Re: FIN Again (was: Re: James Higgo)

2001-08-30 Thread Jacques Mallah
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] I don't understand your objection. It seems to me that it is perfectly coherent to imagine a TOE which includes both a universal objective measure on the set of all observer-moments and also a relative conditional probability which tells me what the

RE: FIN

2001-08-30 Thread Charles Goodwin
Hi, I have just joined this list after seeing it mentioned on the Fabric of Reality list Would someone mind briefly explaining what FIN is (or at least what the letters stand for)? Is it some version of QTI (Quantum theory of immortality) ? Assuming it *is* related to QTI... Why should a

Re: FIN

2001-08-30 Thread Saibal Mitra
Jacques Mallah wrote: From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jacques Mallah wrote: `` I have repeated pointed out the obvious consequence that if that were true, then a typical observer would find himself to be much older than the apparent lifetime of his species would allow; the fact that

Re: FIN

2001-08-30 Thread Jacques Mallah
From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] You wrote earlier that consciousness can't be transferred to a copy. But consciousness isn't transferred, the copies had the same consciousness already because they were identical. No, they weren't _identical_. They were different people, who happened

RE: FIN too

2001-08-30 Thread Jacques Mallah
From: Charles Goodwin [EMAIL PROTECTED] Hi, I have just joined this list after seeing it mentioned on the Fabric of Reality list Hi. BTW, what's up on the FOR list? Ever see anything interesting there? I thought the book sucked except for chapter 2 (I think; the one explaining the

Re: FIN

2001-08-30 Thread rwas
Hello, One might take the position that consciousness just is..., and is focused at a particular point we might call an identity. If we assume time is an illusion, the idea of being much older than the apparent vehicle consciousness, would hold. As for the statement: I exist because somewhere I