Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> >
> You don't have to. Body identity is not sufficient to establish the "fact of
> the matter". People
> >
> may be acquited to murder (by reason of insanity) because they suffer from
> multiple personality
> >
> disorder. In such
Bruno Marchal writes:> > In any case, it is telling that even Parfit's philosophical > > adversaries do not focus on lack of scientific plausibility as an > > argument against *philosophical* validity. For the most part, he could > > have made the same points had he been writing a century ago, dr
Brent Meeker writes:> You don't have to. Body identity is not sufficient to establish the "fact of the matter". People > may be acquited to murder (by reason of insanity) because they suffer from multiple personality > disorder. In such cases, one "personality" is generally not aware of the ot
ut the rest.
The ideas may be recent, but the modus operandi (mental) is ancient.
Thanks for the reply
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "everything" ; "John M"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, June 01, 2006
inal Message -
> From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To:
> Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 9:07 PM
> Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons
>
>
> >
> > There must exist a ''high level'' program that specifies a person in
>
e silly neurons?
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 9:07 PM
Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons
>
> There must exist a ''high level'' program that specifies a person in terms
> of qu
Le 01-juin-06, à 03:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I don't see that there have been any scientific developments in the last twenty years which make Parfit's thought experiments more or less plausible.
I think so.
The only exception I can think of is in his favour: there is speculation
The importance of gradual change in the spectrum argument, is that
since personal identity can be conserved through discontinous changes
(the example you cite here), then any gradual change should not alter
identity either.
The slight flaw in this argument comes again by analogy with the
genetic
On Wed, May 31, 2006 at 09:32:29PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
> True, but the same is true of gene-space--there are vastly more sequences of
> A,T,C,G that would fail to produce anything like a viable multicellular
> organism (or even a viable single-celled organism) than there are sequences
The problem with the embryonic brain argument (which I actually raised
BTW), is that is almost assuredly not conscious, and not a "person" in
the way we're using the term here.
Obviously its a little hard to find an exact cutoff between consious
and unconscious states, but the onset of self-aware
Jesse Mazer writes:
> The strength of the synaptic connections between different > neurons or groups of neurons does change in a fairly continuous way, no? Of > course even if we specify all the synaptic connections and strengths, one's > conscious state can change in the short term as differen
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> >
> Of course such cases already arise in which Alzheimer's or schizophrenia
> changes a person into
> >
> "someone else", i.e. we say he is "no longer himself". Just because there is
> an continuum of
> >
> intermediate states it doe
Russell Standish wrote:
This would imply that there exist "islands" of indentity, and having
limited awareness in time and multispace, we can only ever be aware of
one instance from each island, but that might change with technology.
BTW another analogy is the islands of geneflow within bi
Brent Meeker writes:> Of course such cases already arise in which Alzheimer's or schizophrenia changes a person into> "someone else", i.e. we say he is "no longer himself". Just because there is an continuum of> intermediate states it doesn't follow that there is no "fact of the matter".
We sa
I don't see that there have been any scientific developments in the last twenty years which make Parfit's thought experiments more or less plausible. The only exception I can think of is in his favour: there is speculation that teleportation may indeed be theoretically possible. In any case, it i
Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
>On Wed, May 31, 2006 at 07:53:35PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >
> > Anyway, I agree with your basic point--although practical possibility is
>not
> > important to philosophical thought-experiments, *logical* possibility
> > certainly is, and if there were no smooth
On Wed, May 31, 2006 at 07:53:35PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
> Anyway, I agree with your basic point--although practical possibility is not
> important to philosophical thought-experiments, *logical* possibility
> certainly is, and if there were no smooth path between me and Napoleon (or
> B
Russell Standish wrote:
>
>BTW another analogy is the islands of geneflow within biological
>species. Within biology, we have such things as ring species, where
>two species at a location (eg Britain) cannot interbreed, yet can
>interbreed with neighbouring species to the east and west in an
>in
Sure, and if Parfit's discussion boiled down to "if we assume that a
spectrum of identies is possible for the sake of argument, then..."
We can also make the opposite assumption, and come to the opposite
conclusions. Not especially edifying, wouldn't you think.
Parfit was trying to bias the disc
On Wed, May 31, 2006 at 03:30:00PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Of course such cases already arise in which Alzheimers or schizophrenia
> changes a person into
> "someone else", i.e. we say he is "no longer himself". Just because there is
> an continuum of
> intermediate states it doesn't fo
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
> You're being too practical. That's fine for scientific speculation, but
> it can be an impediment in trying to understand philosophers. If I say,
> "if I were God, I would get rid of all the flies", I am saying something
> about my attitude to flies; the fact that
Russell Standish writes:
> On Wed, May 31, 2006 at 04:36:46PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > You're being too practical. That's fine for scientific speculation,
but
> > it can be an impediment in trying to understand philosophers. If I
say,
>
> I'm sorry, but you've already lost me here.
