Re: Theology (was in-between-times)
Le 05-août-05, à 14:44, Kim Jones a écrit : On 04/08/2005, at 11:44 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 31-juil.-05, à 03:13, Kim Jones wrote (just before the thread was censored). Go Bruno!! I will. Thanks to your post I realize that a possible quite huge misunderstanding here could vacuously grow between us. Perhaps you didn't realize the impact of Godel's theorem in computer science, and then, with the assumption of comp, the impact on science in general. I probably underestimate some difficulties. I reassure you at once on Plato. By Plato I mean Plato with all the necessary revision and updating made necessary by the discovery of the incompleteness phenomenon. In particular its politics does not survive and I agree with Popper on its critics of *that* aspect of Plato. (I will answer Colin, Chris and Hal Finney later, but my answer to Colin will somehow try to clarify points in those discussions too, actually the reciprocal is also true). Theology concerns itself with the mechanism of belief. What is the mechanism of belief? It acts like a filter, or a pair of tinted glasses if you will. Belief is that way of looking at reality that reinforces that way of looking at reality. Is that scientific? No. But then your definition of theology is perhaps a little bit to much a contingent matter. Perhaps the word theology has too many connotations. I explain below why I do think that, despite its heavy historical background, it could still be the less misleading word. I prefer metaphysical myself. After all, it claims to be the system that is looking at the system. That is perhaps best described as metaphysics I don't like too much that word because, in my neighborhood it has become almost a synonym of crackpot. It interfere also with metamathematics, which is the mathematical study of what machine (or more general theories) can prove and guess about themselves. Any assessment of supposed objective rigour in ANY form of theological thinking - be it total unrigorous manipulative pseudo- theology or even the usual kind of theology taught to the average working cleric has to be seen in the light of this comment. The FOR book, Everett formulation of QM, and my own work rely on the computationalist hypothesis. Is this not a theological assumption? Only if it can never be proven. It is incredible that you say that. My point is, among others, that IF comp is true, then it will never be proven. It is the beauty of it; the theory justifies why you should not take the theory for granted. Practically it means that if your doctor guaranties you under the name of science that you will survive with some artificial digital brain, you better run. He is provably an ignorant, or a lier, or joking person, or mad, or a zombie, etc: he communicates the false. Bf. The trick is to NEVER believe that it can never be proven! My problem, Kim, is that I have a theology. With comp, it is computer science. But, after Godel computer science splitted somehow into two parts revealing an inescapable gap between truth and provability. The most theological part of it is the difference between computer science and computer's computer science, that is between what is true about the destiny of machines from their many possible points of view, and what machines can prove, in all generality, from, in and out of those points of view. Mathematically the propositional part of that theology is given by the difference between two modal logics G* and G. By (machine) theology I mean G* - G. My result (see my url) is that physics is derivable from it, constructively, if comp is true. I have reason to identify (at first) the scientific belied with proof. You tell me ~B~B(comp), making you false by G*. Read Smullyan's Forever undecided which gives a good introduction to G. If COMP one day turns out to be true You mean will be proved ? What do you mean? then it's not theological anymore, it's logical. Mmmh... Since the fall of logicism even numbers are not logical. But comp is at the intersection of computer science, theoretical physics and cognitive science. It is at at best applied mathematics. We can only bet on our better theory. (my work shows that comp is testable, that is we could learn it is false, but if comp is true we will need forever some act of faith to say yes to the doctor. Thought experiments can illustrate that even if you survive with an artificial brain, that personal fact of you does not make it possible to be use for a third person (scientific) communication of that facts. I'm assuming an equivalence of meaning here in the use of the terms theological and metaphysical in dealing with assumptions. No problem at all. I told that I have use biology, psychology etc. I am searching a term, that's all. Of course, if quantum computers turn out to work in the specified manner, then MWI is proven No. Is
Re: Theology (was in-between-times)
