Re: dot dot dot

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Aug 2014, at 02:18, meekerdb wrote:

Are you aware of the research by the dating website OKCupid that  
showed that the best way to find out if your date believes in God,  
without asking directly, is to ask if they are persnickety about  
spelling and grammar.  "No" indicates a likely believer.  "Yes"  
means a likely atheist.



Nice. Agnostic says "it depends on what is written"




It's purely a statistical correlation, but one based on a large  
sample.



It shows perhaps that believers believe that taking care of the sense,  
the sounds will take care of themselves.
The atheists believe that by taking care of the sounds, the sense will  
take care of themselves.
But that's mechanism, I think, the duality top down/bottom up, or  
syntax-semantics, theory-models, machine-realities, etc.


Bruno








Brent

On 8/18/2014 5:10 PM, LizR wrote:
I wish that often, but then I'm (a) pernickety* about grammar and  
spelling, and (b) generally in a hurry!


*Or a word spelled something like that!


On 18 August 2014 23:44, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 17 Aug 2014, at 07:23, LizR wrote:


PS You do know you can delete posts from the EL, don't you?



But not from the mail boxes. Besides, I am against all post  
deletions, except on facebook when people use your wall for  
advertising, or when they repeat insults.


What would be nice is an ability to edit mails, for the typo.

Bruno




On 17 August 2014 17:23, LizR  wrote:
Never mind, you stated your position nice and clearly, perhaps  
more clearly than you normally do on the EL.


(...or is that why you're saying "OOPS!" ? :-)


On 17 August 2014 16:54, meekerdb  wrote:
OOPS! I didn't intend to post this to the everything-list;  
although it may serve as an introduction for James Lindsay if he  
decides to join the list.  I wrote to him after reading his book  
"dot dot do" which is about infinity in mathematics and philosophy.


Brent


On 8/16/2014 9:28 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote:

Hi Brent,

Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a  
refinement of language. I also think of it as a specialization  
of philosophy, or even a highly distilled variant upon it with  
limited scope. Indeed, I frequently conceive of mathematics as a  
branch of philosophy where we (mostly) agree upon the axioms and  
(mostly) know we're talking about abstract ideas, to be  
distinguished from what I feel like I get from many philosophers.


I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal,


Here's his paper that describes his TOE.  It rests on two points  
for which he gives arguments: (1) If consciousness is  
instantiated by certain computational processes which could be  
realized in different media (so there's nothing "magici" about  
them being done in brains) then they can exist the way arithmetic  
exist (i.e. in "platonia").  And in platonia there is a universal  
dovetailer, UD, that computes everything computable (and more),  
so it instantiates all possible conscious thoughts including  
those that cause us to infer the existence of an external  
physical world.  The problem with his theory, which he  
recognizes, is that this apparently instantiates too much.  But  
as physicist like Max Tegmark, Vilenkin, and Krause talk about  
eternal inflation and infinitely many universes in  
which  all possible  
physics is realized, maybe the UD doesn't produce too much.  He  
thinks he can show that what it produces is like quantum  
mechanics except for a measure zero.  But I'm not convinced his  
measure is more than wishful thinking.


He's a nice fellow though and not a crank.  So if you'd like to  
engage him on any of this you can join the discussion list everything-list@googlegroups.com 
.


and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less  
everything, based upon computation or  
even   
computation theories. I remain a bit skeptical of them, and  
overall, I would suggest that such things are likely to be  
theories of everything, which is to say still on the map side of  
the map/terrain divide.


I agree.  But some people assume that there must be some ultimate  
ontology of ur-stuff that exists necessarily - and mathematical  
objects are their favorite candidates (if they're not  
religious).  I don't think this is a compelling argument since I  
regard numbers as inventions (not necessarily human - likely  
evolution invented them).  I think of ontologies as the stuff  
that is in our theories.  Since  
theories  are  
invented to explain things they may ultimately be circular, sort  
of like: mathematics-> physics-> chemistry->biology->  
intelligence-> mathematics.  So you can start with whatever you  
think you understand.  If this circle of explanation is big  
enough to include everything, then I claim it's "virtuously"  
circular.


Brent
"What is there?  

Re: dot dot dot

[meekerdb]

Are you aware of the research by the dating website OKCupid that showed that the best way 
to find out if your date believes in God, without asking directly, is to ask if they are 
persnickety about spelling and grammar.  "No" indicates a likely believer.  "Yes" means a 
likely atheist.


It's purely a statistical correlation, but one based on a large sample.

Brent

On 8/18/2014 5:10 PM, LizR wrote:
I wish that often, but then I'm (a) pernickety* about grammar and spelling, and (b) 
generally in a hurry!