On Wed, May 31, 2006 at 04:36:46PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> You're being too practical. That's fine for scientific speculation, but
> it can be an impediment in trying to understand philosophers. If I say,
I'm sorry, but you've already lost me here. If there is no grounding
in understo
Russell,
> > Having said that, I still think it misses the point. The fact that
> > Parfit's thought experiments sometimes seem to have a degree of
> > scientific plausibility is just a bonus that makes his writing more
> > entertaining. Parfit's ideas on personal identity are squarely in
the
>
Can I add a nuance that seems to be missing from this discourse?
What if the original 'programming' or 'configuration' of the neurons
(the entire brain including the neuron/astrocyte syncitium) was as a
single entity and intrinsically dynamic?
That is, the laying down of the brain configuration
On Tue, May 30, 2006 at 08:55:19PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> I agree with the comments made by Jesse Mazer and Saibal Mitra, and
> would go further to suggest that there *necessarily* exists a continuous
> series of intermediates between any two minds, if you allow that
> essentially
On Tue, May 30, 2006 at 03:02:05PM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
>
>
> One way (perhaps the only way) I could see to do it would be for you
> to gradually acquire amnesia, then once you have forgotten your past,
> your personality could gradually change to match Napoleon's, then you
> could gradual
Jesse Mazer writes:
> I agree that Parfit's simple method would probably create a nonfunctional
> state in between, or at least the intermediate phase would involve a sort of
> split personality disorder with two entirely separate minds coexisting in
> the same brain, without access to each oth
Russell,
IMO ANY argument ("set of assumptions") "is" truly
believable for people with a mindset that finds it so
(truly believable that is.)
Also Jesse's 'need' for a high level qualia-assignment
is human postulate upon things more than just human.
We have the bad habit to think with our huma
8:22 PM
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons
>
>
> On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing
through
> > non-funct
Well yes, I suppose there is a set of assumptions about persons that
makes the argument work, the trouble is can we come up with a truly
believable set of assumptions? (My comment also on Jesse Mazer's post also).
This is good - it is delving deeper into Parfit's argument, exposing
subtle traps w
program to
the corresponding neural network.
- Original Message -
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2006 02:29 AM
Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> >
> >On Mon, May 29, 2006 a
Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
>On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through
> > non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all,
> > there is a continuous sequence of intermed
On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through
> non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all,
> there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a
> fertilized
L'esprit de l'escalier:
after reading my post below as an interesting
list-post it occurred that I left out an important
addage:
I may feel as the same person (self) in my earlier
life and situations - I do not IDENTIFY with 'it'. I
know: "it is me" but not "I am like that". Not even:
"I was like
I read the remark of Russell and Satathis's reply with
great interest.
Russell wrote (among others):
*
> > ...The change into
> > Napoleon is a difference in kind, not degree, as
> >one would have to
> > pass through non-functional brain structures in
> >order to change from me to him.< <
*
refle
Russell Standish writes:
> >Even though it is very unlikely to happen in reality, it is easy
> > enough to imagine that the relatively minor physical/psychological
> > changes that have occurred in the past day are exaggerated, so that
> > instead of changing from me-yesterday to me-today, I chan
t;
> >
> > Several list members cajoled me into reading David Parfit's "Reasons
> > and Persons". So I braved our dragon infested library, and sourced a
> > copy. I can see why his book is relevant to this list, particularly
> > part 3 of his book "Person
On Sun, May 28, 2006 at 03:35:07PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Philosophers are at the opposite extreme of engineers, in that they
> consider the practical details of their thought experiments to be
> unimportant. I think the idea that Parfit is exploring in the term
> "psychological sp
t@googlegroups.com
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Russell Standish
Sent: Wednesday, 24 May 2006 5:29 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Reasons and Persons
Several list members cajoled me into reading David Parfit's "Reasons
and Persons". So I braved our dragon
Russ
where can I get a copy of this alarming book?
cheers
Kim
On 24/05/2006, at 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> Several list members cajoled me into reading David Parfit's "Reasons
> and Persons". So I braved our dragon infested library, and sourced a
> c
Several list members cajoled me into reading David Parfit's "Reasons
and Persons". So I braved our dragon infested library, and sourced a
copy. I can see why his book is relevant to this list, particularly
part 3 of his book "Personal Identity". It was a good recomme
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