Re: Re: How can intelligence be physical ?
On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 , Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: I define intelligence as the ability to make choices or selctions completely on one's own. Such as roulette wheels. Adding free will to the requirements, it rules out computers Because free will is gibberish and computers are not. free will and autonomous choice are all nonphysical. And nonsensical too. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Re: How can intelligence be physical ?
Hi Telmo Menezes Agreed, computers can be, or at least seem to be, intelligent, but they are slaves to mathematical codes, which are not material. A turing machine is not material, it is an idea. - Receiving the following content - From: Telmo Menezes Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-02-02, 06:05:53 Subject: Re: How can intelligence be physical ? Hi Roger, I don't really understand how people can object to the idea of physical/mechanical intelligence now that we live in a world where we're surrounded by it. Google searches, computers that can beat the best human chess player, autonomous rovers in Mars, face recognition, automatic stock traders that are better at it than any human being and so on and so on. Every time AI comes up with something that only humans could do, people say oh right, but that's not intelligence - I bet computer will never be able to do X. And then they do. And then people say the same thing. It's just a bias we have, a need to feel special. WIth all due respect to Leibniz, he didn't know computer science. On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 10:02 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi socra...@bezeqint.net and Craig, and all, How can intelligence be physical ? How can meaning be physical ? How can thinking be physical ? How can knowing be physical ? How can life or consciousness or free will be physical ? IMHO You need to consider what is really going on: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/ One is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it is inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception. Leibniz's argument seems to be this: the visitor of the machine, upon entering it, would observe nothing but the properties of the parts, and the relations they bear to one another. But no explanation of perception, or consciousness, can possibly be deduced from this conglomerate. No matter how complex the inner workings of this machine, nothing about them reveals that what is being observed are the inner workings of a conscious being. Hence, materialism must be false, for there is no possible way that the purely mechanical principles of materialism can account for the phenomena of consciousness. In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of materialism cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the New System of Nature (1695), the second from the Reply to Bayle (1702), are revealing in this regard: Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which corresponds to what is called the I in us; such a thing could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organized it may be. But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of which compound things are merely the results, internal experience refutes the Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the consciousness which is in us of this I which apperceives things which occur in the body. This perception cannot be explained by figures and movements. Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and consciousness must be truly one, a single “I” properly regarded as one conscious being. An aggregate of matter is not truly one and so cannot be regarded as a single I, capable of being the subject of a unified mental life. This interpretation fits nicely with Lebniz's oft-repeated definition of perception as “the representation in the simple of the compound, or of that which is outside” (Principles of Nature and Grace, sec.2 (1714)). More explicitly, in a letter to Antoine Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz wrote that “in natural perception and sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed into many entities to be expressed or represented in a single indivisible entity or in a substance which is endowed with genuine unity.” If perception (and hence, consciousness) essentially involves a representation of a variety of content in a simple, indivisible “I,” then we may construct Leibniz's argument against materialism as follows: Materialism holds that matter can explain (is identical with, can give rise to) perception. A perception is a state whereby a variety of content is represented in a true unity. Thus, whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception. Whatever is divisible
Re: Re: How can intelligence be physical ?
Hi Roger, On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 2:41 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Telmo Menezes Agreed, computers can be, or at least seem to be, intelligent, but they are slaves to mathematical codes, which are not material. A turing machine is not material, it is an idea. Ok but that depends on how you define material. Those mathematical codes are what I mean by material. F = mA is (an approximation) of part of what I mean by material. You can build and approximation of a turing machine (a finite one) with stuff you can touch and you can ever use it as a doorstop. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2013-02-02, 06:05:53 *Subject:* Re: How can intelligence be physical ? Hi Roger, I don't really understand how people can object to the idea of physical/mechanical intelligence now that we live in a world where we're surrounded by it. Google searches, computers that can beat the best human chess player, autonomous rovers in Mars, face recognition, automatic stock traders that are better at it than any human being and so on and so on. Every time AI comes up with something that only humans could do, people say oh right, but that's not intelligence - I bet computer will never be able to do X. And then they do. And then people say the same thing. It's just a bias we have, a need to feel special. WIth all due respect to Leibniz, he didn't know computer science. On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 10:02 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi socra...@bezeqint.net and Craig, and all, How can intelligence be physical ? How can meaning be physical ? How can thinking be physical ? How can knowing be physical ? How can life or consciousness or free will be physical ? IMHO You need to consider what is really going on: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/ One is obliged to admit that *perception* and what depends upon it is *inexplicable on mechanical principles*, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception. Leibniz's argument seems to be this: the visitor of the machine, upon entering it, would observe nothing but the properties of the parts, and the relations they bear to one another. But no explanation of perception, or consciousness, can possibly be deduced from this conglomerate. No matter how complex the inner workings of this machine, nothing about them reveals that what is being observed are the inner workings of a conscious being. Hence, materialism must be false, for there is no possible way that the purely mechanical principles of materialism can account for the phenomena of consciousness. In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of materialism cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the *New System of Nature* (1695), the second from the *Reply to Bayle* (1702), are revealing in this regard: Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which corresponds to what is called the *I* in us; such a thing could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organized it may be. But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of which compound things are merely the results, internal experience refutes the Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the consciousness which is in us of this *I* which apperceives things which occur in the body. This perception cannot be explained by figures and movements. Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and consciousness must be truly one, a single “I” properly regarded as *one*conscious being. An aggregate of matter is not truly one and so cannot be regarded as a single *I*, capable of being the subject of a unified mental life. This interpretation fits nicely with Lebniz's oft-repeated definition of perception as “the representation in the simple of the compound, or of that which is outside” (*Principles of Nature and Grace,*sec.2 (1714)). More explicitly, in a letter to Antoine Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz wrote that “in natural perception and sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed into many entities to be expressed or represented in a single indivisible entity or in a substance which is endowed
Re: Re: How can intelligence be physical ?
