Re: duplicatability or copying is problematic
Hi Stephen, At 21:44 16/06/04 -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote: BM (previous) Giving that the Comp, through the UDA (for exemple) , leads to Monistic idealism, I think the use of the word epiphenomenon could be misleading (it is used more in the non interactive dualist approach of the mind body problem, as far as I know). It is better to to talk about simply phenomena, and I guess you pretend I don't address them (which imo is a little bit unfair as I will try to explain). [SPK] No, Bruno, Comp does not lead to Monistic idealism, it is based on it! One must assume Monistic Idealism in order to accept the notion that Arithmetic realism and that this Truth is independent of physicality, as you have written previously: http://www.mail-archive.com/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/msg04913.html By Arithmetic Realism I mean that Arithmetical Truth is independent of me, you, and the rest of humanity. and if we take comp seriously (comp = AR + TC + yes doctor) then physics is eventually a branch of machine's psychology (itself a branch of computer science itself a branch of number theory. BM: But your very quote of what I said confirms what I was saying. I don't understand. When I say IF comp is true THEN physics is a branch of machine psychology, it is part of the prood that comp will imply monistic idealism. This comes from the UD Argument. You have not yet tell me at which steps you disagree (cf http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3044.html I could simplify my presentation by postulating what i call sometime Pythagorean COMP, which postulates Arithmetical Realism AND NO MORE (but in my thesis that pyth is a consequence, i have worked hard enough for not postulating it :)). SPK: We cannot dismiss physicality! BM: Why? We can certainly dismiss it in the hypothesis once we explain its appearance. That is the point of the technical part of my thesis. Wait perhaps a little bit I provide more explanation. I just don't need the physicalist hypothesis, and besides I show it incompatible with comp (UDA). SPK: One thing that I have always been attracted by in science and mathematics is that I was not required to blindly believe some statement. What you are asking of me is not different from the blind faith (unjustified belief) that I was raised in by Fundamentalist Christian parents. You must understand that I have a severe allergy to postulations that cannot be justified. BM: I do not ask you to believe in anything! I do just prove the following two things: 1) IF comp is correct THEN indeed a machine must make an act of faith to PRACTICE it. (Put in another way : if COMP is correct, then if a doctor tells you that science implies comp, then you KNOW he is a lier). As an analogy (which will run deeper latter) it is like CONSISTENCY for a machine: IF a machine is consistent THEN the machine cannot prove it. With Godel + comp, you can guess that even just self-consistency need a sort of blind faith. SPK: On The Other Hand (OTOH), I agree with your statement about Gödel theorem: If I am a machine I will be unable to prove that I am. That is not my problem. My problem is in finding a falsifiable justification for the belief that I am a Machine. BM: But this is exactly what I provide: I show (simplifying a little bit for reason of shortness, giving that is what I am suppose to explain, but it *is* my thesis): IF comp is true then physics is given by the propositions which are 1) true in all our consistent extensions 2) true in at least one consistent extension (By Godel, 1 does not imply 2 !) 3) accessible par the universal dovetailer. This is translated by observable(p) = []p p, with p sigma_1. I showed: 1) the logic of observable(p) obeys a sort of quantum logic. 2) that logic is sufficiently constrained to derive the whole physical probailities. To evaluate comp, it is enough to compare those probabilities with the empirically evaluated probabilities. BM: previous You say that again. Perhaps you are right. I would be please to know some references. In the case of monistic idealist theory I do think phenomena or appearances are less misleading terms. [SPK] The difference is purely semantical. The Problem is not! From: http://www.meta-religion.com/Philosophy/Articles/Philosophy_of_the_mind/mind-body.htm Until the present century the duality of mind and brain was never in question except, that is, to the adherents of various Idealist or Phenomenalist doctrines which, in defiance of common sense, insisted that matter was just a construction of mind and had no ontological independence. What was at issue was whether the brain was self-sufficient and operated on a purely physical basis or whether mind could intervene in its operations so as to ensure one overt action rather than another. Determinists insisted that the brain was a machine and so mental events could have no influence on behaviour, they were mere 'epiphenomena.' Another term related to this Problem, as it occurs of Monistic Materialism
Re: duplicatability or copying is problematic