Le 05-août-05, à 17:50, chris peck a écrit : Bruno wrote: Futhermore, with regards to formal logic, there is some controversy over how logical operators should be interpreted I gather. Yes and no. Because their job consists in making mathematical the interpretations, and then to study completeness, soundness, independence of the axioms, etc. Nowadys logic is just a branch of math. Controversy can appear in apllication (but that's true for any application of math). Indeed whilst it is possible to derive all operators from just one (Sheffer's I think), and thus reason to think that this operator is fundamental in some way, its interpretation however is clearly a combination of 'english' operators. That is not a problem at all. There doesnt appear to be a strict isomorphism between language and logic. True. But that is not a problem at all. There exists many interesting and well defined morphisms. I think Descartes is much maligned actually. Sure, his attempt to rebuild the world from the cogito fails, I am not sure. Surely they are many vagueness ... but his theology and philosophy really just form a tiny part of his oevre. I am not sure of that either. His work in analytical geometry is testament to how good a mathematician he was. His study of algebra and curves has been of unquestionable use to the world. Sure. Newton did even acknowledge it in ... the *first* edition of his main work! But Descartes has a coherent view of both theology and sciences. He oversimplified it a little bit too much for pedagoical purposes, I guess, and also with an eye on the church authority for escaping social difficulties. For most of the time he did not succeed and he runned away. Actually I don't believe in science at all. I believe just in honest and curious people capable of trying to make clear and sharable their ideas and works. Knowledge by any means! I think knowledge in science has a pragmatic definition. Ideally, a theory has authority over its field to the degree to which it is of use. More predictive theories replace older ones, whether or not the older ones strictly speaking have been falsified. (Newton vs. Einstein). I follow the argument Hilary Putnam makes in 'The Corroboration of Theories', that intertheoretic dependency renders falsifiability impossible for most theories. I certainly agree with Feyerabend, and many others, that scientists usually dont (and shouldnt) worry about falsifiability too much. Given they shouldnt, and dont, it becomes somewhat fustrating to see epirical falsification wielded as some great method other disciplines ignore. So do scientists very often. The point is that there isnt a 'unique' method that garauntees futhering knowledge. There are many ways of understanding, and many ways of enquiring. Mmmh ... yes sure. But to communicate knowledge you need to find agreement with the other. Logic, math, and modern axiomatics are excellent non reductive way to attempt such communications. How much did relative space/time as concept cost compared to the non descovery of the Higgs Boson? I don't know. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Theology (was in-between-times)
Le 04-août-05, à 18:11, chris peck a écrit : Bruno wrote: No. But then your definition of theology is perhaps a little bit to much a contingent matter. Perhaps the word theology has too many connotations. I agree largely. I think the correct distinction to make between what people seem to mean wrt the religion/science dispute is between 'recieved wisdom' and 'reasoned wisdom'. Religion and theology begin to encroach on liberty when the wisdom is 'recieved'. When things are true 'because that is how it is written'. It leaves little space for question or change. I agree. Thanks for mentioning this important point. Here I deeply believed that just teaching logic could help people. Indeed, once you understand enough logic you understand that even in mathematics, few text can have an univocal interpretation and it helps you to be cautious in front of any literal interpretation of any text. Theology takes on a different character in the hands of a Descartes because he reasons for his ideas. In doing so he opens himself up for criticism and refutation. We can analyse his methodology and deductive accuracy. Absolutely. Note that before Descartes some other were reasoning nicely to. I am tring to have a better understanding of the thread Plato, Plotin, Proclus and other neo-platonists. Note that Descartes miss logic, due to the exaggeration of many scholastic logicians, but he is really a good reasoner (which by the way shows we don't need logic to be a good reasoner). Science can and does adopt sometimes a 'received' methodology. There is a prevailing world view, a chauvanism towards certain methodologies. A bias towards rewarding certain research projects over others. There seems to be little understanding that paradigmatic shifts in science often come from left field. Theories are judged to an extent on how well they fit in to the current model - however many difficulties that model is encountering. Yes. As you point out, many ideas here have mystical consequences really. They are reasoned for however. Whilst life after death is common to many religious and philsophical models, in those presented here we can see how the conclusions are arrived at and why. Exactly. An