*Or a word spelled something like that!


On 18 August 2014 23:44, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:


On 17 Aug 2014, at 07:23, LizR wrote:


PS You do know you can delete posts from the EL, don't you?



But not from the mail boxes. Besides, I am against all post deletions, 
except on
facebook when people use your wall for advertising, or when they repeat 
insults.

What would be nice is an ability to edit mails, for the typo.

Bruno




On 17 August 2014 17:23, LizR mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Never mind, you stated your position nice and clearly, perhaps more 
clearly
than you normally do on the EL.

(...or is that why you're saying "OOPS!" ? :-)


On 17 August 2014 16:54, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

OOPS! I didn't intend to post this to the everything-list; although 
it may
serve as an introduction for James Lindsay if he decides to join the list. 
I wrote to him after reading his book "dot dot do" which is about infinity

in mathematics and philosophy.

Brent


On 8/16/2014 9:28 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote:

Hi Brent,

Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a 
refinement
of language. I also think of it as a specialization of philosophy, 
or
even a highly distilled variant upon it with limited scope. Indeed, 
I
frequently conceive of mathematics as a branch of philosophy where 
we
(mostly) agree upon the axioms and (mostly) know we're talking about
abstract ideas, to be distinguished from what I feel like I get 
from many
philosophers.

I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal,


Here's his paper that describes his TOE.  It rests on two points 
for which
he gives arguments: (1) If consciousness is instantiated by certain
computational processes which could be realized in different media 
(so
there's nothing "magici" about them being done in brains) then they 
can
exist the way arithmetic exist (i.e. in "platonia").  And in 
platonia
there is a universal dovetailer, UD, that computes everything 
computable
(and more), so it instantiates all possible conscious thoughts 
including
those that cause us to infer the existence of an external physical world. 
The problem with his theory, which he recognizes, is that this apparently

instantiates too much. But as physicist like Max Tegmark, Vilenkin, 
and
Krause talk about eternal inflation and infinitely many universes 
in which
all possible physics is realized, maybe the UD doesn't produce too 
much.
He thinks he can show that what it produces is like quantum 
mechanics
except for a measure zero.  But I'm not convinced his measure is 
more than
wishful thinking.

He's a nice fellow though and not a crank.  So if you'd like to 
engage him
on any of this you can join the discussion list
everything-list@googlegroups.com 
.


and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less everything, 
based
upon computation or even computation theories. I remain a bit 
skeptical
of them, and overall, I would suggest that such things are likely 
to be
/theories/ of everything, which is to say still on the map side of 
the
map/terrain divide.


I agree.  But some people assume that there must be some ultimate 
ontology
of ur-stuff that exists necessarily - and mathematical objects are 
their
favorite candidates (if they're not religious).  I don't think this 
is a
compelling argument since I regard numbers as inventions (not 
necessarily
human - likely evolution invented them). I think of ontologies as 
the
stuff that is in our theories.  Since theories are invented to 
explain
things they may ultimately be circular, sort of like: mathematics->
physics-> chemistry->biology-> intelligence-> mathematics.  So you 
can
start with whatever you think you understand.  If this circle of
explanation is big enoug

Re: dot dot dot

[LizR]

I wish that often, but then I'm (a) pernickety* about grammar and spelling,
and (b) generally in a hurry!

*Or a word spelled something like that!


