Hi Roger,
On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 2:41 PM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Telmo Menezes > > Agreed, computers can be, or at least seem to be, > intelligent, but they are slaves to mathematical codes, > which are not material. A turing machine is not material, it is an > idea. > Ok but that depends on how you define "material". Those mathematical codes are what I mean by material. F = mA is (an approximation) of part of what I mean by material. You can build and approximation of a turing machine (a finite one) with stuff you can touch and you can ever use it as a doorstop. > > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> > *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> > *Time:* 2013-02-02, 06:05:53 > *Subject:* Re: How can intelligence be physical ? > > Hi Roger, > > I don't really understand how people can object to the idea of > physical/mechanical intelligence now that we live in a world where we're > surrounded by it. Google searches, computers that can beat the best human > chess player, autonomous rovers in Mars, face recognition, automatic stock > traders that are better at it than any human being and so on and so on. > > Every time AI comes up with something that only humans could do, people > say "oh right, but that's not intelligence - I bet computer will never be > able to do X". And then they do. And then people say the same thing. It's > just a bias we have, a need to feel special. > > WIth all due respect to Leibniz, he didn't know computer science. > > > On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 10:02 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Hi [email protected] and Craig, and all, >> How can intelligence be physical ? How can meaning be physical ? >> How can thinking be physical ? How can knowing be physical ? >> How can life or consciousness or free will be physical ? >> IMHO You need to consider what is really going on: >> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/ >> >> One is obliged to admit that *perception* and what depends upon it is >> *inexplicable >> on mechanical principles*, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining >> that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to >> sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while >> retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like >> into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find >> only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a >> perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or >> in the machine, that one must look for perception. >> >> Leibniz's argument seems to be this: the visitor of the machine, upon >> entering it, would observe nothing but the properties of the parts, and the >> relations they bear to one another. But no explanation of perception, or >> consciousness, can possibly be deduced from this conglomerate. No matter >> how complex the inner workings of this machine, nothing about them reveals >> that what is being observed are the inner workings of a conscious being. >> Hence, materialism must be false, for there is no possible way that the >> purely mechanical principles of materialism can account for the phenomena >> of consciousness. >> >> In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of >> perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of materialism >> cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the *New >> System of Nature* (1695), the second from the *Reply to Bayle* (1702), >> are revealing in this regard: >> >> Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which >> corresponds to what is called the *I* in us; such a thing could not >> occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however >> organized it may be. >> >> But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of >> which compound things are merely the results, internal experience refutes >> the Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the >> consciousness which is in us of this *I* which apperceives things which >> occur in the body. This perception cannot be explained by figures and >> movements. >> >> Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and >> consciousness must be truly one, a single “I” properly regarded as >> *one*conscious being. An aggregate of matter is not truly one and so cannot >> be >> regarded as a single *I*, capable of being the subject of a unified >> mental life. This interpretation fits nicely with Lebniz's oft-repeated >> definition of perception as “the representation in the simple of the >> compound, or of that which is outside” (*Principles of Nature and >> Grace,*sec.2 (1714)). More explicitly, in a letter to Antoine Arnauld of 9 >> October >> 1687, Leibniz wrote that “in natural perception and sensation, it is enough >> for what is divisible and material and dispersed into many entities to be >> expressed or represented in a single indivisible entity or in a substance >> which is endowed with genuine unity.” If perception (and hence, >> consciousness) essentially involves a representation of a variety of >> content in a simple, indivisible “I,” then we may construct Leibniz's >> argument against materialism as follows: Materialism holds that matter can >> explain (is identical with, can give rise to) perception. A perception is a >> state whereby a variety of content is represented in a true unity. Thus, >> whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception. Whatever is >> divisible is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely divisible. Hence, >> matter cannot form a true unity. Hence, matter cannot explain (be identical >> with, give rise to) perception. If matter cannot explain (be identical to, >> give rise to) perception, then materialism is false. Hence, materialism is >> false. >> >> Leibniz rejected materialism on the grounds that it could not, in >> principle, ever capture the “true unity” of perceptual consciousness, that >> characteristic of the self which can simultaneously unify a manifoldness of >> perceptual content. If this is Leibniz's argument, it is of some historical >> interest that it bears striking resemblances to contemporary objections to >> certain materialist theories of mind. Many contemporary philosophers have >> objected to some versions of materialism on the basis of thought >> experiments like Leibniz's: experiments designed to show that qualia and >> consciousness are bound to elude certain materialist conceptions of the >> mind (cf. Searle 1980; Nagel 1974; McGinn 1989; Jackson 1982). >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> *From:* [email protected] >> *Receiver:* Everything List <[email protected]> >> *Time:* 2013-02-02, 01:39:35 >> *Subject:* Re: Science is a religion by itself. >> >> On Feb 1, 7:51爌m, Craig Weinberg >> <[email protected]<[email protected]>> >> wrote: >> > On Friday, February 1, 2013 12:26:43 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote: >> > >> > > 燞i [email protected] <[email protected]> <javascript:> >> > >> > > Feynman was wrong. 燣ife isn't physics, >> > > it's intelligence or consciousness, free will. >> > >> > If we understand that physics is actually experience, then life, >> > intelligence, consciousness, free will, qualia, etc are all physics. How >> > could it really be otherwise? >> > >> > Craig >> ====== >> >> In the name of reason and common sense: >> How could it really be otherwise? >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to >> [email protected].<[email protected].> >> To post to this group, send email to >> [email protected].<[email protected].> >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> ____________________________________________ >> *DreamMail* - New experience in email software www.dreammail.org >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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