Hi socra...@bezeqint.net Leibniz's and Kant's idealisms are roughly equivalent to neuroscience's double aspect theory, which is fairly widely accepted, as is Kant, by the neuroscience community. Leibniz is too difficult to understand to be widely accepted. - Receiving the following content - From: socra...@bezeqint.net Receiver: Everything List Time: 2013-02-02, 08:52:43 Subject: Re: How can intelligence be physical ? On Feb 2, 10:02?m, Roger Cloughrclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi socra...@bezeqint.net and Craig, and all, How can intelligence ?e physical ? How can meaning be physical ? How can thinking be physical ? How can knowing be physical ? How can life or consciousness or free will be physical ? In the name of reason and common sense: How can dualism be equal to idealism ? =. To solve the problem of dualism of particle in physics is equal to solve the problem of idealism in philosophy. Dualism = Idealism. Why? Because in physics we have two ( 2) conceptions of impulse: a) Newtonian/ Classical physics explains conceptions of impulse as an outside effect. b) Quantum physics explains conceptions of impulse as an inside ? inner effect. ==. What it means ? My explanation. According to Quantum theory the elementary particle quantum of light can be in three ( 3) states: a) Quantum of light can be in potential state, then its inner impulse and speed is zero: h=0, c=0. b) Quantum of light can be in the state of constant and straight motion ( in vacuum) then its inner impulse according to Planck is h=E/t and according to Einstein it is h=kb. Einstein proved that h= E/t = kb =1 Using this impulse quantum of light moves in a straight line with constant speed c = 299,792,458 m/sec = 1. We call such quantum of light - ?hoton?. From Earth ? gravity point of view this speed is maximally. From Vacuum point of view this speed is minimally. In this movement quantum of light behave as a corpuscular. c) According to Goudsmit and Uhlenbeck quantum of light can rotate around its axis by its inner impulse h* = h / 2pi. In such movement quantum of light has charge and produce electric waves ( waves property of particle). We call such quantum of light - ? electron? . The speed of rotating electron is faster than when it moves in a straight line : c1. The speed of rotating electron we call ?requency? ( f ). Now is possible ?isual? to understand the formula of electron? energy: E=h*f. ==. Quantum of light can be in three ( 3) states: a) h=0 (potential state) b) h=1 ( be as a photon in a straight constant movement) c) h* = h/ 2pi ( be as an electron ? rotates around its own axis) The reason of these different kind of motions is its inner impulses. (!) What this mean? It means that quantum of light has free will to choice in which state to be. To have possibility to choice needs some kind of consciousness. This consciousness cannot be statically. This consciousness can develop. The development of consciousness goes, as ancient Indian Veda says, ? from vague wish up to a clear thought ? It means that quantum of light not only object but subject too and therefore I wrote: Dualism = Idealism. =. P.S. Of course, when we think about behavior of quantum of light we need to take in attention its reference frame ? Infinite Vacuum: T=0K. . Best wishes. Israel Sadovnik Socratus. ==. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Re: Re: How can intelligence be physical ?