On 18 August 2014 23:44, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 17 Aug 2014, at 07:23, LizR wrote:
>
> PS You do know you can delete posts from the EL, don't you?
>
>
>
> But not from the mail boxes. Besides, I am against all post deletions,
> except on facebook when people use your wall for advertising, or when they
> repeat insults.
>
> What would be nice is an ability to edit mails, for the typo.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> On 17 August 2014 17:23, LizR  wrote:
>
>> Never mind, you stated your position nice and clearly, perhaps more
>> clearly than you normally do on the EL.
>>
>> (...or is that why you're saying "OOPS!" ? :-)
>>
>>
>> On 17 August 2014 16:54, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>  OOPS! I didn't intend to post this to the everything-list; although it
>>> may serve as an introduction for James Lindsay if he decides to join the
>>> list.  I wrote to him after reading his book "dot dot do" which is about
>>> infinity in mathematics and philosophy.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>> On 8/16/2014 9:28 PM, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>> On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote:
>>>
>>>Hi Brent,
>>>
>>>  Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a
>>> refinement of language. I also think of it as a specialization of
>>> philosophy, or even a highly distilled variant upon it with limited scope.
>>> Indeed, I frequently conceive of mathematics as a branch of philosophy
>>> where we (mostly) agree upon the axioms and (mostly) know we're talking
>>> about abstract ideas, to be distinguished from what I feel like I get from
>>> many philosophers.
>>>
>>>  I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal,
>>>
>>>
>>> Here's his paper that describes his TOE.  It rests on two points for
>>> which he gives arguments: (1) If consciousness is instantiated by certain
>>> computational processes which could be realized in different media (so
>>> there's nothing "magici" about them being done in brains) then they can
>>> exist the way arithmetic exist (i.e. in "platonia").  And in platonia there
>>> is a universal dovetailer, UD, that computes everything computable (and
>>> more), so it instantiates all possible conscious thoughts including those
>>> that cause us to infer the existence of an external physical world.  The
>>> problem with his theory, which he recognizes, is that this apparently
>>> instantiates too much.  But as physicist like Max Tegmark, Vilenkin, and
>>> Krause talk about eternal inflation and infinitely many universes in which
>>> all possible physics is realized, maybe the UD doesn't produce too much.
>>> He thinks he can show that what it produces is like quantum mechanics
>>> except for a measure zero.  But I'm not convinced his measure is more than
>>> wishful thinking.
>>>
>>> He's a nice fellow though and not a crank.  So if you'd like to engage
>>> him on any of this you can join the discussion list
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>>>
>>>and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less everything,
>>> based upon computation or even computation theories. I remain a bit
>>> skeptical of them, and overall, I would suggest that such things are likely
>>> to be *theories* of everything, which is to say still on the map side
>>> of the map/terrain divide.
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree.  But some people assume that there must be some ultimate
>>> ontology of ur-stuff that exists necessarily - and mathematical objects are
>>> their favorite candidates (if they're not religious).  I don't think this
>>> is a compelling argument since I regard numbers as inventions (not
>>> necessarily human - likely evolution invented them).  I think of ontologies
>>> as the stuff that is in our theories.  Since theories are invented to
>>> explain things they may ultimately be circular, sort of like: mathematics->
>>> physics-> chemistry->biology-> intelligence-> mathematics.  So you can
>>> start with whatever you think you understand.  If this circle of
>>> explanation is big enough to include everything, then I claim it's
>>> "virtuously" circular.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>> "What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!"
>>>  --- Norm Levitt, after Quine
>>>
>>>
>>>  Regarding your note about my Chapter 2, that's an interesting point
>>> that he raises, and interestingly, I don't wholly disagree with him that it
>>> is an integral feature of arithmetic that it is axiomatically incomplete
>>> (though maybe I thought differently when I wrote the book). Particularly, I
>>> don't think of it as a "bug," but I don't necessarily think of it as a
>>> "feature" either. I'm pretty neutral to it, and I feel like I was trying to
>>> express the idea in my book that it reveals mostly how theoretical, as
>>> opposed to real, mathematics is. I'm not sure about this "more than a map"
>>> thing yet, as by "map" I just mean abstract way to work with reality
>>> instead of reality itself a

Re: dot dot dot

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Aug 2014, at 07:23, LizR wrote:


PS You do know you can delete posts from the EL, don't you?



But not from the mail boxes. Besides, I am against all post deletions,  
except on facebook when people use your wall for advertising, or when  
they repeat insults.


What would be nice is an ability to edit mails, for the typo.

Bruno




On 17 August 2014 17:23, LizR  wrote:
Never mind, you stated your position nice and clearly, perhaps more  
clearly than you normally do on the EL.


(...or is that why you're saying "OOPS!" ? :-)


On 17 August 2014 16:54, meekerdb  wrote:
OOPS! I didn't intend to post this to the everything-list; although  
it may serve as an introduction for James Lindsay if he decides to  
join the list.  I wrote to him after reading his book "dot dot do"  
which is about infinity in mathematics and philosophy.


Brent


On 8/16/2014 9:28 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote:

Hi Brent,

Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a  
refinement of language. I also think of it as a specialization of  
philosophy, or even a highly distilled variant upon it with  
limitedscope. Indeed, I frequently conceive of  
mathematics as a branch of philosophy where we (mostly) agree upon  
the axioms and (mostly) know we're talking about abstract ideas,  
to be distinguished from what I feel like I get from many  
philosophers.