expression like quantum immortality *is* theological. To negate this consists in making science not only theological again, but dogmatically so! For me thats a critical difference. I rarely share opinions with post-modernist and other deconstructivists, but I do share with some of them the idea that the frontier between fields are biological-cultural, just locally useful, constructions. Actually I don't believe in science at all. I believe just in honest and curious people capable of trying to make clear and sharable their ideas and works. Some gardiners and parapsychologist(*) can be more rigorous than mathematician and physicists. It is really a question of attitude. (*) I am thinking to that chef-d'oeuvre of science: In search of the Light by Suzanne Blackmore (much more rigorous than her more recent book on Memes, actually). The original discovery that lucid dreaming can be tested in laboratory (in a third person verifiable way) has been done by a parapsychologist (Hearne). The scientific community will gives the credit to a neuroscientist and mathematician though, Laberge, when he (re)published the results in scientific journal. Some mathematician acts like Pavlov Dog. They dismiss any text has non serious if some words appears in it, like mind, quantum (sic). Empirically I have discovered that engineers are most of the time more open to serious reasoning on fundamental questions. In science they still exist popes, and truth need to wait they leaves the planet to progress. I am not alluding to anything personal here, but what I say is clear from any books on the history of sciences. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Theology (was in-between-times)
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Theology (was in-between-times) Date: 5 August 2005 10:44:38 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.comOn 04/08/2005, at 11:44 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Le 31-juil.-05, à 03:13, Kim Jones wrote (just before the thread was censored).Go Bruno!!Theology concerns itself with the "mechanism" of belief.What is the mechanism of belief?It acts like a filter, or a pair of tinted glasses if you will.Belief is that way of looking at reality that reinforces that way oflooking at reality. Is that scientific?No. But then your definition of theology is perhaps a little bit to much a contingent matter.Perhaps the word "theology" has too many connotations. I explain below why I do think that, despite its heavy historical background, it could still be the less misleading word.I prefer "metaphysical" myself. After all, it claims to be the system that is looking at the system. That is perhaps best described as "metaphysics"Any assessment of supposed objective rigour in ANY form oftheological thinking - be it "total unrigorous manipulative pseudo-theology" or even the usual kind of theology taught to the averageworking cleric has to be seen in the light of this comment.The FOR book, Everett formulation of QM, and my own work rely on the computationalist hypothesis. Is this not a "theological" assumption?Only if it can never be proven. The trick is to NEVER believe that it can never be proven!If COMP one day turns out to be true then it's not theological anymore, it's logical. I'm assuming an equivalence of meaning here in the use of the terms "theological" and "metaphysical" in dealing with assumptions. Of course, if quantum computers turn out to work in the specified manner, then MWI is proven and there never was anything metaphysical going on. Whether or not that is seen as reliable proof of COMP remains to be seenThe danger, that Alan guards against, lies in STARTING from the metaphysical/theological viewpoint. But this of course makes it extremely hard to deal with all these assumptions out in the open (as you say).I certainly do not hold that scientists are somehow free of the ravages of belief. In science, one's beliefs are always smuggled in through the back door - hence Einstein's famous "God does not play dice with the universe". He meant it quite as much as a statement of religious faith as a refutation of QM (and I do not believe Einstein would have considered himself offtopic either)Is this not a belief in a form of survival after a form of possible death? A belief that I can survive with an artificial body can be seen as an argument for the ability of the "soul" to be independent of its body. No?Yes of course, but again if it turns out to be physically real or at least possible (testable), why do we need the metaphysics? What if the "soul" turns out to be the summation of the "amplitude of your minds" to use Herwig's words, spread across the multiverse? I can cope with that notion under the banner of the real, the possible. No star in the east, no burning bushes - just a mind-blowing real possibilityThose cases also illustrate the possibility of some theological assumptions about which we can reason. As Deutsch and Tipler do, it seems to me.The exciting part surely in what they do is to bypass the theology altogether. It's simply an unnecessary explanatory step. Truth really is stranger than fiction. Theology