Theres is some duplication in the propositions below which I have not bothered
to clear up, sorry.

1) Mind, being inextended, is "outside" of the brain, which is extended.
    Mind (shared and the general, Platonia) is the subjective realm. 
    Brain (personal, private, the particular, materialistic) is in the 
objective realm.

2) So Mind is beyond spacetime (Platonic) , but each brain is in spacetime
 (materialistic), and only brains can access the Platonic*.

3) Brains are in time, as are all materialistic things, including computers.
Mind is timeless*. 

4) Objective time is in spacetime, so can be measured.

5) Subjective time is outside of spacetime, so only sensible by the brain.

* So I think of our brains as racing through Mind in an auto
while looking at the passing landscape of Mind.

Roger Clough,
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-06, 15:25:14
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One

On Thursday, September 6, 2012 2:02:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Sep 2012, at 17:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 10:50:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, 
just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, 
but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of 
comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, 
and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what 
he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I 
wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, 
this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual 
truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to 
physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own 
survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI 
simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough 
consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least.

Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient 
organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or 
reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would 
be sufficient.
That is step 6.

I haven't even gotten to step 2 yet. I'm reading "In the figure the teleported 
individual is represented by a black box. Its annihilation is
represented by a white box appearing at the left of the arrow" from 1.

Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion 
people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over 
cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported 
person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The 
writing and erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where 
does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?
As you illustrate here, plausibly not on the physical means used by the brain. 
Step 8 shows that indeed the physical has nothing to do with consciousness, 
except as a content of consciousness. Keeping comp here, we associate 
consciousness with the logical abstract computations.

So the person's consciousness arises spontaneously through the overall 
effort-ness behind the writing, erasing, and calling, or does it gradually 
constellate from lesser fragments of disconnected effort-ness?

Consciousness does not arise. It is not in space, nor in time. Its local 
content, obtained by differentiation, internally can refer to time and space, 
but that's particular content of an atemporal consciousness. I would say (no 
need of this in UDA).

If you exclude space and time, what kind of locality do you refer to? In my 
example, a quintillion people call each other on the phone and write down 
numbers that they get from each other and perform arithmetic functions on them 
(which in turn may inform them on how to process subsequent arithmetic 
instructions, etc). Ok. So where does the interpretation of these trillion 
events per second come in? What knows what all of the computations add up to 
be? At what point does the 'local content' begin to itch and turn blue? Even if 
it could, why should it do such a thing?


Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role this 
actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like teleportation 
and less like what it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an 
original document and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported 
the original.
Right. Classical teleportation = duplication + annihilation of the original. 
That's step 5, precisely.

You understand the reasoning very well, but we know that the problem for you is 
in the assumption.

Yes, the assumption seems to presume physicality to disprove physicality 

At some place, yes. In a reductio ad absurdum. 

and presume consciousness to explain consciousness. 

Yes. Like we presume (at some metalevel) anything we want to explain (from some 
other realm). It is not a lott, but science works that way. We don't know the 
public truth. We can only make clear our hypothesis and reason, and propose 

Why not just recognize it formally and say that consciousness doesn't need any 
explanation other than the experience of "this" and "that".

Computation seems to have nothing to do with either one of them in comp other 
than the fact of the plasticity and aloofness of comp can be seen as a sign 
that it is neither mind nor matter. It still doesn't answer the question of why 
have appearances of mind or matter at all? 

Comp is used to formulate the problem in math. Then we can see the general 
shape of the solution, which is a reduction of physics into arithmetic, with 
the advantage that we get a clear explanation of the difference of qualia and 
quanta. And we can test the quanta.

I'm ok with reducing physics to math or math to physics, but neither have any 
link back to experience. 

If there is a reason, then that reason is the nature of the cosmos, not the 
filing and organizing system that indexes it's activities.

I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
yes, doctor: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire 
thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain function 
and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain 
devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is a universal 
Why? A program or piece of information is not nothing. It asks works, can be 
paid for, can be precious and rare, etc.

It can't ask for anything by itself though. 


We can't coerce data into keeping secrets. All forms of secrecy require some 
kind of social control of information. Data will always talk to strangers. (see 
my post today:!topic/everything-list/L9LbbtQAN9U)

We are the ones to whom the significance relates. 

Actually God told me yesterday that we are wrong on this. Only the jumping 
spider can do that.

Jumping spiders and God are us too.

Information is nothing but an experience that can be remembered and transmitted 
to other experiencers through formation.

Church thesis: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, 
supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical 
theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is 
it that does the computing? How and why does data enter or exit a computation?
It is a discovery by mathematicians. 

And it is a valid discovery in the context of mathematical theory, but it 
doesn't translate to the realism of subjectivity and physics. 

Physics, or not physics are not among the hypothesis. More in the questioning.

It assumes weightless computation that generates weight (for not particular 

We search the reason. You say "for no particular reason" without providing a 

The realism of physical weight in the universe is what I am saying is one of 
the things that is not derived from pure computation. There seems to be no 
anchoring in mass (despite info-theoretic confusions about entropy). To comp, 
it makes no difference whether a program operates on a galactic scale or 
microscopic scale - the code is weightless. That is not our experience of 
galaxies and atoms though.

Arithmetical Realism: The idea that truth values are self justifying 
independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. Like 
yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and 
saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic constitutes universal 
supremacy without any real indication of that. Wouldn't computers tend to be 
self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each logic 
circuit? Where do errors come from?
They come from the inadequacy between belief and truth. Incompleteness makes 
this unavoidable at the root, and that is why the logic of Bp & p is different 
from the logic of Bp, despite G* proves Bp -> p. G does not prove it, so 
correct machine already knows that they might be incorrect "soon enough".

Your last paragraph confirms you are still thinking of machines and numbers in 
a pre-Godelian or pre-L?ian way, I think.

I admit that I have only a wisp of understanding about modal logic and 
G?elian-L?ianian ideas, but I feel like even this surface understanding is 
enough to tell me that it is ultimately a red herring. 

This is self-defeating.

Why, do you feel yourself to be defeated ;) ?

These concepts seem to just be about self-reference - maps of maps with no 
territory. Great for simulating some aspects of thought, because indeed, 
thinking has to do with copying copies and intellectual grammar, but feeling 

The machine knows that, already. Feeling and first person notion have no 3p 
representation at all. For logical reason, explainable with the math above.

I agree. Why does 1p machine theory propose the existence of feeling though?

These are ways of mentioning how ideas are mentioned. In reality, this sentence 
does not refer to itself. There are only characters, or pixels, or optical 
phenomena here. The significance does not arise from the same level in which it 
is transmitted. This is the Chinese Room. Ceci n'est pas une pipe.

This has already been commented. You confuse the 3p self-reference and the 1p 
self-reference. I think.

I don't think that I do (nor does Searle or Korzybski, Magritte...)





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