I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal,


Here's his paper that describes his TOE.  It rests on two points  
for which he gives arguments: (1) If consciousness is instantiated  
by certain computational processes which could be realized in  
different media (so there's nothing "magici" about them being done  
in brains) then they can exist the way arithmetic exist (i.e. in  
"platonia").  And in platonia there is a universal dovetailer, UD,  
that computes everything computable (and more), so it instantiates  
all possible conscious thoughts including those that cause us to  
infer the existence of an external physical world.  The problem  
with his theory, which he recognizes, is that this apparently  
instantiates too much.  But as physicist like Max Tegmark,  
Vilenkin, and Krause talk about eternal inflation and infinitely  
many universes in which all possible physics is realized, maybe the  
UD doesn't produce too much.  He thinks he can show that what it  
produces is like quantum mechanics except for a measure zero.  But  
I'm not convinced his measure is more than wishful thinking.


He's a nice fellow though and not a crank.  So if you'd like to  
engage him on any of this you can join the discussion list everything-list@googlegroups.com 
.


and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less everything,  
based upon computation or even computation theories. I remain a  
bit skeptical of them, and overall, I would suggest that such  
things are likely to be theories of everything, which is to say  
still on the map side of the map/terrain divide.


I agree.  But some people assume that there must be some ultimate  
ontology of ur-stuff that exists necessarily - and mathematical  
objects are their favorite candidates (if they're not religious).   
I don't think this is a compelling argument since I regard numbers  
as inventions (not necessarily human - likely evolution invented  
them).  I think of ontologies as the stuff that is in our   
theories.  Since theories are invented to explain things they may  
ultimately be circular, sort of like: mathematics-> physics->  
chemistry->biology-> intelligence-> mathematics.  So you can start  
with whatever you think you understand.  If this circle of  
explanation is big enough to include everything, then I claim it's  
"virtuously" circular.


Brent
"What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!"
 --- Norm Levitt, after Quine



Regarding your note about my Chapter 2, that's an interesting  
point that he raises, and interestingly, I don't wholly disagree  
with him that it is an integral feature of arithmetic that it is  
axiomatically incomplete (though maybe I thought differently when  
I wrote the book). Particularly, I don't think of it as a "bug,"  
but I don't necessarily think of it as a "feature" either. I'm  
pretty neutral to it, and I feel like I was trying to express the  
idea in my book that it reveals mostly how theoretical, as opposed  
to real, mathematics is. I'm not sure about this "more than  
amap" thing yet, as by "map" I just mean abstract  
way to work with reality instead of reality itself and hadn't read  
more into my own statement than that.


I would disagree with him, however, that it is related to the hard  
problem of consciousness, I think, or perhaps it's better to say  
that I'm very skeptical of such a claim. Brains are, however  
"immensely" complex, finite things, and as such, I do not think  
that the lack of a complete axiomatization of arithmetic is likely  
to be 

Re: dot dot dot

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Aug 2014, at 06:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote:

Hi Brent,

Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a  
refinement of language. I also think of it as a specialization of  
philosophy, or even a highly distilled variant upon it with limited  
scope. Indeed, I frequently conceive of mathematics as a branch of  
philosophy where we (mostly) agree upon the axioms and (mostly)  
know we're talking about abstract ideas, to be distinguished from  
what I feel like I get from many philosophers.


I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal,


Here's his paper that describes his TOE.  It rests on two points for  
which he gives arguments: (1) If consciousness is instantiated by  
certain computational processes which could be realized in different  
media (so there's nothing "magici" about them being done in brains)  
then they can exist the way arithmetic exist (i.e. in "platonia").   
And in platonia there is a universal dovetailer, UD, that computes  
everything computable (and more), so it instantiates all possible  
conscious thoughts including those that cause us to infer the  
existence of an external physical world.  The problem with his  
theory, which he recognizes, is that this apparently instantiates  
too much.  But as physicist like Max Tegmark, Vilenkin, and Krause  
talk about eternal inflation and infinitely many universes in which  
all possible physics is realized, maybe the UD doesn't produce too  
much.  He thinks he can show that what it produces is like quantum  
mechanics except for a measure zero.  But I'm not convinced his  
measure is more than wishful thinking.


Hmm ... You should say instead:  "he claims having proved that if the  
brain works like a digital computer, then physics is given by a  
measure on all computations, making comp + some theory of knowledge  
testable, but I think there is a flaw.


The existence of that measure is a consequence of "taking comp  
seriously enough", without adding ad hoc selection principles. It  
might be wishful thinking, but then the point would be that  
computationalism would be itself wishful thinking.







He's a nice fellow though and not a crank.  So if you'd like to  
engage him on any of this you can join the discussion list everything-list@googlegroups.com 
.


Thanks Brent.




and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less everything,  
based upon computation or even computation theories. I remain a bit  
skeptical of them, and overall, I would suggest that such things  
are likely to be theories of everything, which is to say still on  
the map side of the map/terrain divide.