At 18:23 15/06/04 -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear George, BM: The post is addressed to George, but concern my thesis. May I make some comments? I put my thesis in quotes because it is really the Sound Universal (Turing) Machine's thesis, you know. ... or will know ;) Turing is under quotes thanks to Church thesis. It is Church thesis which makes the notion of universal machine independent of which precise machine is used to define it. After denying the Church Turing Post Markov ... thesis for some time Godel will eventually accept it and he will call it an epistemological miracle (in its Princeton talk, see Davis 1965). Church thesis makes the intuitive notion of computability -machine or -reference frame totally independent. We can also say that the notion of computability is formalism independent. After having accepted Church thesis, Godel will look after a corresponding machine or formalism independent notion of provability. This is curious, because at that time Godel did show, by its own incompleteness phenomenon, that provability is an essentially machine or formalism dependent notion. At the same time, by its very reasoning Godel will provide tools for studying what *is* universal and machine independent concerning the provability notion. This gives rise to the logic of provability, also called the logic of self-reference, which has made tremendous and continuous progress since its birth. After this introduction I want to comment Stephen's genuine remarks in some sufficiently precise way so that we can avoid future misunderstanding. SPK: The problems that I have with Bruno's thesis is Digital substitution and that it does not address the problem of epiphenomenona found in both Idealism and Materialism. BM: Giving that the Comp, through the UDA (for exemple) , leads to Monistic idealism, I think the use of the word epiphenomenon could be misleading (it is used more in the non interactive dualist approach of the mind body problem, as far as I know). It is better to to talk about simply phenomena, and I guess you pretend I don't address them (which imo is a little bit unfair as I will try to explain). SPK: Digital substitution seems to assume that consciousness and awareness and related notions can be completely explained in terms of how one number relates to another. BM: Here is an important error, on which ultimately Godel's theorem will put light. Saying yes doctor for a digital brain substitution does not mean you or the surgeon or the international scientific community has *explained* how consciousness is related to numbers or machines. As I insist, comp needs an act of faith. It says there is a level where we can survive (in the grandmother sense) to a digital subtitution, but then it justifies why an ignorance gap remains and must remain. That is: IF there is a level where we survive the subtitution, then we can never pretend to know that level. Please remember that Godel's theorem shows that provability by a machine and truth about that machine are different from the machine perspective. Yes the comp practionners believe its own consciousness can be reduce in some way to relations between numbers, but he/she does not pretend that, even if the correct realtions are given to him, that he can take them as a complete explanation. Comp + Godel will justify why he would became inconsistent would he find such an explanation. It helps to keep this in mind to understand the explanation of where the physical appearance comes from, because in some sense the physical appearances will come from our sharable border of that necessary ignorance, where our refers to *us* the hopefully sound universal machines. SPK: I think that your would agree that Bruno's thesis is a very sophisticated form of Idealism. BM: OK. Although I'm not so sure it is so sophisticated. I could argue it is just the consequence of George Boole's laws of thought. But OK. SPK: It is widely recognized that matter and physicality in general is an epiphenomenona within any Ideal theory. BM: You say that again. Perhaps you are right. I would be please to know some references. In the case of monistic idealist theory I do think phenomena or appearances are less misleading terms. SPK: This in turn makes the notion of a physical substrate suspect as it does not exist apart from its properties as encoded in numbers, e.g. our consciousness is merely information thus what that information is encoded in is irrelevant. BM: I do not quite agree with the saying consciousness is merely information. I will at some point suggest that consciousness is true and partially automated anticipation of our own consistency, but it is premature to do it now (without first explaining Godel's theorem and the Solovay's extensions with G, G* etc.). SPK: What I am trying to do is to make the point that it is not sufficient to just take as an article of faith or postulation the idea that digital substitution is actually possible, especially
Re: duplicatability or copying is problematic
Dear Stephen, At 13:25 14/06/04 -0400, You (Stephen Paul King) wrote: Dear Bruno, Does your thesis survive without the notion of duplicatability or copying? As I have pointed out, QM does not allow duplication and I am hard pressed to understand how duplication can be carried out in classical physics. Remember the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA, see link in my url). It shows that the stability of any piece of matter is due to a continuum of (infinite) computational histories. A priori this is not Turing-emulable. So, for the same reason there is a notion of comp-immortality, there is a quasi obvious non cloning theorem for the comp-observable piece of information. It remains to be seen if this can be explained by the machine-itself (cf the logic G) or its guardian angel (cf G*). But that, only the future will say. Big first evidences have appeared, though, in the sense that the general shape of quantum logic appears for the comp-observable. If we merely consider the Platonia of mathematics we find only a single example of each and every number. If we assume digital substitutability there would be one and only one number for each and every physical object. Where does duplication obtain in Platonia? If duplicatability is an impossible notion, does your thesis survive? It is known that classical information is duplicable. This is actually illustrated by the fact that this current mail will be multiplied without loss of information (same number of bits) to the readers of the everything and FOR list. I mean: at some right level with respect to the content of this post. (Assuming no