On 23 Oct 2012, at 16:39, Roger Clough wrote:
Computers, materialism and subjective/objective dyslexia
In materialism there is no self, it is implied.
In computationalism there is no matter, it is implied (apparent).
This works in most cases, except if the case involves the
self or subjectivity.
You are right. That is a good intuition. But the solution does not
need to abandon subjectivity (which would be senseless), you can also
abandon ontological or primary matter.
The problem with that situation is that,
without a self to be subjective, there can be no subjectivity.
Hence what we know to be subjective (lived experience,
for example) has to be considered as objective. This is
somewhat understandable, because subjective/objective
dyslexia and its issues are hard to understand.
Thus comp, or computer output, which is objective, can easily
be confused with subjective phenomena.
That would be a mistake. Consciousness is not an output, which is
usually a 3p thing.
Now life, thought, consciousness, and intelligence are all
subjective (non-physical, non-objective) activities.
With comp the physical becomes first person plural. It is also a
subjective object (but not necessarily a subject).
But because of subjective/objective dyslexia, and the
fact that it is difficult to conceive of the nonphysical,
Think about arithmetic and mathematic. This is not so hard to
conceive, and is not physical.
they are almost always often considered to be objective
(physical) phenomena. In other words, life, consciousness and
thought are thought to be properties of or associated with,
material objects.
Few people are aware of this but materialism and comp are
incompatible. Unfortunately many materialists use comp to evacuate the
mind-body problem. I explained in this list (and elsewhere) that this
does not work.
Bruno
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/23/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
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