I agree.  But some people assume that there must be some ultimate  
ontology of ur-stuff that exists necessarily - and mathematical  
objects are their favorite candidates (if they're not religious).


But I disagree. There is no ur-stuff at all. There is an appearance of  
ur-stuff. Numbers or combinators are not stuff. Nothing is made-of  
numbers, but numbers relation can support hallucination, when we  
suppose comp, and the hard part of the mind-body problem consists in  
explaining the stability of some those hallucinations, as there is an  
inflation of dreams in the arithmetical reality (with dreams in the  
large sense of computation enough rich to support the activity in the  
brain of a conscious person at the right level or below).


Despite with comp we can take (N, +, *) as the ultimate reality,  
science like physics or theology remains quite distinct from number  
theory per se. Arithmetic is the absolute reality, but only because we  
are willing to commit the religious act of faith of believing in some  
technological reincarnation.






I don't think this is a compelling argument since I regard numbers  
as inventions (not necessarily human - likely evolution invented  
them).  I think of ontologies as the stuff that is in our theories.   
Since theories are invented to explain things they may ultimately be  
circular, sort of like: mathematics-> physics-> chemistry->biology->  
intelligence-> mathematics.  So you can start with whatever you  
think you understand.  If this circle of explanation is big enough  
to include everything, then I claim it's "virtuously" circular.


But mathematics, even arithmetic are not theories, they are realities  
or realms. The theory are PA, or, in a slightly larger sense, machine,  
bodies, finite piece of thing.


With comp you can start from any Turing complete theory, without  
adding any extra ontology, which will reappear as appearance from the  
internal, first person view, of the enough rich self-observers whose  
existence is a consequence of the axioms defining the Turing complete  
theory we start with. That can lead to some virtuous circle, running  
in a non circular way.


Bruno





Brent
"What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!"
 --- Norm Levitt, after Quine



Regarding your note about my Chapter 2

Re: dot dot dot

[LizR]

PS You do know you can delete posts from the EL, don't you?


On 17 August 2014 17:23, LizR  wrote:

> Never mind, you stated your position nice and clearly, perhaps more
> clearly than you normally do on the EL.
>
> (...or is that why you're saying "OOPS!" ? :-)
>
>
> On 17 August 2014 16:54, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  OOPS! I didn't intend to post this to the everything-list; although it
>> may serve as an introduction for James Lindsay if he decides to join the
>> list.  I wrote to him after reading his book "dot dot do" which is about
>> infinity in mathematics and philosophy.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>> On 8/16/2014 9:28 PM, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>> On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote:
>>
>>Hi Brent,
>>
>>  Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a
>> refinement of language. I also think of it as a specialization of
>> philosophy, or even a highly distilled variant upon it with limited scope.
>> Indeed, I frequently conceive of mathematics as a branch of philosophy
>> where we (mostly) agree upon the axioms and (mostly) know we're talking
>> about abstract ideas, to be distinguished from what I feel like I get from
>> many philosophers.
>>
>>  I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal,
>>
>>
>> Here's his paper that describes his TOE.  It rests on two points for
>> which he gives arguments: (1) If consciousness is instantiated by certain
>> computational processes which could be realized in different media (so
>> there's nothing "magici" about them being done in brains) then they can
>> exist the way arithmetic exist (i.e. in "platonia").  And in platonia there
>> is a universal dovetailer, UD, that computes everything computable (and
>> more), so it instantiates all possible conscious thoughts including those
>> that cause us to infer the existence of an external physical world.  The
>> problem with his theory, which he recognizes, is that this apparently
>> instantiates too much.  But as physicist like Max Tegmark, Vilenkin, and
>> Krause talk about eternal inflation and infinitely many universes in which
>> all possible physics is realized, maybe the UD doesn't produce too much.
>> He thinks he can show that what it produces is like quantum mechanics
>> except for a measure zero.  But I'm not convinced his measure is more than
>> wishful thinking.
>>
>> He's a nice fellow though and not a crank.  So if you'd like to engage
>> him on any of this you can join the discussion list
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>>
>>and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less everything,
>> based upon computation or even computation theories. I remain a bit
>> skeptical of them, and overall, I would suggest that such things are likely
>> to be *theories* of everything, which is to say still on the map side of
>> the map/terrain divide.
>>
>>
>> I agree.  But some people assume that there must be some ultimate
>> ontology of ur-stuff that exists necessarily - and mathematical objects are
>> their favorite candidates (if they're not religious).  I don't think this
>> is a compelling argument since I regard numbers as inventions (not
>> necessarily human - likely evolution invented them).  I think of ontologies
>> as the stuff that is in our theories.  Since theories are invented to
>> explain things they may ultimately be circular, sort of like: mathematics->
>> physics-> chemistry->biology-> intelligence-> mathematics.  So you can
>> start with whatever you think you understand.  If this circle of
>> explanation is big enough to include everything, then I claim it's
>> "virtuously" circular.
>>
>> Brent
>> "What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!"
>>  --- Norm Levitt, after Quine
>>
>>
>>  Regarding your note about my Chapter 2, that's an interesting point that
>> he raises, and interestingly, I don't wholly disagree with him that it is
>> an integral feature of arithmetic that it is axiomatically incomplete
>> (though maybe I thought differently when I wrote the book). Particularly, I
>> don't think of it as a "bug," but I don't necessarily think of it as a
>> "feature" either. I'm pretty neutral to it, and I feel like I was trying to
>> express the idea in my book that it reveals mostly how theoretical, as
>> opposed to real, mathematics is. I'm not sure about this "more than a map"
>> thing yet, as by "map" I just mean abstract way to work with reality
>> instead of reality itself and hadn't read more into my own statement than
>> that.
>>
>>  I would disagree with him, however, that it is related to the hard
>> problem of consciousness, I think, or perhaps it's better to say that I'm
>> very skeptical of such a claim. Brains are, however "immensely" complex,
>> finite things, and as such, I do not think that the lack of a complete
>> axiomatization of arithmetic is likely to be integrally related to the hard
>> problem of consciousness. Maybe I just don't understand what he's getting
>> at, though. Who knows?
>>
>>  I also tend to agree with you--in some se