would try to reference everything to the Bible - see nextTheology wants to limit the field of ideas because theology is thetraditional gate-keeper of the intellect of organised religion.It is not because 99% of the theologians, and this 99% of the time, are under the control of political organization (like science sometimes, somewhere: ex: genetic in Soviet Union), that we should dismiss the original questioning.I feel it is the other way around. Politics is belief or spirituality in action. What we believe authors what we do, sets up what we call "moral". The supposed split between the Church and the State is as much nonsense today as it was in the Middle Ages. Law is ultimately rooted in adherence to a moral framework, so belief in values, morals etc precedes politics, indeed gives rise to itHasanyone heard of an organised religion that is gagging for newthinking, new ideas???Come on. The jewish commentaries, the scolastic christians, The Muslim neoplatonist, the Hinduism school, the taoist schools, the buddhist schools: all have been open some long time to critical argumentations and improvements. Hinduism and Buddhism have even had quite sophisticate internal school of logic.Most look to their past for a continuing mandate and thus fall back on their laurels. There is not enough futuristic stuff in theology. It's usually about why things have to be NOW the way they
Re: Theology (was in-between-times)
Bruno wrote: Here I deeply believed that just teaching logic could help people. Well I think you are right. Its a discipline. Indeed, once you understandenough logic you understand that even in mathematics, few text can have an univocal interpretation and it helps you to be cautious in front of any literal interpretation of any text. yes. I think there are problems of interpretation in all fields of enquiry. Lets distinguish between 'interpretations' that are handed down, and accidental interpretations that were wrong, or misleading ala Pythagoras's definition of a point, which I understand led to stagnation in geometry for some time. The two are different in the sense that the latter is open to change when the problem is established and understood. Futhermore, with regards to formal logic, there is some controversy over how logical operators should be interpreted I gather. Indeed whilst it is possible to derive all operators from just one (Sheffer's I think), and thus reason to think that this operator is fundamental in some way, its interpretation however is clearly a combination of 'english' operators. There doesnt appear to be a strict isomorphism between language and logic. Note that before Descartes some other were reasoning nicely to. Ofcourse. Where there are homosapiens, you will no doubt find decent reasoning. Note that Descartes miss logic, due to the exaggeration of many scholastic logicians, but he is really a good reasoner (which by the way shows we don't need logic to be a good reasoner). I think Descartes is much maligned actually. Sure, his attempt to rebuild the world from the cogito fails, but his theology and philosophy really just form a tiny part of his oevre. His work in analytical geometry is testament to how good a mathematician he was. His study of algebra and curves has been of unquestionable use to the world. Actually I don't believe in science at all. I believe just in honest and curious people capable of trying to make clear and sharable their ideas and works. Knowledge by any means! I think knowledge in science has a pragmatic definition. Ideally, a theory has authority over its field to the degree to which it is of use. More predictive theories replace older ones, whether or not the older ones strictly speaking have been falsified. (Newton vs. Einstein). I follow the argument Hilary Putnam makes in 'The Corroboration of Theories', that intertheoretic dependency renders falsifiability impossible for most theories. I certainly agree with Feyerabend, and many others, that scientists usually dont (and shouldnt) worry about falsifiability too much. Given they shouldnt, and dont, it becomes somewhat fustrating to see epirical falsification wielded as some great method other disciplines ignore. So do scientists very often. The point is that there isnt a 'unique' method that garauntees futhering knowledge. There are many ways of understanding, and many ways of enquiring. How much did relative space/time as concept cost compared to the non descovery of the Higgs Boson? Regards Chris. From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: chris peck [EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Theology (was in-between-times) Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2005 12:16:56 +0200 Le 04-août-05, à 18:11, chris peck a écrit : Bruno wrote: No. But then your definition of theology is perhaps a little bit to much a contingent matter. Perhaps the word theology has too many connotations. I agree largely. I think the correct distinction to make between what people seem to mean wrt the religion/science dispute is between 'recieved wisdom' and 'reasoned wisdom'. Religion and theology begin to encroach on