bugs, no moderation, etc.) OK. I could give you another answer. I could say that duplication is not only allowed in QM, but is very easy to do. Just look at a cat in the superposition state dead (d) and alive (a). If you (y) look at it: this happens: y(a+d) = y_a a + y_d d, where y_i = y (you) with the 1-memory of a dead (resp alive) cat. Of course you can object that if you don't look at the cat the situation is really described by y a + y b, and if you look at the cat this becomes y_a a + y_d d, so that no duplication has occurred: just a differentiation. Right, but recall that this *is* the way I have explained why, just with classical comp, we are obliged to consider in fine that with comp too we have only differentiation. Do you remember the Y = | | drawing? That is: if you duplicate yourself into an exemplary at Sidney, and one at Pekin, from an original at Amsterdam, your probability weight at Amsterdam is bigger. A future duplication add weight in the present. That's why I agree with David that in QM it is preferable to consider the Schroedinger (or Heisenberg) Equation as describing differentiation instead of duplication. But the same is true for classical comp, by the way the UDA forces the probability weights. Last answer (I agree the matter is subtle, and it is better to have more than one explanation). Remember simply I do not assume QM at the start. If comp would entails the duplicabilty of matter, then, as far as we can correctly believe in QM, comp would be refuted. But as I said, comp predicts the non-duplicability of matter. The thought experiment used in the UDA does NOT presuppose the duplicability of matter, only the duplicability, at some level, of the 3- *person*. (Not of the 1-person which is never duplicated: as Everett puts it: the observer cannot feel the split, and the 1-person is the observer/feeler, etc.). You can sum up things with the following slogan: Duplicability of the soul (the 1-person, say) = the non-duplicability of whatever remains stable in its observations. (3-person or 1-person plural). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: duplicatability or copying is problematic
At 01:25 PM 6/14/2004, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, Does your thesis survive without the notion of duplicatability or copying? As I have pointed out, QM does not allow duplication and I am hard pressed to understand how duplication can be carried out in classical physics. If computationalism is true, it's possible in principle to implement a CA on our boring (i.e. non-quantum, classical) computers that contains conscious beings. Since we would have access to every single bit of information in this CA universe, we could make exact, bit-level copies of these conscious beings. This alone is enough to open the door to all of the philosophical issues we discuss on this list. We can make one copy of the CA and send it to a computer in Moscow, while we leave one copy running here in Washington... and so on. Presumably, these CA beings would be hard pressed to make copies of themselves while working within the constraints of their own physics; similarly, we may never figure out how to construct matter transmitters and matter copiers within our own physics. But that doesn't change that fact that, in principle, an exact copy of me could be made - say, by a being outside of this universe who has total access to this universe's state information and the ability to change it. (Of course, this is a very single-world way of looking at things - imagining that our universe is like a single-history deterministic or indeterministic CA that can be viewed and changed by some outside computer programmer. In actual fact, I take a more complex multi-worlds view, but that view only makes sense after you work out the consequences of copying. The easiest way to work that out is to concentrate on simple single-world scenarios, like CA worlds that we have perfect information about.) If we merely consider the Platonia of mathematics we find only a single example of each and every number. If we assume digital substitutability there would be one and only one number for each and every physical object. Where does duplication obtain in Platonia? The suggestion that there is only a single example of each number in Platonia is so ontologically wispy that I don't even know how to label it true or false. Presumably every real number - that is, every possible infinite string of 0s and 1s - exists in Platonia. Even if we insist that each real number exists only once, it follows that any given integer - that is, any given finite string of 1s and 0s - will appear an infinite number of times within the digits of these real numbers. So in fact, we can just as easily say that each integer exists an infinite number of times in Platonia. This is not an idle example. Every possible history of every possible CA exists in Platonia, and even if we insist that each of these unique histories exists only once, it still follows that some particular *finite* pattern of bits which represents a conscious being will appear innumerable times within these CAs. Within some of these universes there will be beings who create large computers in their worlds, and run CAs on them which contain other beings, and they will be able to make perfect copies of these beings. All of the philosophical questions about copying and identity and 1st person vs. 3rd person views apply here. -- Kory
Re: duplicatability or copying is problematic
Hi Stephen
Let me add my grain of salt to Bruno's post. The No Cloning Theorem
applies to the physical duplication but not necessarily to the
duplication of information that is carried by a physical substrate. For
example, you could very well make a copy of a DVD that reproduces
exactly the information stored in the DVD without reproducing exactly
the atomic arrangement of the DVD.