Re: dot dot dot

[LizR]

Never mind, you stated your position nice and clearly, perhaps more clearly
than you normally do on the EL.

(...or is that why you're saying "OOPS!" ? :-)


On 17 August 2014 16:54, meekerdb  wrote:

>  OOPS! I didn't intend to post this to the everything-list; although it
> may serve as an introduction for James Lindsay if he decides to join the
> list.  I wrote to him after reading his book "dot dot do" which is about
> infinity in mathematics and philosophy.
>
> Brent
>
>
> On 8/16/2014 9:28 PM, meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote:
>
>Hi Brent,
>
>  Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a refinement
> of language. I also think of it as a specialization of philosophy, or even
> a highly distilled variant upon it with limited scope. Indeed, I frequently
> conceive of mathematics as a branch of philosophy where we (mostly) agree
> upon the axioms and (mostly) know we're talking about abstract ideas, to be
> distinguished from what I feel like I get from many philosophers.
>
>  I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal,
>
>
> Here's his paper that describes his TOE.  It rests on two points for which
> he gives arguments: (1) If consciousness is instantiated by certain
> computational processes which could be realized in different media (so
> there's nothing "magici" about them being done in brains) then they can
> exist the way arithmetic exist (i.e. in "platonia").  And in platonia there
> is a universal dovetailer, UD, that computes everything computable (and
> more), so it instantiates all possible conscious thoughts including those
> that cause us to infer the existence of an external physical world.  The
> problem with his theory, which he recognizes, is that this apparently
> instantiates too much.  But as physicist like Max Tegmark, Vilenkin, and
> Krause talk about eternal inflation and infinitely many universes in which
> all possible physics is realized, maybe the UD doesn't produce too much.
> He thinks he can show that what it produces is like quantum mechanics
> except for a measure zero.  But I'm not convinced his measure is more than
> wishful thinking.
>
> He's a nice fellow though and not a crank.  So if you'd like to engage him
> on any of this you can join the discussion list
> everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>
>and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less everything,
> based upon computation or even computation theories. I remain a bit
> skeptical of them, and overall, I would suggest that such things are likely
> to be *theories* of everything, which is to say still on the map side of
> the map/terrain divide.
>
>
> I agree.  But some people assume that there must be some ultimate ontology
> of ur-stuff that exists necessarily - and mathematical objects are their
> favorite candidates (if they're not religious).  I don't think this is a
> compelling argument since I regard numbers as inventions (not necessarily
> human - likely evolution invented them).  I think of ontologies as the
> stuff that is in our theories.  Since theories are invented to explain
> things they may ultimately be circular, sort of like: mathematics->
> physics-> chemistry->biology-> intelligence-> mathematics.  So you can
> start with whatever you think you understand.  If this circle of
> explanation is big enough to include everything, then I claim it's
> "virtuously" circular.
>
> Brent
> "What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!"
>  --- Norm Levitt, after Quine
>
>
>  Regarding your note about my Chapter 2, that's an interesting point that
> he raises, and interestingly, I don't wholly disagree with him that it is
> an integral feature of arithmetic that it is axiomatically incomplete
> (though maybe I thought differently when I wrote the book). Particularly, I
> don't think of it as a "bug," but I don't necessarily think of it as a
> "feature" either. I'm pretty neutral to it, and I feel like I was trying to
> express the idea in my book that it reveals mostly how theoretical, as
> opposed to real, mathematics is. I'm not sure about this "more than a map"
> thing yet, as by "map" I just mean abstract way to work with reality
> instead of reality itself and hadn't read more into my own statement than
> that.
>
>  I would disagree with him, however, that it is related to the hard
> problem of consciousness, I think, or perhaps it's better to say that I'm
> very skeptical of such a claim. Brains are, however "immensely" complex,
> finite things, and as such, I do not think that the lack of a complete
> axiomatization of arithmetic is likely to be integrally related to the hard
> problem of consciousness. Maybe I just don't understand what he's getting
> at, though. Who knows?
>
>  I also tend to agree with you--in some senses--about the ultrafinitists
> probably being right. My distinction is that I'm fine with infinity as a
> kind of fiction that we play with or use to make calculus/analysis more
> accessible. I certainly

