Hi,
I'm just mulling this over in my head, but what effect do you guys
think a many worlds context would have on the Doomsday argument? There
seems to be an implicit assumption that we're _either_ in a universe
where the human race has a long future, _or_ we're not. The missing
possibility
This has been discussed on the list before. See my book Theory of
Nothing, in particular page 88. Its available as a free download if
you haven't bought a copy.
Cheers
On Wed, Jan 23, 2008 at 01:31:40PM -0800, Rosy At Random wrote:
Hi,
I'm just mulling this over in my head, but what
HI,
If all of the balls had been numbered unambiguously from 1 through
1,000,010, the statistical effect produced by Bostrom's ambiguous ball
7 would vanish.
Agreed. Also consider another version: do not name the balls in the
first urn 1 to 10, but with uniform random numbers of the
Günther Greindl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If all of the balls had been
numbered unambiguously from 1 through
1,000,010, the statistical effect produced by Bostrom's ambiguous ball
7 would vanish.
Agreed. Also consider another version: do not name the balls in the
first urn 1 to 10, but with
In his article, Investigations into the Doomsday Argument, Nick
Bostrom introduces the Doomsday Argument with the following example:
Imagine that two big urns are put in front of you, and you know
that one of them contains ten balls and the other a million, but you
are ignorant as to which is
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