Re: Brains and time, subjectivity vs objectivity
On 07 Sep 2012, at 16:06, Roger Clough wrote: Theres is some duplication in the propositions below which I have not bothered to clear up, sorry. 1) Mind, being inextended, is outside of the brain, which is extended. Mind (shared and the general, Platonia) is the subjective realm. Brain (personal, private, the particular, materialistic) is in the objective realm. Mind does not even belong to the category of things capable of being extended or not extended. 2) So Mind is beyond spacetime (Platonic) , but each brain is in spacetime (materialistic), and only brains can access the Platonic*. Only persons, using brains. 3) Brains are in time, as are all materialistic things, including computers. Mind is timeless*. OK. 4) Objective time is in spacetime, so can be measured. OK. Note that objective = capable of being doubted, or capable of being an illusion or a dream. 5) Subjective time is outside of spacetime, so only sensible by the brain. By the person. My brain does no more thinking than my stomach do tasting. The brain is just a local tool. * So I think of our brains as racing through Mind in an auto while looking at the passing landscape of Mind. Except that eventually, the brain is only a construct of the mind too. The persons are in Platonia. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/7/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-06, 15:25:14 Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One On Thursday, September 6, 2012 2:02:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Sep 2012, at 17:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 10:50:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least. Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient. That is step 6. I haven't even gotten to step 2 yet. I'm reading In the figure the teleported individual is represented by a black box. Its annihilation is represented by a white box appearing at the left of the arrow from 1. Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where does the experience of the now disembodied person come in? As you illustrate here, plausibly not on the physical means used by the brain. Step 8 shows that indeed the physical has nothing to do with consciousness, except as a content of consciousness. Keeping comp here, we associate consciousness with the logical abstract computations. So the person's consciousness arises spontaneously through the overall effort-ness behind the writing, erasing, and calling, or does it gradually constellate from lesser fragments of disconnected effort-ness? Consciousness does not arise. It is not in space, nor in time. Its local content, obtained by differentiation, internally can refer to time and space, but that's particular content of an atemporal consciousness. I would say (no need of this in UDA). If you exclude space and time, what kind of locality do you refer to? In my example, a quintillion people call each other on the phone and write down numbers that they get from each other and perform arithmetic functions on them (which in turn may inform them on how to process subsequent arithmetic instructions, etc). Ok. So where does the
Re: Re: Brains and time, subjectivity vs objectivity
Hi Bruno Marchal 1) Mind is nonphysical, the nopnphysical by definition is not extended. 2) The All in Platonia is the end-all and be-all of everything, being to my mind Universal Intelligence, including human or computers. So not just persons. All of existence swims in the All. Living and dead. It is the why the what the when* and the how. - *Presumably the All created the physical world so that physical time could exist. The subjective view of physical time is a minimal definition of consciousness. -- 3) The brain was constructed to ciommunicate with Mind like a cell phone. The brain cannot itself do anythig, the mind does all because it is Platonia, intelligence itself. 4) As to doubt and subjective time, yes, but no to/fro objective time. Subjective time would be comparable to the perception of some event in physical time. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/8/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-08, 05:01:02 Subject: Re: Brains and time, subjectivity vs objectivity On 07 Sep 2012, at 16:06, Roger Clough wrote: Theres is some duplication in the propositions below which I have not bothered to clear up, sorry. 1) Mind, being inextended, is outside of the brain, which is extended. Mind (shared and the general, Platonia) is the subjective realm. Brain (personal, private, the particular, materialistic) is in the objective realm. Mind does not even belong to the category of things capable of being extended or not extended. 2) So Mind is beyond spacetime (Platonic) , but each brain is in spacetime (materialistic), and only brains can access the Platonic*. Only persons, using brains. 3) Brains are in time, as are all materialistic things, including computers. Mind is timeless*. OK. 4) Objective time is in spacetime, so can be measured. OK. Note that objective = capable of being doubted, or capable of being an illusion or a dream. 5) Subjective time is outside of spacetime, so only sensible by the brain. By the person. My brain does no more thinking than my stomach do tasting. The brain is just a local tool. * So I think of our brains as racing through Mind in an auto while looking at the passing landscape of Mind. Except that eventually, the brain is only a construct of the mind too. The persons are in Platonia. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/7/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-06, 15:25:14 Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One On Thursday, September 6, 2012 2:02:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Sep 2012, at 17:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 10:50:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least. Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient. That is step 6. I haven't even gotten to step 2 yet. I'm reading In the figure the teleported individual is represented by a black box. Its annihilation is represented by a white box appearing at the left of the arrow from 1. Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what
Brains and time, subjectivity vs objectivity
Theres is some duplication in the propositions below which I have not bothered to clear up, sorry. 1) Mind, being inextended, is outside of the brain, which is extended. Mind (shared and the general, Platonia) is the subjective realm. Brain (personal, private, the particular, materialistic) is in the objective realm. 2) So Mind is beyond spacetime (Platonic) , but each brain is in spacetime (materialistic), and only brains can access the Platonic*. 3) Brains are in time, as are all materialistic things, including computers. Mind is timeless*. 4) Objective time is in spacetime, so can be measured. 5) Subjective time is outside of spacetime, so only sensible by the brain. * So I think of our brains as racing through Mind in an auto while looking at the passing landscape of Mind. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/7/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-06, 15:25:14 Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One On Thursday, September 6, 2012 2:02:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Sep 2012, at 17:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 10:50:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least. Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient. That is step 6. I haven't even gotten to step 2 yet. I'm reading In the figure the teleported individual is represented by a black box. Its annihilation is represented by a white box appearing at the left of the arrow from 1. Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where does the experience of the now disembodied person come in? As you illustrate here, plausibly not on the physical means used by the brain. Step 8 shows that indeed the physical has nothing to do with consciousness, except as a content of consciousness. Keeping comp here, we associate consciousness with the logical abstract computations. So the person's consciousness arises spontaneously through the overall effort-ness behind the writing, erasing, and calling, or does it gradually constellate from lesser fragments of disconnected effort-ness? Consciousness does not arise. It is not in space, nor in time. Its local content, obtained by differentiation, internally can refer to time and space, but that's particular content of an atemporal consciousness. I would say (no need of this in UDA). If you exclude space and time, what kind of locality do you refer to? In my example, a quintillion people call each other on the phone and write down numbers that they get from each other and perform arithmetic functions on them (which in turn may inform them on how to process subsequent arithmetic instructions, etc). Ok. So where does the interpretation of these trillion events per second come in? What knows what all of the computations add up to be? At what point does the 'local content' begin to itch and turn blue? Even if it could, why should it do such a thing? Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported the original. Right. Classical teleportation