Re: dot dot dot

[meekerdb]

OOPS! I didn't intend to post this to the everything-list; although it may serve as an 
introduction for James Lindsay if he decides to join the list.  I wrote to him after 
reading his book "dot dot do" which is about infinity in mathematics and philosophy.


Brent

On 8/16/2014 9:28 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote:

Hi Brent,

Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a refinement of language. 
I also think of it as a specialization of philosophy, or even a highly distilled 
variant upon it with limited scope. Indeed, I frequently conceive of mathematics as a 
branch of philosophy where we (mostly) agree upon the axioms and (mostly) know we're 
talking about abstract ideas, to be distinguished from what I feel like I get from many 
philosophers.


I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal,


Here's his paper that describes his TOE.  It rests on two points for which he gives 
arguments: (1) If consciousness is instantiated by certain computational processes which 
could be realized in different media (so there's nothing "magici" about them being done 
in brains) then they can exist the way arithmetic exist (i.e. in "platonia").  And in 
platonia there is a universal dovetailer, UD, that computes everything computable (and 
more), so it instantiates all possible conscious thoughts including those that cause us 
to infer the existence of an external physical world.  The problem with his theory, 
which he recognizes, is that this apparently instantiates too much.  But as physicist 
like Max Tegmark, Vilenkin, and Krause talk about eternal inflation and infinitely many 
universes in which all possible physics is realized, maybe the UD doesn't produce too 
much.  He thinks he can show that what it produces is like quantum mechanics except for 
a measure zero. But I'm not convinced his measure is more than wishful thinking.


He's a nice fellow though and not a crank.  So if you'd like to engage him on any of 
this you can join the discussion list everything-list@googlegroups.com.


and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less everything, based upon 
computation or even computation theories. I remain a bit skeptical of them, and 
overall, I would suggest that such things are likely to be /theories/ of everything, 
which is to say still on the map side of the map/terrain divide.


I agree.  But some people assume that there must be some ultimate ontology of ur-stuff 
that exists necessarily - and mathematical objects are their favorite candidates (if 
they're not religious). I don't think this is a compelling argument since I regard 
numbers as inventions (not necessarily human - likely evolution invented them).  I think 
of ontologies as the stuff that is in our theories.  Since theories are invented to 
explain things they may ultimately be circular, sort of like: mathematics-> physics-> 
chemistry->biology-> intelligence-> mathematics.  So you can start with whatever you 
think you understand.  If this circle of explanation is big enough to include 
everything, then I claim it's "virtuously" circular.


Brent
"What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!"
 --- Norm Levitt, after Quine



Regarding your note about my Chapter 2, that's an interesting point that he raises, and 
interestingly, I don't wholly disagree with him that it is an integral feature of 
arithmetic that it is axiomatically incomplete (though maybe I thought differently when 
I wrote the book). Particularly, I don't think of it as a "bug," but I don't 
necessarily think of it as a "feature" either. I'm pretty neutral to it, and I feel 
like I was trying to express the idea in my book that it reveals mostly how 
theoretical, as opposed to real, mathematics is. I'm not sure about this "more than a 
map" thing yet, as by "map" I just mean abstract way to work with reality instead of 
reality itself and hadn't read more into my own statement than that.


I would disagree with him, however, that it is related to the hard problem of 
consciousness, I think, or perhaps it's better to say that I'm very skeptical of such a 
claim. Brains are, however "immensely" complex, finite things, and as such, I do not 
think that the lack of a complete axiomatization of arithmetic is likely to be 
integrally related to the hard problem of consciousness. Maybe I just don't understand 
what he's getting at, though. Who knows?