The crucial question is whether our consciousness is aware of its
physical substrate at the atomic (Planck) level or only at a much
higher biological, neurological or psychological level. Would we agree
("Yes Doctor") to an organ substitution at the high level or would we
hold out for a a substitution at the Planck level? If we allow copying
at the high level, then Bruno's thesis survives.
How much resolution should the copier have? I don't know the answer to
this question. I don't even know if copying (increasing measure) has
any ethical significance or any other value or drawbacks.
George
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Bruno,
Does your thesis survive without the notion
of duplicatability or copying? As I have pointed
out, QM does not allow duplication and I am hard pressed to understand
how duplication can be carried out in classical physics.
If we merely consider the Platonia of
mathematics we find only a single example of each and every number.If
we assume digital substitutability there would be one and only one
number for each and every physical object. Where does duplication
obtain in Platonia? If duplicatability is an impossible notion, does
your thesis survive?
Stephen
Re: duplicatability or copying is problematic
Dear George,
The problems that I have
withBruno's thesisis Digital substitution and
that it does not address the problem of epiphenomenona found in both Idealism
and Materialism.Digital substitution seems to assume that consciousness
and awareness and related notions can be completely explained in terms of how
one number relates to another.
I think that your would agree that Bruno's
thesis is a very sophisticated form of Idealism. It is widely recognized that
"matter" and physicality in general is an epiphenomenona within any Ideal
theory. This in turn makes the notion of a physical substrate suspect as it does
not exist apart from its properties as encoded in numbers, e.g. our
consciousness is merely information thus what that information is "encoded" in
is irrelevant.
What I am trying to do is to make the
point that it is not sufficient to just take as an article of faith or
postulation the idea that digital substitution is actually possible, especially
when the epiphenomenona problem is not even addressed! OTOH, if it can be shown
that digital substitution is possible in practice then Bruno's thesis will go
along way to explaining many things. But there is more to my difficulties than
this! Copying, to me, implies that something is doing the copying. What is that
which does the copying? Physical states are mere epiphenomenona...
Stephen
- Original Message -
From:
George Levy
To: Everything List
Sent: Tuesday, June 15, 2004 4:25
PM
Subject: Re: duplicatability or copying
is problematic
Hi StephenLet me add my grain of salt to Bruno's post.
The No Cloning Theorem applies to the physical duplication but not necessarily
to the duplication of information that is carried by a physical substrate. For
example, you could very well make a copy of a DVD that reproduces exactly the
information stored in the DVD without reproducing exactly the atomic
arrangement of the DVD. The crucial question is whether our
consciousness is aware of its physical substrate at the atomic (Planck) level
or only at a much higher biological, neurological or psychological level.
Would we agree ("Yes Doctor") to an organ substitution at the high level or
would we hold out for a a substitution at the Planck level? If we allow
copying at the high level, then Bruno's thesis survives.How much
resolution should the copier have? I don't know the answer to this question. I
don't even know if copying (increasing measure) has any ethical significance
or any other value or drawbacks. GeorgeStephen Paul King
wrote:
Dear Bruno,
Does your thesis survive without the
notion of duplicatability or copying? As I have pointed
out, QM does not allow duplication and I am hard pressed to understand how
duplication can be carried out in classical physics.
If we merely consider the Platonia of
mathematics we find only a single example of each and every number.If
we assume digital substitutability there would be one and only one number
for each and every physical object. Where does duplication obtain in
Platonia? If duplicatability is an impossible notion, does your thesis
survive?
Stephen