liberty when the wisdom is 'recieved'. When things are true 'because that is how it is written'. It leaves little space for question or change. I agree. Thanks for mentioning this important point. Here I deeply believed that just teaching logic could help people. Indeed, once you understand enough logic you understand that even in mathematics, few text can have an univocal interpretation and it helps you to be cautious in front of any literal interpretation of any text. Theology takes on a different character in the hands of a Descartes because he reasons for his ideas. In doing so he opens himself up for criticism and refutation. We can analyse his methodology and deductive accuracy. Absolutely. Note that before Descartes some other were reasoning nicely to. I am tring to have a better understanding of the thread Plato, Plotin, Proclus and other neo-platonists. Note that Descartes miss logic, due to the exaggeration of many scholastic logicians, but he is really a good reasoner (which by the way shows we don't need logic to be a good reasoner). Science can and does adopt sometimes a 'received' methodology. There is a prevailing world view, a chauvanism towards certain methodologies. A bias
Theology (was in-between-times)
Le 31-juil.-05, à 03:13, Kim Jones wrote (just before the thread was censored). Theology concerns itself with the mechanism of belief. What is the mechanism of belief? It acts like a filter, or a pair of tinted glasses if you will. Belief is that way of looking at reality that reinforces that way of looking at reality. Is that scientific? No. But then your definition of theology is perhaps a little bit to much a contingent matter. Perhaps the word theology has too many connotations. I explain below why I do think that, despite its heavy historical background, it could still be the less misleading word. Any assessment of supposed objective rigour in ANY form of theological thinking - be it total unrigorous manipulative pseudo- theology or even the usual kind of theology taught to the average working cleric has to be seen in the light of this comment. The FOR book, Everett formulation of QM, and my own work rely on the computationalist hypothesis. Is this not a theological assumption? Is this not a belief in a form of survival after a form of possible death? A belief that I can survive with an artificial body can be seen as an argument for the ability of the soul to be independent of its body. No? Those cases also illustrate the possibility of some theological assumptions about which we can reason. As Deutsch and Tipler do, it seems to me. Theology wants to limit the field of ideas because theology is the traditional gate-keeper of the intellect of organised religion. It is not because 99% of the theologians, and this 99% of the time, are under the control of political organization (like science sometimes, somewhere: ex: genetic in Soviet Union), that we should dismiss the original questioning. Has anyone heard of an organised religion that is gagging for new thinking, new ideas??? Come on. The jewish commentaries, the scolastic christians, The Muslim neoplatonist, the Hinduism school, the taoist schools, the buddhist schools: all have been open some long time to critical argumentations and improvements. Hinduism and Buddhism have even had quite sophisticate internal school of logic. Look at the neo-platonist tradition: quite a long and sincere argumentation. It still exists today everywhere on the planet, even if it is hidden by the media politically correct cacophonia. Theology has an unspoken brief to limit the field of ideas to what the powerbrokers in organised religions long ago decided was permissable But organised religion, like organised academy, should be separate from the original intent. The same is true for philosophy. Science (and hopefully philosophy if it can keep up) will usually seek to enlarge and populate the field of ideas with anything and everything necessary to understand reality. But by preventing seriousness in theology and its related questions, you make yourself an objective ally of those who want theology to be kept in the hand of social manipulators. And the worst is that this attitude encourages a wrong understanding of science, like if science was answering (or even tackling) those questions, which for methodological reasons only, it does not. It makes science a peculiar theology : one which pretend to reach the truth. Is that not a form of arrogance? Is not naturalism a religion? Is not the primitive universe or Nature just a Modern God? After all, as I just recall in my preceding post, nobody has given a proof of the existence of Nature. Even Aristotle, as I begin to suspect, has been much more cautious on the existence of Nature than most of its followers. I have no problem with scientists and theologians. I have problem with any dogma, both when used in science or in theology. But today, dogmatic theologians are less annoying than dogmatic scientists, because the dogmatic scientists pretend having no dogma, making dialog on fundamental open questions even more difficult I'm afraid. Bruno Kim Jones On 31/07/2005, at 2:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The problem is that if the scientist dismiss some fundamental questions, they will be tackled by those who will use some urgency feeling related to them to to do total unrigorous manipulative pseudo-theology, so that the scientist will say you see, let us keep those things under the carpet. Your negative attitude is unfounded and self-fulfilling, I'm afraid. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: Theology (was in-between-times)
