, Free Will Theorem
John Mikes wrote:
The question of (in)determinacy within our judgement is model-related. A
distinction:
...free will to refer to conscious entities making indeterminate
choices... is as well the judgement of reasonability in our limited
views.
There may be (hidden
@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 1:42 AM
Subject: Re: John Conway, Free Will Theorem
John Mikes wrote:
Stathis:
it is always dangerous (wrong!) to mix deviated cases (sick patients)
with
the general (non sick) human (behavioral etc.) concepts.
One thing is even worse: to draw
banned from writing to the list?
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2005 10:46 PM
Subject: Re: John Conway, Free Will Theorem
Here are some interesting symptoms from sufferers
I got something from you yesterday ... maybe you had an errant email
relay like I suffered yesterday.
On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 11:25:29AM -0400, John M wrote:
I wrote some comments in this thread lately and did not see them being
included in the list-posts. Am I banned from writing to the list?
John Mikes wrote:
The question of (in)determinacy within our judgement is model-related. A
distinction:
...free will to refer to conscious entities making indeterminate
choices... is as well the judgement of reasonability in our limited views.
There may be (hidden? undiscovered?) 'reasons'
John Mikes wrote:
Stathis:
it is always dangerous (wrong!) to mix deviated cases (sick patients) with
the general (non sick) human (behavioral etc.) concepts.
One thing is even worse: to draw conclusions of such.
I disagree with this, in general. In medical science, in particular, one of
the most
Hi Stathis:
My argument is that Turing's result points towards the MWI and makes it a
deterministic outcome but I so far see no reason why all worlds should run
concurrently. So the judge's decision you experience now is an
indeterminate [random] selection from all possible outcomes and gives
Hi Stathis:
I left out that Turing's result seem to point towards a conclusion that the
set of universe descriptions does not form a continuum but rather a
countable set and thus these descriptions can generally differ by too large
an amount to store all prior quantum level states - too coarse
Since this topic of legal responsibility regularly comes up in
discussions of free, it needs to be squashed from a great height.
The notion of legal responsibility has nothing whatsoever to do with
free will.
Legal responsibility is used for different purposes, depending on
whether the case is
Russel, Stathis
I agree that free will and legal responsibility are different. Free
will is a subjective concept. It is a feeling that one has
about being "master" of one's decisions. In the terminology used in
this list, free will is also a "first person" issue.
Legal responsibility is an
Russell Standish writes:
Since this topic of legal responsibility regularly comes up in
discussions of free, it needs to be squashed from a great height.
The notion of legal responsibility has nothing whatsoever to do with
free will.
Legal responsibility is used for different purposes, depending
On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 10:30:25AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I agree that the purpose of punishment is to prevent that occurrence from
happening again; at least, this is what the purpose of punishment ought to
be. But note that this *does* imply an assumption about the reasons
Here are some interesting symptoms from sufferers of schizophrenia, which
may be seen as disorders of free will:
1. Command auditory hallucinations. The patient hears voices commanding him
to do sometimes horrific things, which he feels he *must* obey, and often
does obey, even though he does
nd awe.
I don't want to even guess how much we did not
yet discover. Well, we are past the Flat Earth. Or are we?
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: "Pete Carlton" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
S
The answer to Statis' question seems straightforward. Given quantum
indeterminacy, thought processes cannot be predictable. Therefore, genuine
free will exists.
...Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising *genuine*
free will, as opposed to this pseudo-free variety,
Norman Samish writes:
The answer to Stat[h]is' question seems straightforward. Given quantum
indeterminacy, thought processes cannot be predictable. Therefore, genuine
free will exists.
...Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising
*genuine*
free will, as opposed to this
@eskimo.com
Subject: John Conway, Free Will Theorem
Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2005 01:30:00 -0700
Greetings,
I recently attended a talk here in Berkeley, California given by John
Conway (of 'Game of Life' fame), in which he discussed some of his results
with Simon Kochen, extending the Kochen-Specker
Hi Stathis:
At 08:17 AM 4/8/2005, you wrote:
I am worried that some of what I have always believed to be my freely made
decisions may actually result from physical processes in my brain which
are either, on the one hand, completely random, or on the other hand,
entirely deterministic (even if
Greetings,
I recently attended a talk here in Berkeley, California given by John
Conway (of 'Game of Life' fame), in which he discussed some of his
results with Simon Kochen, extending the Kochen-Specker paradox. He
presents this as the Free Will Theorem, saying basically that
particles
The Multiverse is a deterministic framework for quantum mechanics. It
is completely compatible with it. A paradox can only occur if you
think the single world universe of our senses is deterministic - which
it clearly isn't.
My definition of free will is the ability to do something
completely
Hi Pete and Russell
While it may be true that the propagation of the wave equation (and the
consequent branching pattern) is deterministic, the actual branch in
which one instance of us finds itself in the Multiverse, is random.
I agree with Russell that free will occurs only in irrational
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