I also tend to agree with you--in some senses--about the ultrafinitists probably being 
right. My distinction is that I'm fine with infinity as a kind of fiction that we play 
with or use to make calculus/analysis more accessible. I certainly agree with you that 
infinity probably shouldn't be taken too seriously, particularly once they start 
getting weird and (relatively) huge.


There's something interesting to think about, though, when it comes to the ideas of 
some infinities being larger than others. I was thinking a bit about it the other day, 
in fact. Tha

Re: dot dot dot

[meekerdb]

On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote:

Hi Brent,

Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a refinement of language. I 
also think of it as a specialization of philosophy, or even a highly distilled variant 
upon it with limited scope. Indeed, I frequently conceive of mathematics as a branch of 
philosophy where we (mostly) agree upon the axioms and (mostly) know we're talking about 
abstract ideas, to be distinguished from what I feel like I get from many philosophers.


I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal,


Here's his paper that describes his TOE.  It rests on two points for which he gives 
arguments: (1) If consciousness is instantiated by certain computational processes which 
could be realized in different media (so there's nothing "magici" about them being done in 
brains) then they can exist the way arithmetic exist (i.e. in "platonia"). And in platonia 
there is a universal dovetailer, UD, that computes everything computable (and more), so it 
instantiates all possible conscious thoughts including those that cause us to infer the 
existence of an external physical world.  The problem with his theory, which he 
recognizes, is that this apparently instantiates too much.  But as physicist like Max 
Tegmark, Vilenkin, and Krause talk about eternal inflation and infinitely many universes 
in which all possible physics is realized, maybe the UD doesn't produce too much.  He 
thinks he can show that what it produces is like quantum mechanics except for a measure 
zero.  But I'm not convinced his measure is more than wishful thinking.


He's a nice fellow though and not a crank.  So if you'd like to engage him on any of this 
you can join the discussion list everything-list@googlegroups.com.


and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less everything, based upon 
computation or even computation theories. I remain a bit skeptical of them, and overall, 
I would suggest that such things are likely to be /theories/ of everything, which is to 
say still on the map side of the map/terrain divide.


I agree.  But some people assume that there must be some ultimate ontology of ur-stuff 
that exists necessarily - and mathematical objects are their favorite candidates (if 
they're not religious).  I don't think this is a compelling argument since I regard 
numbers as inventions (not necessarily human - likely evolution invented them).  I think 
of ontologies as the stuff that is in our theories. Since theories are invented to explain 
things they may ultimately be circular, sort of like: mathematics-> physics-> 
chemistry->biology-> intelligence-> mathematics.  So you can start with whatever you think 
you understand.  If this circle of explanation is big enough to include everything, then I 
claim it's "virtuously" circular.


Brent
"What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!"
 --- Norm Levitt, after Quine



Regarding your note about my Chapter 2, that's an interesting point that he raises, and 
interestingly, I don't wholly disagree with him that it is an integral feature of 
arithmetic that it is axiomatically incomplete (though maybe I thought differently when 
I wrote the book). Particularly, I don't think of it as a "bug," but I don't necessarily 
think of it as a "feature" either. I'm pretty neutral to it, and I feel like I was 
trying to express the idea in my book that it reveals mostly how theoretical, as opposed 
to real, mathematics is. I'm not sure about this "more than a map" thing yet, as by 
"map" I just mean abstract way to work with reality instead of reality itself and hadn't 
read more into my own statement than that.


I would disagree with him, however, that it is related to the hard problem of 
consciousness, I think, or perhaps it's better to say that I'm very skeptical of such a 
claim. Brains are, however "immensely" complex, finite things, and as such, I do not 
think that the lack of a complete axiomatization of arithmetic is likely to be 
integrally related to the hard problem of consciousness. Maybe I just don't understand 
what he's getting at, though. Who knows?


I also tend to agree with you--in some senses--about the ultrafinitists probably being 
right. My distinction is that I'm fine with infinity as a kind of fiction that we play 
with or use to make calculus/analysis more accessible. I certainly agree with you that 
infinity probably shouldn't be taken too seriously, particularly once they start getting 
weird and (relatively) huge.


There's something interesting to think about, though, when it comes to the ideas of some 
infinities being larger than others. I was thinking a bit about it the other day, in 
fact. That seems to be a necessary consequence of little more than certain definitions 
on certain kinds of sets (with "infinite" perhaps not even necessary here, using the 
finitists' "indefinite" instead) and one-to-one correspondences.


Anyway, thanks again for the note.

Kindly,
James


On Sat, Aug 16, 2014 at