Bruno wrote: No. But then your definition of theology is perhaps a little bit to much a contingent matter. Perhaps the word theology has too many connotations. I agree largely. I think the correct distinction to make between what people seem to mean wrt the religion/science dispute is between 'recieved wisdom' and 'reasoned wisdom'. Religion and theology begin to encroach on liberty when the wisdom is 'recieved'. When things are true 'because that is how it is written'. It leaves little space for question or change. Theology takes on a different character in the hands of a Descartes because he reasons for his ideas. In doing so he opens himself up for criticism and refutation. We can analyse his methodology and deductive accuracy. Science can and does adopt sometimes a 'received' methodology. There is a prevailing world view, a chauvanism towards certain methodologies. A bias towards rewarding certain research projects over others. There seems to be little understanding that paradigmatic shifts in science often come from left field. Theories are judged to an extent on how well they fit in to the current model - however many difficulties that model is encountering. As you point out, many ideas here have mystical consequences really. They are reasoned for however. Whilst life after death is common to many religious and philsophical models, in those presented here we can see how the conclusions are arrived at and why. For me thats a critical difference. rom: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Kim Jones [EMAIL PROTECTED],FoR [EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Theology (was in-between-times) Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2005 15:44:07 +0200 Le 31-juil.-05, à 03:13, Kim Jones wrote (just before the thread was censored). Theology concerns itself with the mechanism of belief. What is the mechanism of belief? It acts like a filter, or a pair of tinted glasses if you will. Belief is that way of looking at reality that reinforces that way of looking at reality. Is that scientific? No. But then your definition of theology is perhaps a little bit to much a contingent matter. Perhaps the word theology has too many connotations. I explain below why I do think that, despite its heavy historical background, it could still be the less misleading word. Any assessment of supposed objective rigour in ANY form of theological thinking - be it total unrigorous manipulative pseudo- theology or even the usual kind of theology taught to the average working cleric has to be seen in the light of this comment. The FOR book, Everett formulation of QM, and my own work rely on the computationalist hypothesis. Is this not a theological assumption? Is this not a belief in a form of survival after a form of possible death? A belief that I can survive with an artificial body can be seen as an argument for the ability of the soul to be independent of its body. No? Those cases also illustrate the possibility of some theological assumptions about which we can reason. As Deutsch and Tipler do, it seems to me. Theology wants to limit the field of ideas because theology is the traditional gate-keeper of the intellect of organised religion. It is not because 99% of the theologians, and this 99% of the time, are under the control of political organization (like science sometimes, somewhere: ex: genetic in Soviet Union), that we should dismiss the original questioning. Has anyone heard of an organised religion that is gagging for new thinking, new ideas??? Come on. The jewish commentaries, the scolastic christians, The Muslim neoplatonist, the Hinduism school, the taoist schools, the buddhist schools: all have been open some long time to critical argumentations and improvements. Hinduism and Buddhism have even had quite sophisticate internal school of logic. Look at the neo-platonist tradition: quite a long and sincere argumentation. It still exists today everywhere on the planet, even if it is hidden by the media politically correct cacophonia. Theology has an unspoken brief to limit the field of ideas to what the powerbrokers in organised religions long ago decided was permissable But organised religion, like organised academy, should be separate from the original intent. The same is true for philosophy. Science (and hopefully philosophy if it can keep up) will usually seek to enlarge and populate the field of ideas with anything and everything necessary to understand reality. But by preventing seriousness in theology and its related questions, you make yourself an objective ally of those who want theology to be kept in the hand of social manipulators. And the worst is that this attitude encourages a wrong understanding of science, like if science was answering (or even tackling) those questions, which for methodological reasons only, it does not. It makes science a peculiar theology : one which
