem with your model. In http://www.cis.udel.edu/~case/self-ref.html we find a very informative discussion of self-reference and the way that infinite regression is avoided by using an external aspect to act as a mirror/sketch pad for the machine to use as a self-referential imaging system. While I do have some reservation regarding the assumption that N - N functions can completely capture physics and the exclusive usage of Well founded statements in mathematics, I propose to set them aside for the sake of a discussion. BM I am not sure which external aspect you allude to. Case'w work relies on the second recursion of Kleene, which gives easy way to construct self-referential programs. The mirror is really in machine's head. The basic idea is very easy. Let D be a duplicator in the sense that the program D applied to X, written DX, gives a description of X apply to itself, that is XX. So DA gives AA. DB gives BB. DC gives CC, ... What gives DD? Yes. DD gives DD. It's an example of a duplicating program. For all transformation T you can generalize and find a program which computes T applied to itself. Simple reproduction is the particular case when T = the identity transformation: take a new duplicator which apply to any X, written DX, gives T applied to a description of XX, that is T(XX). Now DD gives T(DD). DD gives T applied to itself. So you get self-referential machines by the substitution of some [variable of some transformation] by duplicator applied to themselves. You could say that the self-referentiality comes from the language chosen, but working with Rogers numerical representations, the \phi_i, you can show the reasoning constructive and machine, or programming language, independent. What remains true is that any self-referential program needs a universal program to run it, for making the self-referentiality manifest. I have never deny that. What the universal dovetailer argument shows is that from the point of view of the machine, if she looks closely enough to its probable local implementation, that is near its comp substitution level, she will describe not one universal machines, but MANY one. QM confirms that. But people have invented selecting rules, like the collapse of the wave or some guiding potential, making things look more Aristotelian. But Everett comes and said why for?. And I come, if you want, and just say that if you take seriously the Everett comp then you can ask why for? even for the Schroedinger Equation. Not because you should dismiss it, but because if it is true, it should be derivable from LOGIC + ARITHMETIC. That the result of the UDA proof. SPK: Your model, as I understand it, ... BM: But I'm afraid you miss the point. It is not a model. It is not a theory. It is a theorem, a deductive argument. If you don't understand it, you should tell me at which step of the reasoning you are stuck. I am not so interested in knowing if the hypotheses are true. I am enough glad for showing them refutable. When a computationalist practitioners accepts an artificial digital brain, he does not ask for a model in its head. He asks and hope for the real thing. In case he survives (= COMP) he can bet he is immaterial. He can choose is body and travel on the nets, without any stable body. The UDA result is that this imateriality is contagious, in some sense, the environment cannot be more material than himself. Descartes, Hume, and Kant have partially describe this. SPK: would seem to make the mirror/ sketch pad to be a derivative or epiphenomenona of the UD, BM: Why epiphenomena? They are phenomenal appearances, stable patterns in consistent machines memories. Dreams if you want, but stable dreams in which they have partial control ... And thanks to the G/G* difference we get communicable and incommunicable truth. Thanks to the Z/Z* difference we get room for both physical measure and physical sensations, as uncommunicable physical result of (self)measurement. SPK: e.g. that physicality itself is merely derived from the intetionality of arithmetic statements, BM: Yes. SPK: what x implies about y. My argument is that if physicality is mere epiphenomenona, is it sufficient to merely have a belief by S that x implies y to have a causal consequence on the possible behavior of S, such that if x did not imply y behavior would be 3-person distinguishable? BM: ... would be 1-person plural distinguishable (for the technical reason that the quantum, seems to appear at the star level. I am not yet sure). But you are right. That is, if that is believable and consistent. It is not that mind acts on matter, but it is more like the arithmetical border of mind defines matter. Roughly
Re: I the mirror
At 11:59 +1100 21/01/2003, Colin Hales wrote: This is a query placed as a result of failing to succeed to find answers when googling my way around the place for a very long time (2 years). I am about to conclude that a) no such discourse exists or b) that it is disguised in a form of physics/math that my searching has not uncovered. I know it is off-topic but I thought I'd run it by you folk as the most eclectic agglomerators of knowledge in the multiverse. Off-list replies welcome - keep the noise down and all that. Q. What branch of science has ascertained the role and status of the image in a first person perspective of a mirror? .ie. 'be' the mirror. The answer 'there ain't one as far as I know' is as acceptable as anything. I just need to know what's out there. If there's nothing there then I take it I'm in that breezy lonely spot past the front lines of epistemology and trundle on assuming (a) above. As far as I understand the question it seems to me that the answer is intensional recursion theory. My own approach to epistemology has been based on it, especially through the work of John Case. Fortunately or unfortunately, the modal logics of self-reference (G, G*) can be used as a sort of shortcut so that I am no more relying directly on the, although very beautiful, work by John Case. A good starting point is http://www.cis.udel.edu/~case/self-ref.html Note that it is not really first person perspective of a mirror, at least as I define first person because my first person is just invisible for all third persons and so cannot be seen in a mirror. First persons share this property with vampires! One day I will put my paper amoeba, planaria, and dreaming machine on my web page, because it shows the relationship between Case's use of the mirror in abstract biology and the loebian machine psychology. Hoping that helps. Bruno
RE: I the mirror
Hi, Onar Aam wrote some nice essays on mirrors and awareness, a few years back. He had a quite elaborate theory. Unfortunately, his website seems not to be up anymore. However, if you e-mail him, he will probably send them to you. A year ago his e-mail was [EMAIL PROTECTED], but I'm not 100% sure it's current. -- Ben -Original Message- From: Colin Hales [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Monday, January 20, 2003 7:59 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: I the mirror Dear Everythingers, This is a query placed as a result of failing to succeed to find answers when googling my way around the place for a very long time (2 years). I am about to conclude that a) no such discourse exists or b) that it is disguised in a form of physics/math that my searching has not uncovered. I know it is off-topic but I thought I'd run it by you folk as the most eclectic agglomerators of knowledge in the multiverse. Off-list replies welcome - keep the noise down and all that. Q. What branch of science has ascertained the role and status of the image in a first person perspective of a mirror? .ie. 'be' the mirror. The answer 'there ain't one as far as I know' is as acceptable as anything. I just need to know what's out there. If there's nothing there then I take it I'm in that breezy lonely spot past the front lines of epistemology and trundle on assuming (a) above. Thanks in advance. Cheers, Colin Hales
Re: I the mirror
The ancient Egyptians were the first to identify 'mirror' with first-person experience, some 5000 years ago. The word ankh means both 'life' and 'mirror' since full living-reality was what visually appears represented on the surface of 'mirrors'. Whether there was 'self-experience' there or not was another issue; it was sufficient to observe tht identical 'observable phenomena' were there in both 'places'. :-) Jamie Rose Ceptual Institute Colin Hales wrote: Dear Everythingers, This is a query placed as a result of failing to succeed to find answers when googling my way around the place for a very long time (2 years). I am about to conclude that a) no such discourse exists or b) that it is disguised in a form of physics/math that my searching has not uncovered. I know it is off-topic but I thought I'd run it by you folk as the most eclectic agglomerators of knowledge in the multiverse. Off-list replies welcome - keep the noise down and all that. Q. What branch of science has ascertained the role and status of the image in a first person perspective of a mirror? .ie. 'be' the mirror. The answer 'there ain't one as far as I know' is as acceptable as anything. I just need to know what's out there. If there's nothing there then I take it I'm in that breezy lonely spot past the front lines of epistemology and trundle on assuming (a) above. Thanks in advance. Cheers, Colin Hales
