Hi Telmo Menezes 

By "material" I mean physical. Decartes similarly defines 
the physical as being extended in space. Mathematics
is not extended in space, so is nonphysical. A Turing machine
is conceived of as having a tape with holes in it,
but it can be used mathematically without physically constructing it.

An actual computer consists of hardware, which is physical,
and software, which may be physical in terms of charges,
but ultimately those charges represent binary nuymbers, and
numbers are nonphysical. 

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Telmo Menezes 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2013-02-02, 08:59:44
Subject: Re: Re: How can intelligence be physical ?


Hi Roger,





On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 2:41 PM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:

Hi Telmo Menezes 
 
Agreed, computers can be, or at least seem to be,
intelligent,  but they are slaves to mathematical codes,
which are not material.   A turing machine is not material, it is an 
idea.


Ok but that depends on how you define "material". Those mathematical codes are 
what I mean by material. F = mA is (an approximation)  of part of what I mean 
by material. You can build and approximation of a turing machine (a finite one) 
with stuff you can touch and you can ever use it as a doorstop.
 
 
 
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Telmo Menezes 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2013-02-02, 06:05:53
Subject: Re: How can intelligence be physical ?


Hi Roger, 


I don't really understand how people can object to the idea of 
physical/mechanical intelligence now that we live in a world where we're 
surrounded by it. Google searches, computers that can beat the best human chess 
player, autonomous rovers in Mars, face recognition, automatic stock traders 
that are better at it than any human being and so on and so on.


Every time AI comes up with something that only humans could do, people say "oh 
right, but that's not intelligence - I bet computer will never be able to do 
X". And then they do. And then people say the same thing. It's just a bias we 
have, a need to feel special.


WIth all due respect to Leibniz, he didn't know computer science.



On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 10:02 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:

Hi socra...@bezeqint.net and Craig, and all,
 
How can intelligence  be physical ? How can meaning be physical ?
How can thinking be physical ? How can knowing be physical ?
How can life or consciousness or free will be physical ?
 
IMHO You need to consider what is really going on:
 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/
One is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it is 
inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figures and motions. In 
imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, 
to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while 
retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into 
a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only 
parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. 
Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine, 
that one must look for perception.
Leibniz's argument seems to be this: the visitor of the machine, upon entering 
it, would observe nothing but the properties of the parts, and the relations 
they bear to one another. But no explanation of perception, or consciousness, 
can possibly be deduced from this conglomerate. No matter how complex the inner 
workings of this machine, nothing about them reveals that what is being 
observed are the inner workings of a conscious being. Hence, materialism must 
be false, for there is no possible way that the purely mechanical principles of 
materialism can account for the phenomena of consciousness.
In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of 
perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of materialism 
cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the New System of 
Nature (1695), the second from the Reply to Bayle (1702), are revealing in this 
regard:
Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which 
corresponds to what is called the I in us; such a thing could not occur in 
artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organized it may 
be. 
But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of which 
compound things are merely the results, internal experience refutes the 
Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the consciousness 
which is in us of this I which apperceives things which occur in the body. This 
perception cannot be explained by figures and movements.
Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and consciousness 
must be truly one, a single “I” properly regarded as one conscious being. An 
aggregate of matter is not truly one and so cannot be regarded as a single I, 
capable of being the subject of a unified mental life. This interpretation fits 
nicely with Lebniz's oft-repeated definition of perception as “the 
representation in the simple of the compound, or of that which is outside” 
(Principles of Nature and Grace, sec.2 (1714)). More explicitly, in a letter to 
Antoine Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz wrote that “in natural perception 
and sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed 
into many entities to be expressed or represented in a single indivisible 
entity or in a substance which is endowed with genuine unity.” If perception 
(and hence, consciousness) essentially involves a representation of a variety 
of content in a simple, indivisible “I,” then we may construct Leibniz's 
argument against materialism as follows: Materialism holds that matter can 
explain (is identical with, can give rise to) perception. A perception is a 
state whereby a variety of content is represented in a true unity. Thus, 
whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception. Whatever is 
divisible is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely divisible. Hence, matter 
cannot form a true unity. Hence, matter cannot explain (be identical with, give 
rise to) perception. If matter cannot explain (be identical to, give rise to) 
perception, then materialism is false. Hence, materialism is false.
Leibniz rejected materialism on the grounds that it could not, in principle, 
ever capture the “true unity” of perceptual consciousness, that characteristic 
of the self which can simultaneously unify a manifoldness of perceptual 
content. If this is Leibniz's argument, it is of some historical interest that 
it bears striking resemblances to contemporary objections to certain 
materialist theories of mind. Many contemporary philosophers have objected to 
some versions of materialism on the basis of thought experiments like 
Leibniz's: experiments designed to show that qualia and consciousness are bound 
to elude certain materialist conceptions of the mind (cf. Searle 1980; Nagel 
1974; McGinn 1989; Jackson 1982).
 
 
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: socra...@bezeqint.net 
Receiver: Everything List 
Time: 2013-02-02, 01:39:35
Subject: Re: Science is a religion by itself.


On Feb 1, 7:51?m, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Friday, February 1, 2013 12:26:43 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
>
> > ?i socr...@bezeqint.net <javascript:>
>
> > Feynman was wrong. ?ife isn't physics,
> > it's intelligence or consciousness, free will.
>
> If we understand that physics is actually experience, then life,
> intelligence, consciousness, free will, qualia, etc are all physics. How
> could it really be otherwise?
>
> Craig
======

In the name of reason and common sense:
How could it really be otherwise?

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