Re: In-Between Times
Le 29-juil.-05, à 05:46, Bill Taylor wrote (FOR-LIST) Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: -I would say theology is even more important. than physics !!! ??? I will try to explain. The word theology has many connotations. The word is not so important if you understand the idea. I have favorite theologians. Plato (who invents the word), but also Plotinus and neo-platonist in general. But also many oriental researchers ... I could argue that Deutsch's FOR book, or more clearly TIPLER's physics of immortality book are (physicalist) approach to theological questions. - we are still a long way before we succeed in -keeping alive the scientific attitude in that field. I can only presume you must be speaking of questions of the type, why is there something rather than nothingand what was there before the big bang ? Well not really. I'm just looking to the consequences of our assumptions. To say yes to a doctor who propose you a digital brain substitution needs to make a non trivial act of faith. To say no, also. Imagine a pro-life physician who does not believe in mechanism. Heavy conscience problems. If so, I would have said these were metaphysical questions rather than theological ones; and whatever one calls them, they hardly seem to be in the same category as what can be treated by science. I don't believe that there is any field of enquiry where the scientific attitude should not be applied. Scientific attitude, I think, is not much more than modesty. The more fundamental are the questions, the more modest the scientist should be. - The subject is still too hot. And too vague. Vagueness is not necessarily a problem, unless it is (mis)used by people who wants manipulate other people. Less vague statements are born from more vague statements. Degree of vagueness could also depend on the assumptions. -Most theological questions are still buried under the carpet, Where they belong. The problem is that if the scientist dismiss some fundamental questions, they will be tackled by those who will use some urgency feeling related to them to to do total unrigorous manipulative pseudo-theology, so that the scientist will say you see, let us keep those things under the carpet. Your negative attitude is unfounded and self-fulfilling, I'm afraid. -or dismiss as non scientific. As I have just done. No sincere questions are non scientific. Prejudice against some possible sense in those questions will not help making them more clear and, who can know in advance, susceptible to scientific progress on them. - All this is helped by many materialist or atheist superstitions. One doesn't need to be either of those things in order to question the appropriateness of metaphysical matters to scientific ones. Some scientists pretend not doing metaphysics, but when you dig a little bit you realized they believe in Nature or in a primitive physical world. That *is* a metaphysical opinion. If you really want to avoid useless *metaphysics* then you should be more open to the possibility of progress in theological matters. Indeed, in *any* matter. -Also, if you assume the computationalist hypothesis, like David Deutsch, I have earlier noted that this would more accurately be called the Matrix hypothesis. - then there is a case that Physics emerges from Mathematics and Logic As I earlier convincingly (IMHO) showed, this can be rejected on categorical grounds alone, apart from any other consideration. So you confess that you think there is no need to look at my argument because you find the conclusion already inconsistent. At least you are frank. Yet I would appreciate a more constructive critics. If you are so sure you could play the game of finding the error in the argumentation you refer to. - so that it is clearly testable. It is not. In the same sense that solipsism is not testable. You don't get it at all. Apology for pointing to my work: I have given two things. First a deductive argument showing that if we make a precise hypothesis in the cognitive theoretical science it follows necessarily that physics is derivable from computer science. The simplicity of the argument is provided by the high non-constructivity of the proof. But then I translate that argument in the language of a sound universal turing machine (with enough introspective ability) from which I derive the logic of the observable propositions. To put it bluntly I can sum up the main technical result by the shape of the arithmetical translation of the argument: PHYSICS = SOL ° THEAE ° COMP (G), where SOL, THEAE, and COMP are the main components of the translation of the reversal arguments. Mathematically they are well defined modal logic transforms, so that we can test the result. Unfortunately, although the propositional physics is decidable, even easy question like Bell's inequality, symmetry of nature, no-cloning