Hi Telmo Menezes By material I mean physical. Decartes similarly defines the physical as being extended in space. Mathematics is not extended in space, so is nonphysical. A Turing machine is conceived of as having a tape with holes in it, but it can be used mathematically without physically constructing it. An actual computer consists of hardware, which is physical, and software, which may be physical in terms of charges, but ultimately those charges represent binary nuymbers, and numbers are nonphysical. - Receiving the following content - From: Telmo Menezes Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-02-02, 08:59:44 Subject: Re: Re: How can intelligence be physical ? Hi Roger, On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 2:41 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Telmo Menezes Agreed, computers can be, or at least seem to be, intelligent, but they are slaves to mathematical codes, which are not material. A turing machine is not material, it is an idea. Ok but that depends on how you define material. Those mathematical codes are what I mean by material. F = mA is (an approximation) of part of what I mean by material. You can build and approximation of a turing machine (a finite one) with stuff you can touch and you can ever use it as a doorstop. - Receiving the following content - From: Telmo Menezes Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-02-02, 06:05:53 Subject: Re: How can intelligence be physical ? Hi Roger, I don't really understand how people can object to the idea of physical/mechanical intelligence now that we live in a world where we're surrounded by it. Google searches, computers that can beat the best human chess player, autonomous rovers in Mars, face recognition, automatic stock traders that are better at it than any human being and so on and so on. Every time AI comes up with something that only humans could do, people say oh right, but that's not intelligence - I bet computer will never be able to do X. And then they do. And then people say the same thing. It's just a bias we have, a need to feel special. WIth all due respect to Leibniz, he didn't know computer science. On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 10:02 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi socra...@bezeqint.net and Craig, and all, How can intelligence be physical ? How can meaning be physical ? How can thinking be physical ? How can knowing be physical ? How can life or consciousness or free will be physical ? IMHO You need to consider what is really going on: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/ One is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it is inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception. Leibniz's argument seems to be this: the visitor of the machine, upon entering it, would observe nothing but the properties of the parts, and the relations they bear to one another. But no explanation of perception, or consciousness, can possibly be deduced from this conglomerate. No matter how complex the inner workings of this machine, nothing about them reveals that what is being observed are the inner workings of a conscious being. Hence, materialism must be false, for there is no possible way that the purely mechanical principles of materialism can account for the phenomena of consciousness. In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of materialism cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the New System of Nature (1695), the second from the Reply to Bayle (1702), are revealing in this regard: Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which corresponds to what is called the I in us; such a thing could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organized it may be. But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of which compound things are merely the results, internal experience refutes the Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the consciousness which is in us of this I which apperceives things which occur in the body. This perception cannot be explained by figures and movements. Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and consciousness must be truly one, a single “I” properly regarded as one conscious being. An aggregate of matter is not truly one and so cannot be regarded as a single I
Re: Re: Re: How can intelligence be physical ?
On Saturday, February 2, 2013 9:10:49 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote: Hi Telmo Menezes By material I mean physical. Decartes similarly defines the physical as being extended in space. Mathematics is not extended in space, so is nonphysical. A Turing machine is conceived of as having a tape with holes in it, but it can be used mathematically without physically constructing it. An actual computer consists of hardware, which is physical, and software, which may be physical in terms of charges, but ultimately those charges represent binary nuymbers, and numbers are nonphysical. I agree that mathematics is not extended in space, but rather, like all things not extended, is intended. Mathematics is an intention to reason quantitatively, and quantitative reasoning is an internalized model of spatially extended qualities: persistent, passive entities which can be grouped or divided: rigid bodies. Digits. So yes, numbers are not extended, but they are intended to represent what is extended. Craig - Receiving the following content - *From:* Telmo Menezes javascript: *Receiver:* everything-list javascript: *Time:* 2013-02-02, 08:59:44 *Subject:* Re: Re: How can intelligence be physical ? Hi Roger, On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 2:41 PM, Roger Clough rcl...@verizon.netjavascript: wrote: Hi Telmo Menezes Agreed, computers can be, or at least seem to be, intelligent, but they are slaves to mathematical codes, which are not material. A turing machine is not material, it is an idea. Ok but that depends on how you define material. Those mathematical codes are what I mean by material. F = mA is (an approximation) of part of what I mean by material. You can build and approximation of a turing machine (a finite one) with stuff you can touch and you can ever use it as a doorstop. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Telmo Menezes javascript: *Receiver:* everything-list javascript: *Time:* 2013-02-02, 06:05:53 *Subject:* Re: How can intelligence be physical ? Hi Roger, I don't really understand how people can object to the idea of physical/mechanical intelligence now that we live in a world where we're surrounded by it. Google searches, computers that can beat the best human chess player, autonomous rovers in Mars, face recognition, automatic stock traders that are better at it than any human being and so on and so on. Every time AI comes up with something that only humans could do, people say oh right, but that's not intelligence - I bet computer will never be able to do X. And then they do. And then people say the same thing. It's just a bias we have, a need to feel special. WIth all due respect to Leibniz, he didn't know computer science. On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 10:02 AM, Roger Clough rcl...@verizon.netjavascript: wrote: Hi socr...@bezeqint.net javascript: and Craig, and all, How can intelligence be physical ? How can meaning be physical ? How can thinking be physical ? How can knowing be physical ? How can life or consciousness or free will be physical ? IMHO You need to consider what is really going on: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/ One is obliged to admit that *perception* and what depends upon it is *inexplicable on mechanical principles*, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception. Leibniz's argument seems to be this: the visitor of the machine, upon entering it, would observe nothing but the properties of the parts, and the relations they bear to one another. But no explanation of perception, or consciousness, can possibly be deduced from this conglomerate. No matter how complex the inner workings of this machine, nothing about them reveals that what is being observed are the inner workings of a conscious being. Hence, materialism must be false, for there is no possible way that the purely mechanical principles of materialism can account for the phenomena of consciousness. In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of materialism cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the *New System of Nature* (1695), the second from the *Reply to Bayle* (1702), are revealing in this regard: Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which corresponds to what is called the *I* in us; such a thing could not occur
